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JPRS-NEA-84-019

1 FEBRUARY 1984

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Near East/South Asia Report

19980319 121

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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1 February 1984

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FLN NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS EXAMINED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 16-22 Dec 83 pp 12-16

[Article by Z. Gadouche: "The Tie That Binds"]

[Text] "It is through strengthening the alliance among the workers, the peasants, the junud, the young, and all patriotic revolutionary elements that the Revolution will become invincible and that it will find strength to advance resolutely along the path of socialism." (National Charter)
[Constitution]

Basically, Article 120 [of the Constitution] aims at nothing but a harmonious ordering of relations between the FLN and its national organizations, which in and of itself will consolidate the rank-and-file membership. It must be apparent to everyone that the Party's contribution to strengthening the mass organizations would not be possible in the absence of several important conditions.

We do not, however, lose sight of the fact that, while the inspiration, guidance, and orientation of the mass organizations is one of the Party's primary roles, this does not mean that the Party has ever, at any time, been tempted to replace those organizations and thereby weaken their drive and initiative.

The tie that binds the FLN and its national organizations (the mass organizations and the trade and cultural unions) necessarily implies that the latter be led by fully trained Party members, deeply convinced of the rightness of the action they undertake within the framework of coordination with the Party. It is certain, in any case, that this statutory measure, while lacking any special dimension -- as some have tried to make us believe it embodied -- has made it possible for all the unions, whose congresses met regularly throughout the long period between the two FLN Congresses, effectively to accomplish their mission, both vis-à-vis the Party and in connection with their specific action.

Some 3 years ago, when the Party decided to set up Party cells in the state-owned companies, some people found reason to disagree with that decision and to criticize both the form and the rationale for the measure. It would have been far more startling if that had not been the case.

Today, more than a thousand company cells have been established, enhancing the Party's presence in a great many areas of activity. The company cell is a structure that lives cheek by jowl with the traditional agencies, and the law clearly defines each one's responsibilities and authority vis-à-vis the other.

In this way, a fundamental need, repeatedly expressed, for Party organization of every sector of national activity has been translated into the establishment of Party cells in the work-place. Just what, precisely, is their mission?

Their goals are crystal-clear: they share in consciousness-raising, in raising the political level, in ideological training, and in the organization of the working masses, as well as in the preservation and protection of the rights the people have won and in the deepening and expansion of those rights. The Party's action here is not so much a one-time action as it is an operation in depth whose ultimate goals are far in the future. In short, the company cell is part of the organizing effort put forth by the FLN, which has also launched upon a far-reaching program of ideological training. After all, isn't it through ideological and political indoctrination of Party members, by keeping them constantly informed, that we can achieve the unity of thought and action to which we aspire? This unity which, once it begins to gain in strength and to thrive, can develop a new dynamics of its own, which will perforce assert a positive influence on everything relevant to its action, and will shape and guide proper implementation of its political line.

For quite some time this training and indoctrination consisted of study by the rank-and-file of some very deep and complicated syllabi, which, from this point of view, proved very productive. There is no question but that there could be no hindrance to the ideological indoctrination of Party members, since the nation's political decisions, upheld by institutions which have stood the test of the most trying events conceivable, could not be clearer. An ideological action which will enable the Party to sharpen the political consciousness of the masses implies rejection of any and all interim or short-term situations and practices. Enhancing the Party's will to fight, rooting the habit of criticism and self-criticism in its heart, encouraging unity among its members, fighting against waste and disorder, against nepotism and against parochialism -- all these constitute a program whose execution will come about through the growth and deepening of sound political and ideological training and through keeping pace with the

issues and demands of the day, particularly during the qualitatively new phase upon which we are embarking. It is, therefore, an area which merits all the attention we can devote to it.

In the course of its four sessions (December 1980, June and December 1981, and June 1982), the Central Committee had approved several projects, to wit: energy, health, culture, the private sector, public information, and youth. Matters so important as these, dealing with the future of the nation, will assuredly leave no one unconcerned.

Decisions and Their Execution

The interest the political leadership takes in matters of such great import is matched by its determination to meet the needs of the people. However, the question that immediately arises is whether or not all the projects approved, all the measures taken, all the decisions handed down and all the formal texts issued will at least be implemented. The main thing is not just to devise theories: the theories must be tested in practice.

Accordingly, the work of the 8th session of the Central Committee was devoted to a survey of the status of decisions taken by the political leadership in the areas of agriculture, water power, housing, tourism, and energy. This session was part of the continuing scrutiny and evaluation operations conducted by the Party, in line with its program of action and in implementation of President Chadli's guidelines and directives, including his Instruction No 30, whose burden was an overall evaluation of the various activities of the Party and of the mass organizations and the elected assemblies, as well as the status of national development projects incorporated in the 5-year Plan.

Obviously, a project that has not actually been brought to fruition is of no practical use. This is a principle which the head of state has constantly emphasized over the past 5 years.

By way of example, in the area of foreign relations, the FLN has undertaken several major policy steps consonant with the foreign policy goals written into the basic law of the land.

Faithfully reflecting domestic policy, foreign policy based on justice and on the right of all peoples to self-determination has been very active, to the point that the Central Committee, at its 6th session, "notes with satisfaction the positive results achieved by the Party in its relations with various brother and friendly parties, reaffirms its concern with watching over these relations as they mature, and with supporting all just causes and all peoples struggling for their independence, their freedom, and their sovereignty. "

OVERALL STATISTICS ON FLN PARTY MEMBERS ACTIVE IN MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Année	O.N.M. 2)		U.N.P.A. 3)		U.G.T.A. 4)		U.N.J.A. 5)		U.N.F.A. 6)		Unions 7) professionnelles	
	Milit.	Candid.	Milit.	Candid.	Milit.	Candid.	Milit.	Candid.	Milit.	Candid.	Milit.	Candid.
1980	4429		47843		53278		13338		1777			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1981	57836	436	59835	9181	69509	17297	16422	7463	2923	482	5502	1314
	+23.17%		+20%		+23.35%		+18.77%		+39.20%			
1982	58786	82	61498	7210	74371	15631	18320	6187	2279	383	5081	1105
	+1.61%	-431.17%	+270%	-27.33%	+6.53%	-10.65%	+10.36%	-20.62%	-28.25%	-25.84%	-8.28%	-18.91%
1983	57398	104	63606	3999	83047	13388	20777	5832	2710	398	6965	759
1er semes	-2.41%	+21.15%	+3.31%	-20.18%	+10.44%	-16.75%	+11.82%	-608%	+16%	+3.76%	+27.04%	-46.94%

KEY:

- (1) Years 1980, '81, '82, and first-half 1983
- (2) National Veterans' Organization
- (3) National Peasants' Union
- (4) General Union of Algerian Workers
- (5) National Movement of Algerian Youth
- (6) Algerian Women's Union
- (7) Trade Unions
- (8) Active Member (FLN)
- (9) Candidate for membership

Furthermore, we have seen a net increase over recent years in exchanges of delegations between the FLN and various parties all over the world. This came about because our Party, aside from its long-standing ties with the organizations of Third-World countries and those of the socialist countries, has made contact with progressive parties in the Western world, with which we find much common ground, even though there are occasionally fine points on which they may differ. This approach stems from a realistic view of international relations at a time when we descry a spurt of growth in the West by progressive and anti-imperialist parties.

Our country's solidarity with just causes throughout the world is demonstrated in several forms: political, diplomatic, and material. Our armed revolution did indeed forge and temper the Algerian citizen and hone his sense of justice to a razor edge.

The principles of liberty, of justice, and of the independence of peoples, for which we fought tooth and nail during our struggle for liberation, were consolidated with the birth of independent Algeria. The FLN philosophy starts with the fact that any occupation of a land, any oppression of a people, is inherently unjust, and that injustice will lead, sooner or later, to an awakening of consciousness and to resistance -- in which there is always the risk of an expansion of hostilities threatening the peace.

As an active member of the Non-Aligned Nations Movement, Algeria has tirelessly worked to make it stronger and to extend its influence on the nature of the international relations that govern the world. In this context, the Party has multiplied its contacts with all Parties committed to the principles of non-alignment. Hence, according to the recommendations of the 4th Congress, /"Solidarity among progressive and democratic forces all over the world with the national liberation movement is a major factor in the dawning awareness of the international community as to the problems of decolonization and liberation of peoples."/ On this score, the Congress /"reaffirms the FLN Party's commitment to continue its action with a view to broadening this solidarity by every means, including ongoing concerted action with all the world's progressive parties and strengthening the anti-imperialist front, particularly in the Third World."/

Remarkable Political Stability

"The strength of the FLN lies in its indissoluble ties with the people. The Party cannot organize and mobilize the masses unless it wins their confidence." (National Charter)

The practical aid extended by the FLN to the revolutions under way in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America is considerable at

OVERALL STATISTICS ON COMPANY CELLS

YEAR	CELLS		ACTIVE MEMBERS		CANDIDATES	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1981	1,260		25,808		1,903	
1982	1,472	+ 14.40	29,593	+ 12.80	2,661	+ 28.48
1st-half 1983	2,005	+ 26.58	42,445	+ 30.27	2,354	- 13.04
		+ 40.98		+ 43.07		

STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN BY AGE-GROUPS

Year	18-30		31-40		41-50		51-60		over 60	
	Members	Candi- dates	Members	Candi- dates	Members	Candi- dates	Members	Candi- dates	Members	Candi- dates
1880	38,141		53,384		56,695		39,127		22,369	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1981	43,912	22.396	58,980	15.418	56,205	3.969	49,550	1,531	24,189	338
	+ 15,13		+ 10.48		- 0.86		+ 26.63		+ 8.13	
1982	49,724	21,113	73,928	14,662	60,644	2,806	43,744			
	+ 13.23	- 9.37	+ 25.34	- 4.90	+ 7.89	- 31.82	- 11.65	- 49.05	+ 8.25	- 19.82
1st-half 1983	51,944	17,175	72,408	11,731	57,052	2,073	41,056	685	23,447	249
	+ 4.46	-18.65	- 2.05	-19.99	-4.93	-23.39	- 6.21	- 12.17	-10.45	- 8.11

a number of levels. Our country's energetic action is remarkable on that score. This is so for obvious reasons. The Party's support for the Palestinian Revolution and for the struggle of the Saharan people is, in the last analysis, part of its unflagging efforts on behalf of just causes, wherever they may be.

Not a single joint communique signed at the conclusion of FLN meetings with various political parties has omitted forceful emphasis on Algeria's principal positions on international issues. Most frequently, our Party makes its contribution to the resolution of certain problems, sometimes proffering its good offices as mediator, and sometimes suggesting solutions which have always been taken very seriously, largely by reason of the prestige our revolution enjoys throughout the world, of its remarkable political stability, and of its credibility, which it enjoys primarily because of its fidelity to the principles it has staunchly upheld from the beginning.

The FLN's Secretary-General, President Chadli Benjedid, by making frequent visits to Arab, African, and socialist countries, has brought strength to the international actions of our country, which is itself Arab, African, progressive, and non-aligned. This has enabled us to develop a dynamics of interplay and of reinforcing ties of friendship and brotherhood between the FLN and the parties concerned on the one hand, and between Algeria and the Arab, African, and Central European countries on the other.

At the Mediterranean level, the FLN has been particularly active on behalf of the recent victories of Socialist Parties in Europe (France, Portugal, Greece, and Spain), and that opened up new prospects for bilateral relations.

The deterioration of the international climate, and increasingly sinister threats that hang over the Mediterranean, led progressive forces in the region to take the initiative in jointly considering implementation of a program for concerted action. As a consequence, in response to the initiative of the FLN, the Yugoslav Communists' League, and the Panhellenic Socialist Party, a meeting of Mediterranean progressive parties was held in 28 and 29 April in Athens. All present made a point of reaffirming their support for the Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Cypriot, and Saharan people, in favor of whom support and sympathy actions will be jointly organized by the Mediterranean progressive parties and movements.

The positive good-neighbor policy adopted by our country has led to boundary agreements covering our national frontiers with Niger, Mali, and Tunisia. In addition, the dream of building the Great Arab Maghreb, so dear to our country, is beginning, little by little, to come true. Initially, this action has led to closer relations between Algeria and Tunisia. However, the Western Sahara problem, as the Central Committee noted during its meeting last

STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY EDUCATIONAL LEVELS

Year	None		Elementary		Middle		Secondary		Higher	
	Sans niveau		Primaire		Moyen		Secondaire		Supérieur	
	Militants	Candidates	Militants	Candidates	Militants	Candidates	Militants	Candidates	Militants	Candidates
1980	93.939		57.712		28.577		20.946		6.701	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1981	100.779	11.383	62.056	12.284	32.533	10.387	21.682	7.214	8.122	2.459
	+7.28%		+8.56%		+13.84%		+3.51%		+21.20%	
1982	107.454	93.358	69.363	37.278	9.713		24.235	7.641	10.166	2.660
	+6.62%	-17.78%	+10.70%	-13%	+14.58%	-6.48%	+11.77%	-6.55%	+25.16%	+8.17%
1983 1er 3 Semest.	96.935	5.549	69.967	8.417	43.790	8.007	28.001	5.613	11.208	2.274
	-9.78%	-30.01%	+0.87%	-21.24%	+17.46%	-17.56%	+16.53%	-16.73%	+10.24%	-14.51%

KEY:

- (1) Active Members
- (2) Candidates for Membership
- (3) First-half 1983

June, /"constitutes an obstacle to the creation of the Great Arab Maghreb,/" and that, in view of this situation, Algeria is still committed to working /"for the reconciliation of the brother peoples of Morocco and the Western Sahara, in observance of the UN and OAU resolutions."/ The meeting between President Chadli and King Hassan II of Morocco demonstrate Algeria's readiness to help solve this problem along the lines of the United Nations and Organization of African Unity resolutions.

"Lax control is the source of abuse and indifference, not to say corruption. It creates the conditions for degeneration of the revolutionary phenomenon and, in the end, for its suffocation."
(The Constitution)

All these actions conducted over the past 5 years drew their inspiration in general from the Constitution and from the provisions in its subsidiary texts. But, were we to make an analysis of the Party's difficulties during that period, and to assess all the work actually done, we should have to take into account all the political, organic, institutional, economic, social, and cultural goals, simply because every government body (legislative or executive) operates according to its guidelines laid down by the FLN, while respecting the separation of functions.

"The Party is strong only insofar as its members are the most dedicated of fighters for the people's interests." (Constitution)

As we look at the record, we find that political activity in our country has been extremely fruitful. Fruitful, because democracy has not been relegated to the sidelines; fruitful, too, because our political discourse has consistently matched our action; intensive, because the Party member aware of his responsibilities, listening dispassionately to what the various political factions have to say, has been immune to the temptations of deviation; of paramount importance, finally, because the winnowing process has come about normally and naturally. Once spelled out plainly, the struggle to which the Party is committed is not quite so simple as people often tend to think.

As we look to the future, and look back upon the long road the nation has traveled in a few short years, we can better appreciate the material and, above all, the human effort that we have had to pour into it. And that is inestimable.

And so it is, bearing in mind all aspects of the situation the country faces now, the basic phases it has gone through and the generally salutary results it has achieved in all domains, that we can safely say that the 5th FLN Congress has all the odds on its side to guarantee the success of its undertaking and to respond to the people's concerns, in the firm conviction that it is vital to the nation's future.

ALGERIA'S AFRICAN POLICY ANALYZED

Bendjedid's Views on Some African Problems

Dakar AFRICA in French No 155 pp 19-21, 23

[Article by Bachir Bousdira: "The Event: Chadli Chooses Africa"]

[Text] President Abdou Diouf's visit to Algiers and President Chadli's arrival in Paris are significantly important. The feeling of interest aroused by this reacquaintance, however, far exceeds its bilateral aspect. This renewed association is taking place at a time when Algerian diplomacy is shifting its views on the important African-Maghrebian problems and questioning Algerian-Libyan relations, this thorniest of problems. AFRICA presents an expanded explanation of this situation.

By receiving President Abdou Diouf in Algiers, the Algerian chief of state, Chadli Bendjedid, was conspicuously implementing his African policy which is now becoming evident in its overall design.

Relying on Boumediene's legacy and without challenging the important principles of Algerian policy as embodied in the national charter, Chadli made a double contribution. Firstly, his analysis took into account the real dangers threatening the African continent, which he clearly perceives, namely, being the battleground of indirect confrontations between East and West rivalries or being caught in conflicts which would result in rescinding the principle pertaining to the respect of the frontiers born of the colonial era.

Secondly, the president changed his methods. He would no longer use inflammatory speeches with repetitive denunciations. He chose to practice a quiet diplomacy prompted by a sense of realism, moderation and tolerance. According to him, "We are currently being confronted with the redeployment of world strategies, the result of a tenacious will to sidetrack us from the pursuit of our efforts to implement our aspirations for unity, freedom and development. Consequently," he continued in this excerpt of a speech delivered in Lagos in April 1983, "attempts against the independence, sovereignty and security of African countries are added, in subtle forms, to the last-ditch fights aimed at upholding the last strongholds of colonialism and racism."

To thwart the threats mentioned in his speech has become the Algerian president's obsession, the more so as the conflict in Western Sahara is right on his doorstep. While supporting the POLISARIO in the name of the sacrosanct principle of aid to national liberation movements fighting to promote respect for the decolonization laws, Chadli is aware of the dangers of regional conflagrations inherent in this conflict, especially since the United States has been arming Morocco.

Consequently, that he should persistently advocate a purely African solution to the Saharan issue, under the wing of the OAU, is understandable. His rapprochement with Morocco, as long as the latter recognizes that Algeria was not the one waging war against it, the signing of a good neighbor pact with Tunisia and the border agreements with Niger and, in the near future, Mali and Mauritania are, for Chadli, necessary imperatives if the eradication of the causes of tension and destabilization is to be achieved and the foundations of a true cooperation between neighbors within the strict respect of the regimes in force in each country are to be laid.

The rest of Chadli's African policy is not much different from the one he implements on a regional level. To a certain extent, it is a natural follow-up of that policy. The Chadian conflict, the situation in South Africa, the safeguard of the OAU and the development of economic relations are at the center of his concern.

The Chadian Conflict

The Algerian regime views Chad, more than West Sahara, as an African ill with disastrous repercussions due to foreign interventions.

Having first supported the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government], until its ouster by Hissein Habre, this, it is said, in conformity with the Lagos Agreement which had recognized Goukouni Oueddei, Algeria then proceeded cautiously, as though it did not want to add fuel to the fire, as Libya was doing, by either sponsoring the GUNT, established to the North of the country, with which it had close political affinity or by giving any kind of support to Habre, even though Algeria did not oppose the Chadian leader's participation in the OAU Summit. The Libyan military intervention deeply irritated the Algerians who watched powerless the onset of the difficulties brought on by the arrival of Zairian troops in Ndjamena and the lending of the French army.

In time past, the sending of French paratroopers to Chad would have aroused the ire and opposition of Algiers. This time, given the nature of the political regime installed in Paris since May 1981 and the explanations supplied by France (the purpose of a quick trip to Algiers by Pierre Mauroy), Chadli showed understanding and he worked with Mitterrand to eliminate the cause of the intervention, namely, the Libyan presence on Chadian soil. In that context, Algiers is acting as a moderator, using his influence to persuade Tripoli to let the Chadians settle their problems in all liberty. According to the Algerian chief of state, Chad will not have a durable peace until national reconciliation has been achieved, all forms of foreign interventions have been stopped and the country's national unity, independence and territorial integrity have been respected.

South Africa

With regard to the end of decolonization and the fight against apartheid, Chadli upholds a constant of Algerian politics, namely, a resolute stand against the regime of Pretoria, the unconditional support of the ANC and SWAPO, and an active solidarity with the frontline states. He does not understand the argument that there should be a dialog with the South African racists. He believes that only a united and determined Africa can put pressure on Westerners, especially the United States, to hasten the independence of Namibia and place the apartheid regime on trial.

The Safeguard of the OAU

The Algerian president is also obsessed with maintaining the Organization of African Unity, strengthening its structures and giving it the capability to intervene with resources that measure up to its obligations and circumstances. His analysis stems from the principle that the OAU is an avenue for meetings and dialogs and for strengthening the continent's autonomy and independence during the historical phase we are crossing. According to Chadli, it is not to the advantage of the ruling powers of Africa which persist in pilfering its wealth to see a strong and competent OAU, for the latter will once again inevitably challenge their privileges, prevent Africa from being used and manipulated within the framework of the East-West confrontation and give respectability, on the international scene, to the voice of the continent.

For Chadli, the best way to safeguard the OAU lies in the strict respect of its charter and in the ability of the African nations to resolve their disagreement or conflicts in conformity with that charter and through peaceful means.

He is strongly opposed to exporting the revolution, this leitmotiv of Qadhdhafi, perceived as a factor of destabilization and, therefore, as a cause of the OAU's weakening. "We must respect the political choices of each country and develop our relations on the basis of the right to differences. Each country must make its own history," is a statement insistently repeated in Algiers.

To Develop Economic Relations

Chadli's entire African policy strives toward one end, namely, to resolve the conflicts and ensure good neighborliness, thus enabling the various nations to devote themselves exclusively to the fight against underdevelopment. Everytime he has had the opportunity to discuss this issue, the Algerian leader has been anxious to declare that underdevelopment is the true enemy. His ambition is to see the African leaders invest all their energy in this struggle, an influential factor in the future of the populations; the South succeed in casting off the domination of the North; and African countries show autonomy and imagination that they may develop their economic trade and create true regional centers.

This rapid survey of Chadli's African policy shows that there is a coherence from which may be gathered that, diplomatically, Algeria is the most active of the North African countries. As for Algiers, it is aware that, in practice, everything is not perfect and many past contingencies, misunderstandings and shortcomings remain to be overcome, but it is sure of being on the right track.

Algerian-Senegalese Relations Renewed

Dakar AFRICA in French No 155 Nov 83 p 20

[Article by John Angulu: "A New Pas de Deux"]

[Text] The reacquaintance of Algeria and Senegal initiated during the 19th OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, was confirmed in Algiers in mid-October. It was heightened by an unsuspected common desire to expand relations and give them an unprecedented structure which would inevitably have a beneficial impact on the affairs of the continent.

Diouf set the tone of his Algerian trip by declaring upon his arrival in Algiers that he was bearer of a message of "warm fraternity and solidarity," during a visit which was "a particularly important moment" in his presidential career. By so doing, he gave a glimpse of the quality of the meetings he was going to have with President Chadli Bendjedid, his "brother and friend."

As a matter of fact, the Algiers historical summit was encouraging from the onset, for Diouf's professed availability was no lesser than that of his counterpart. It became quickly apparent that the initial contact in Addis Ababa was not going to be short-lived. It was a contact between two African chiefs of state belonging to a "new breed," so free are they from some of the obduracy that was hindering their predecessors. For both Chadli and Diouf, the age of playing at leadership or retreating behind dogmas has come to pass. It is now necessary to have a lucid vision of the continent's problems which require urgent and adequate answers beyond this artificial frontier demanding that Africa be divided between progressives and moderates.

The joint communiqué published at the end of Diouf's visit reflects these concerns perfectly. Besides attending political meetings, Diouf visited the Rouiba (a suburb of Algiers) industrial vehicle complex, the Arzew installations of liquified natural gas and an agricultural socialist village. On the bilateral level, the desire to recapture lost time was noted when the two presidents declared "Their willingness to give new impetus to all phases of Algerian-Senegalese relations, an impetus which would measure up to the two country's potentialities and interests. In that context, they took measures to translate this willingness into realities." Many meetings are being scheduled between the two countries and the mixed commission should convene in the near future.

Observers were also struck by the great uniformity of views achieved by the two chiefs of state on all international, and particularly African, issues. Whether it be West Sahara, the true cause of the Algerian-Senegalese break, the Chadian conflict, the future of Namibia, the fight against apartheid, the safeguard of the OAU, or the economic emancipation, Chadli and Diouf advocate identical principles in order to obtain the desired solutions that would enable the continent to stamp out fratricidal wars, complete the decolonization, assert its independence against the covetousness of the great powers and devote itself to its true enemy, underdevelopment.

Furthermore, knowing that speeches are worth no more than the paper on which they are written, Chadli and Diouf decided to take diplomatic initiatives in Africa

that will be the more efficient as they will be more discreet than spectacular. These initiatives could first be aimed at the Chadian conflict and the West Saharan issue, with an eye to the next OAU Summit. It can be asserted, as of now, that the way the Summit is handled in Conakry and its success will depend greatly on the intelligence and spirit of compromise brought on by this dual diplomacy. The Algiers-Dakar axis is born.

Deteriorating Algerian-Libyan Relations Reviewed

Dakar AFRICA in French No 155 Nov 83 pp 23-24

[Article by Paul Bernetel: "Nothing Goes"]

[Text] Chadli Benjedid's Algeria and Qadhdhafi's Libya are viewed by African and international public opinion as two countries linked by a lasting political alliance. Reality is much more cloudy than it looks; the word cloudy is used to avoid saying that a real break has occurred between Algiers and Tripoli whose diplomatic activities are becoming increasingly contradictory. Whether it involves the West Saharan issue, the Chadian conflict, the role of the OAU, or the types of relations to be maintained among African nations, not forgetting the Palestinian tragedy, the two revolutions, which call themselves "sisters," have diametrically opposed positions.

The first, both public and significant, sign that there were differences over the African problems came to light at the Addis Ababa OAU Summit. While deeply worried over avoiding the breakup of the OAU at all cost, Presidents Chadli and Diouf were trying to formulate a compromise solution for West Sahara. Qadhdhafi was advocating a maximalist position, namely, to impose SDAR participation in the Summit, even if it meant breaking up the continental organization. Thank God, the Algerian-Senegalese wisdom, like that of all the African nations, succeeded in breaking the deadlock, even if it were temporarily, through the adoption of an auspicious resolution. The only thing left for Qadhdhafi was to slam the door and leave Addis Ababa precipitately in humiliating isolation.

With regard to Chad, although Algeria was not very fond of Hissein Habre, and still is not, it nevertheless believed that the conflict had to remain confined to Chad. Consequently, the intervention of Libyan troops in the North of that country, in a conflict which has been traumatizing Africa for the past 18 years, could only irritate Chadli's regime as touchy about the need to respect the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of a country as concerned by the embroilment of the interventions, the result of Qadhdhafi's rash and irresponsible action.

The non-intervention principle and the respect of national frontiers are another bone of contention between Algiers and Tripoli. Mali and Niger did not fail to discuss their deep worry with Algeria over their territorial integrity threatened by the Libyan troops. This situation is what lead President Chadli to assure his counterparts, Traore and Kountche, that Algerian troops would be at their disposal to help them defend any violation to their positions.

The Palestinian issue also helped to intensify the Algerian-Libyan differences. Qadhdhafi's call advising the Palestinians, when surrounded by the Israeli, to commit suicide in Beirut rather than leave the Lebanese capital and the colonel's

willingness to play one faction of the PLO against another, were only met with contempt and opposition by Algiers.

Algerian officials did not fail to tell the "teacher" that the PLO's autonomy had to be respected and the Palestinians themselves had to decide the forms, as well as the content, of their struggle. They added that if Arafat was the president of the organization, it was not up to any of the Arab chiefs of state to challenge his legitimacy.

The Ben Bella Affair

A "review of the facts" places a new light on the Algerian-Libyan dossier which acquires new breadth when it is revealed that the impetuous colonel is even interfering in Algerian affairs! Foreign observers did not sufficiently grasp, nor analyzed thoroughly, the scope of some of the statements expressed by President Chadli Bendjedid on 24 February last, on the occasion of the 12th anniversary of the nationalization of hydrocarbons. On that day, the wise and moderate Chadli broke through his reserve for the first time by mentioning the activities of the Algerians opposed to his regime, i.e., Ahmed Ben Bella and the Moslem integrationists. Without naming names or countries, he declared that element of the opposition "Were being manipulated by foreign hands and some of them were being financed by some countries in the region." Further on, the Algerian chief of state added by way of warning that "We do not believe in exporting revolutions and, at the same time, we will not allow anyone to give us lessons in militancy or in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism or in unity."

It is clear that only one person was being targeted in those two quotes, Qadhafi, and only one country implied, Libya. Prior to making these statements, Chadli, who knew that some of the country's small Moslem groups were being subsidized by Tripoli, had just learned from his intelligence services that Qadhafi has recently released a generous manna, a 20 million dollar figure is being quoted (roughly 8 billion CFA francs), for the benefit of Ben Bella who was brewing unrest in Paris under the current fashionable Islamic doctrine. The credibility of this Algerian accusation has now been ascertained since Ben Bella settled in Tripoli.

What kind of explanation is there for Qadhafi's audacity in interfering in the affairs of a country which is still officially a friend and ally? The more so as Algeria has been politically stable since 1965 and its state structures have given ample proof of their strength. The explanation is that the Libyan leader feels that Algeria is no longer the revolutionary country it once was. Several journalists who spoke to him over the past few years have heard him say that, for him, the "Algerians are impostors of the revolution," that their revolutionary reputation is built on a cleverly fostered myth. The Algerian leaders got wind of these statements, that is the reason they declared that they had no lessons to learn about revolution. A few months ago, an Algerian high official had a stormy meeting with Qadhafi in Tripoli. Accused by the "guide," who, in short, was upbraiding Algeria for not endorsing and supporting his adventurism, Chadli's emissary, for the first time, did not hesitate to tell a few home truths to his interlocutor in a tone of voice, it is said, not often heard in diplomatic circles.

Patience and Subtlety

As may be noted, there is very little communication between Algiers and Tripoli. The contentious file is growing. To the above-mentioned facts may be added the inevitably unfavorable reaction of Qadhdhafi to the signing of the Algerian-Tunisian good neighbor pact. The "guide" had difficulty stomaching a unitarian act which was scorning his views, i.e., immediate unity over all, and in which Libya was not involved.

Yet, despite all these differences, the Algerian leaders do not want their relations with Qadhdhafi to deteriorate any further. They appear to be using patience and subtlety in order to use what little influence they retain; however, this small influence increases at times (when Qadhdhafi is very isolated at a regional level) to play a moderating role. It is currently the case with regard to Chad. Algeria is working with France and some African countries in an attempt to obtain the withdrawal of the Libyan troops in order to promote a negotiated and peaceful solution among the various Chadian forces.

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GROWING ROLE OF NEW WAFD PARTY REVIEWED

Attempt at Restoration Analyzed

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 196, 12-18 Nov 83 pp 31, 32

[Article by Wahid 'Abd-al-Hamid and Mahmud Sadiq]

[Text] The morning of 29 October, the administrative judiciary court of the Egyptian Council of State issued its ruling suspending execution of the Party Affairs Committee decree rejecting the legitimacy of the New Wafd Party and the decree of the governor of Cairo refusing to accept the lists of the party's candidates for elections to the local assemblies. With this ruling, the New Wafd is returning to the Egyptian political stage, bringing with it a group of questions revolving around the effect of this return on the current political map in Egypt. This report, which AL-MAJALLAH's office in Cairo has made, will try to answer these questions.

The dispute between the New Wafd and the Committee on Parties began last 24 August, when the party's general assembly met and decided to agree to the party's resumption of political activity. The Committee on Parties hastened to issue a statement on 26 August stressing "The party did not freeze its activities as of June 1978 but dissolved itself, and as a consequence the party does not exist and has no being. Proper procedures require that the party submit a new application to the Committee on Party Affairs." The legal contest between the Wafd and the Committee on Parties began at once. This contest focussed on a specific incident, the meeting of the Wafd's higher council on 6 June 1978, its objection to the dissolution decree issued by the general assembly on 2 June, and its acquiescence to a freeze on the party's political activity. The two parties disagreed on how to formulate this incident. The legal experts in the Wafd said that the higher council's decree to shift from a dissolution to a freeze was in agreement with the provisions of Article 19 of the bylaws of the party ("the resolutions of the general assembly will be considered final unless the higher council demands to review them within 15 days of their issuance"). The legal experts in the Committee on Parties responded with a rejection of this interpretation for two reasons:

The chairman of the New Wafd Party (Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din) notified the Committee on Parties of the general assembly's resolution dissolving the party the day after it was issued.

The chairman of the New Wafd Party did not notify the Committee on Parties that the higher council had objected to the general assembly resolution dissolving the party but had settled for a freeze on its activity.

The legal experts of the Wafd proceeded to reply that the party chairman's initiative of informing the Party Affairs Committee of the general assembly resolution the day following its issuance did not invalidate the higher council's right to object to it, as long as this objection was made within the legal period. They said that the party chairman did not inform the Committee on Parties of the higher council's resolution making a shift away from the dissolution of the party, because Article 16 of the Law on Parties requires notification only with respect to the four cases listed in all-inclusive fashion, and these do not include making a shift from dissolution or a freeze on activities. (The four cases include changes of party chairmen, amendment of bylaws, merger of a party into another party, and dissolution of a party.) Dr Nu'man Jum'ah, the party's assistant secretary general, added, "The leadership of the Wafd preferred not to declare the resolution making the shift from the dissolution of the party for another, political reason, which was the general climate prevailing at that time and the violent attack to which the party and its leadership was subjected by the late President Anwar al-Sadat, which articulated the intention he had harbored within himself to dissolve the party. That means that if the party had declared the resolution to make a shift from dissolution to a freeze, that would certainly have been subjected to dissolution measures on the part of the president."

Face to Face before the Judiciary

At the latest press conference the leaders of the New Wafd held, last 1 September, Dr Nu'man Jum'ah declared "The New Wafd Party asserts its determination to continue along his road, within the limits of constitutional legitimacy and the law, in order to achieve its national mission."

Estimates by observers as to what this statement meant differed at the time. Some people anticipated that the Wafd would turn to the judiciary to assert the legitimacy of its political existence, while others expected that the Wafd would embark on political activity to impose a fait accompli.

However, little time passed before it became apparent that the Wafd's activity was founded on maneuvering. The party leadership did not refuse to get into contact with senior officials when it was called on to do so, and at the same time the Wafd presented a party list for local assembly elections in two districts (al-Sahil and Rawd al-Faraj).

It appears that the Wafd leadership would have preferred not to begin by quarreling juridically with the government but rather moved in that direction by way of a reaction. This is what actually happened.

The competent official in Cairo Governorate refused to receive the papers of the party's candidates last 17 September "because it is not one of the parties that exist according to law." In the face of this, the Wafd filed suit with the Council of State demanding that the decree of refusal to accept the lists of its candidates be abrogated. A team of Wafdist lawyers, Dr Nu'man Jum'ah, Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Hashish, and Ibrahim Faraj, in addition to Dr Muhammad 'Asfur, took charge of the suit, while Counsellor Jamal al-Labban, the vice chairman of the Department of Government Cases, took charge of preparing the special brief on the legal formulation for rejecting the Wafd's list. After two rounds of legal struggle between the two parties, the court issued its verdict on behalf of the Wafd. A scholar of constitutional law told AL-MAJALLAH that the concomitant facts of this ruling were so strong that they would make it difficult to abrogate it in the event the government resorted to an appeal.

What Will Happen after the Ruling?

The prevailing trend now in official circles in Cairo is that the return of the Wafd will not have an effect on the majority the National Party enjoys. Mr Muhammad Rashwan, the minister of state for People's and Consultative Assembly affairs and the secretary of the National Party in Cairo, told AL-MAJALLAH, "The Wafd Party will not affect our party by any percentage worth mentioning. We also have roots which extend into the past, and we have great popularity. However, the existence of the Wafd will without a doubt have an effect on the other opposition parties which are deficient in the organization of mass bases." He added, "The Wafd has resorted to the judiciary and the judiciary made its statement in the first stage. We have the right to appeal this ruling, because we are convinced that the party dissolved itself and that it did not make a resolution to freeze itself. In this regard we are acting as the government and not as the National Party."

We asked Dr Wahid Ra'fat, the vice chairman of the New Wafd, about his predictions on his party's popularity. He said "The Wafd has a longstanding background and has spread seeds about in all areas, by virtue of its past. Although this party now is different from the way it was in the past, its memory endures and its name endures. In every governorate there are Wafdist families which have passed on the heritage from grandfather to father. We truly represent the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois classes." We asked him about the truth of the point the Wafd chairman had mentioned, to the effect that the party would get 40 percent in the coming elections, and he said, "Mr Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din mentioned that to the minister of the interior as a joke with a serious meaning. A few months remain till the elections, and in that period the party will not be able to prepare its lists as it should. However, there is no exaggeration in the statement that if we do not win in the 1984 elections, victory will be certain in the 1989 elections, if things proceed as they ought to."

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, member of the current People's Assembly and a participant in the establishment of the New Wafd in 1978, believes that the Wafd will obtain many votes in the elections. He stated to AL-MAJALLAH, "The Wafd Party is the only one which was established in accordance with the will of the people and in terms of a mass base which rallied around it."

Balance between the Government and the Opposition

By monitoring the New Wafd Party's activity in past days, and by conversing with some of its leaders, one can arrive at the following conclusion: the New Wafd is aiming toward a sort of balance in its relationship with the two parties to the political game in Egypt, the government and the opposition. The most important indication of this is the Wafd's position on the meeting the opposition parties called for last 1 October, which resulted in the formation of what is called the Committee for the Defense of Democracy. The Wafd did not abstain from responding to this call. Rather, it avoided participating in it officially. The two members of the Wafd who attended the front's meetings, Hamid al-Azhari and 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad, took part in it as observers in their union capacity (as members of the board of the Lawyers' Union), not in their party capacity. Dr Wahid Ra'fat, vice chairman of the party, answered that by stating "The front contains parties that actually exist, and the Wafd could not take part in it before the issuance of the ruling." However, it is well known that other parties that are still in the process of being established took part officially in the front's meetings, such as the Justice Party which was represented by its two great leading figures Kamal-al-Din Husayn and Mumtaz Nassar. At the beginning of the front's meetings, the legal status of both the Wafd and the Justice parties was the same: each of them was a party in the process of being established. Therefore, it is most likely that the purpose behind that excuse was to be free from participating officially in the front's meetings in order to preserve the equation of the desired balance between the government and the opposition.

The statement by the vice chairman of the Wafd concerning this front underlines this deduction:

He supports only "the guarantees concerning the elections, and the neutrality of elections, which the front demanded." He is also sympathetic to the amendment of the new election law and the return to the system of individual elections which the opposition is demanding.

However, on the other hand, he rejects the opposition tendency to boycott the elections, and indeed frankly describes this approach as "a form of political triviality and self-indulgence. Why should I boycott the elections and surrender to my rival, so that he can rule 5 more years, if my presence in parliament will have an effect on legislation?"

The final result of this stand is that there will be a broad gap keeping the Wafd from joining the new opposition front. Above and beyond that, there is a large difference between the Wafd and the opposition parties concerning the Emergency Law. The surprising point the vice chairman of the Wafd declared in his conversation with AL-MAJALLAH was that "the Wafd does not object to the existence of the Emergency Law although we are demanding that it be used only to combat terror. In fact the government has not abused this law, and has used it only against terrorist groups that use force to impose their views."

A New Scenario

If one should consider, on the basis of these positions, that it is most unlikely that the New Wafd will officially join the opposition front, is it likely that a rapprochement will occur between the Wafd and the ruling National Party? AL-MAJALLAH has learned from informed sources in Cairo that the government is intending to prepare a working paper and to present it to various parties with the goal of cooperating in solving the pressing problems the country is facing. The important thing is that these sources expect that with the exception of the Wafd Party the parties will not respond to this paper. These sources consider that in the light of the New Wafd's declared positions to this moment, there are no essential differences between it and the National Party.

It seems that the return of the Wafd has concurrently revived the notion that al-Sadat propounded in 1978, of turning the Egyptian party system into a two-party system. Some observers consider that the Wafd deserves to be the other large party, alongside the ruling National Party. In this event, it is likely that the existing opposition parties would retire to the sidelines of the party system. This scenario conforms with the prediction of a major official in the government and the National Party (Mr Muhammad Rashwan) that the return of the Wafd will have a negative effect on the existing opposition parties. However, this scenario, which implies a great change in the Egyptian party system, requires that a number of conditions be present:

The National Party's readiness to accept the risk of betting on the New Wafd Party and its readiness to pursue the political game in the context of its current rules and not proceed in a year or two to change these rules in a manner which is not in the interests of the National Party.

The Wafd's ability to attract some opposition leaders, from existing parties (as an example, Dr Hilmi Murad, for instance), from parties being established and from independents. Therefore, we asked Mr Mumtaz Nassar, the deputy founder of the Justice Party, which is in the process of being established, about his readiness to join the Wafd if it is not possible to establish the Justice Party. He said he would not rule that out, because the Wafd, in this case, would then be the party closest to his own views and thinking.

The New Wafd's readiness to draw close to the National Party to the same extent that it is ready to distance itself from the opposition parties.

Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din: The Final Decision in 2 Months

On Sunday 30 October the Egyptian Committee on Political Parties held a meeting under the chairmanship of Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the committee and chairman of the Consultative Assembly, to discuss the circumstances of the court's ruling on the return of the Wafd. The committee assigned its legal counsellor and Counsellor Jamal al-Labbani, the deputy director of government cases and the government attorney, to study the circumstances surrounding the verdict and to prepare a report on the points it contained. On Monday, 31 October, the report was prepared, and it

included the point that the the court's verdict was not valid in respect to its accusation that the Committee on Political Parties had abused its authority by interfering in the party's affairs. As a result of that, it was decided to delegate the department of government cases to present a contestation of the court's verdict and to appeal it before the higher administrative court of the Council of State.

On Tuesday, 1 November, an official reaction was articulated by Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister and secretary general of the ruling National Democratic Party, in which he declared "The government honors the rulings of the Egyptian judiciary and will not comment on them. However, we are viewing the ruling on the Wafd case from the standpoint of the elimination of legal obscurity and the search for clarification. How could the party declare that it was dissolving itself in November 1978, be inactive for 5 years, then suddenly decide to resume engaging in its political activity, and say that it had not dissolved itself but had frozen its activity? Is that reasonable? Have there been precedents in the history of party activity in Egypt or other countries? As for our political view of the Wafd, we know that it boasts that its roots go back before July 1952, and we can wonder if the Wafd wants to regress, and why the July 1952 revolution then occurred. The history of the National Democratic Party began on 23 July 1952 and it is the legitimate heir of the gains of the revolution and the protector of these gains and rights. We are proud of that. The ruling which has been issued is not yet final, and we will wait to see what the higher administrative court says on this case in 60 days."

An Egyptian parliamentary source stated that if the ruling of the higher administrative court issued is in the Wafd Party's favor, the government will not seek recourse in the abrogation of the law on political isolation issued in 1980 during this parliamentary session to grant the party leaders the right to enter the parliamentary election campaign in April 1984. In the event the ruling issued is in the government's favor, it will abrogate the law on political isolation to demonstrate its good will. He added that the Wafd will present a new application to declare itself if it loses the case and that the application will not be discussed before the coming elections, in order to prevent the Wafd from taking part in them. In this case, the Wafdists will enter the campaign in the lists of candidates of other opposition parties.

New Wafd Wins Ruling

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 195, 5-11 Nov 83 p 17

[Text] Last 29 October the first shot in the direction of the party system in Cairo was fired from the chamber of the Council of State in Egypt. Amidst the enthusiasm of hundreds of Wafdists and members of the press and the amazement of the security men, Counsellor Jalal 'Abd-al-Hamid, the chairman of the court, released his decree, which was considered tantamount to a time bomb on the stage of political activity. The New Wafd returned, once again! Saturday 29 October, 1983, will remain engraved in the book of history as a living symbol of the probity of the Egyptian judiciary. On that day, the law made its statement on an issue which had preoccupied the Egyptian people

and, along with them, Arab people who are interested in Egypt's affairs. The judiciary ruled on the struggle which had arisen between the Egyptian government, as embodied in the Committee on Political Parties, and the New Wafd Party, declaring the party's resumption of its activity and its entry into the coming elections for the local assemblies. Thus the curtain was lowered before the act regarding the New Wafd and the judiciary, in order to rise on the act regarding its struggle with the other political parties on the stage of party activity in Egypt.

Today, now that the storm has ended, we wonder why the struggle between the government and the New Wafd Party reached a peak where the two parties appeared before the judiciary for a ruling on the struggle that had flared up between them, and the court held four sessions starting last 15 October that witnessed constitutional and legal debates between top Wafd figures who were major lawyers and the government's lawyers, in the course of which the court chamber became crowded with supporters of the Wafd, security men and representatives of the press. What happened in the course of these sessions? Why did the Pasha, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, appear before the court? What are the documents the government and the Wafd Party submitted? Is the party's return to the arena to be considered final, or will the government try to use its legal right to present points of ambiguity in order to stop the execution of the ruling issued by the administrative judiciary court within 3 days of its issuance? Or will the Committee on Political Parties resort to issuing a decree suspending the activity of the party in application of the provisions of Article 16 of the Law on Political Parties? Or will the government wait for the decree of the board of delegates in the Council of State?

The beginning occurred on the morning of 15 October, when the administrative judiciary court held a session which was attended by 13 major lawyers for the Wafd and Counsellor Jamal al-Labban for the government. Jalal 'Abd-al-Hamid, the chairman of the court, appeared and started to review the suit which had been filed by Dr Wahid Ra'fat, the vice chairman of the Wafd Party, contesting the decree of the Committee on Political Parties ruling that it was illegal for the Wafd Party to engage in its activity, on grounds that that was an administrative decree. The chairman of the court reviewed the documents submitted by the two parties and the government attorney demanded that the bylaws of the party, the resolution establishing it issued on 4 February 1978, the minutes of the Wafd general assembly on 3 July 1978 regarding the dissolution of the party, and the minutes of the general assembly meeting on 6 May 1983 regarding the termination of the freeze on the party and its resumption of pursuit of its activities be presented. The government attorney contested that it was not legitimate for Dr Wahid Ra'fat to be a representative, because the Law on Parties stipulates that the legal representative is the chairman of the party. Meanwhile the lawyers of the Wafd demanded that the minutes of the August 1983 meeting of the Committee on Political Parties regarding the fact that it was illegal for the Wafd to pursue its activities be presented, and asked if the committee decree had been issued by a majority of the members or unanimously by those present.

At the end of the session, the chairman of the court asked the persons who were filing suit for the Wafd to clarify what was meant by the notion of

freezing activity in the coming session and asked that the documents requested of the two parties be provided at the Tuesday 18 October 1983 session.

On the stipulated day, the review of this case began. The first surprise was the appearance of Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, the chairman of the party, in the chamber of the court, where he wore a black robe and sat in the first row among the lawyers, as Counsellor Jalal 'Abd-al-Hamid, the chairman of the court, began to review the documents that had been requested at the previous session. The second surprise was the declaration made by the government attorney, to the effect that there was no document bearing on the meeting of the Party Committee on 26 August 1983 and its decree that it was illegal for the Wafd to resume engaging in its activity, because the committee had not met at all; a statement had merely been issued by Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, the chairman of the Party Committee, in response to material that had been published in the opposition press regarding the return of the Wafd. At this point the Wafd lawyers requested that this admission be recorded, the secretary of the court recorded it, and the judge read it out as they smiled. After that, the government attorney started to present documents on the case, including a letter sent by Ibrahim Faraj, the secretary general of the Wafd Party, to Dr Mustafa Khalil, the secretary of the central committee, on 11 April 1978, regarding the amendment of the bylaws of the Wafd. Then Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din started to speak, stating, "This letter is suspect and was not issued by Ibrahim Faraj." The chairman of the court presented the letter to Ibrahim Faraj, who admitted that his signature was on it but that it was not in his handwriting, and he demanded the original of the letter, not the copy presented to the court. The government attorney's second request was for the minutes of the meetings of the party's higher council from 4 February 1978 to 13 April 1978. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din objected to this request, stating, "No political party can declare the minutes of its meetings, because secret matters are discussed in the meetings and they cannot be announced." The chairman of the court replied to him by stating, "There is nothing secret to the court, and no one will read them except the government attorney and the board of the court." At the end of the session, the judge demanded that the documents be provided in full and that the government present its defense at the session of Thursday 20 October. The Wafd lawyers departed, crowding around Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din and kissing him, their faces wreathed in smiles as if they had guaranteed the ruling and the resumption of political life.

The third session was on Thursday 20 October; that witnessed discussions by the two parties, contrary to the previous sessions. The government attorney started it, presenting his defense on the case, which was summarized by the refusal to accept the suit because the plaintiff (that is, Dr Wahid Ra'fat, the vice chairman of the party), did not have a legitimate capacity, the party had no presence now, since a decree had been issued dissolving it in June 1978, and the court did not have jurisdiction over the suit because there was no administrative decree by the Committee on Political Parties, which was being contested, regarding the fact that it was not legal for the Wafd Party to engage in its activities again, since the party had dissolved itself by choice on 2 June 1978 and had had no legal identity after that date. Then the Wafd lawyers started to respond to the government's defense. The first person to speak was Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, who said, "The chairman of the Party Committee does not have the right to issue a statement in his own

name, and he ought to have summoned the committee to a meeting; it is not fitting for him to make this ruling, and we, as the Wafd, can dispense with that statement because we have other administrative decrees which have been contested. In addition, the higher party council was re-elected in June 1978 with all its members." Dr Nu'man Jum'ah, member of the higher council of the Wafd, spoke, saying, "What will rule on this dispute is the principle of the freedom to form parties and the Egyptian citizen's right to express his opinion. The life and resolutions of the party are a private internal matter and the Party Committee cannot interpose itself and avail itself of areas of jurisdiction for which there is no basis, because the Law on Parties is biased and filled with restrictions, and it was set out by evildoers." The chairman of the court interrupted him, requesting that he speak objectively in replying to the government's defense.

After that, Dr Muhammad 'Asfur spoke, stating, in his response to the defense of the government attorney, "Have legal effects arisen from the statement issued by the Party Committee or not? If the government concedes that it does not have legal merit, we are prepared to abandon the suit. The fact of the matter is that the statement is an administrative decree, and it is sufficient that the chairman of the Committee on Political Parties usurped the jurisdiction of the committee and arrogated the issuance of the decree to himself. The lesson is not whether it is a statement or decree but rather concerns the legal effects that have arisen from it." Regarding the second issue, Dr Muhammad 'Asfur went on to say, "That is whether the party exists or not. The fact is that the Law on Political Parties regulates the freedom to form the party, and does not regulate the exercise of its activity. We are now in the area of the pursuit of the Wafd Party's activity, not that of its re-establishment, a matter that is outside the scope of the Law on Political Parties, and the government does not have the right to interfere in the activity of the party after its establishment. As regards the freezing of activity, if the law has given the Administration Committee, which is the chairman of the Party Committee, the right to suspend the activity of the party by force, the party has the right to do so voluntarily, and the freeze was carried out on the part of the Wafd."

Counsellor Jamal al-Labban, the government attorney, proceeded again to reply, stating, "The party dissolved itself voluntarily on 2 June 1978, and no longer was in existence. Committees were formed to liquidate the party's possessions and money, and the Central Accounting Agency was notified in order to audit this process. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's letter was then presented to the late President Anwar al-Sadat in May 1981, in response to an attack by the late president against the Wafd Party and the Egyptian leader Mustafa al-Nahhas. In it he acknowledged the dissolution of the New Wafd Party." At this point Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's face became wreathed in a broad smile, and he demanded that the government attorney read his signature on the letter, where Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din was named the secretary of the Wafd Party and chairman of the New Wafd Party, and addressed the late president in this capacity, although the president did not object, and [stated] that the liquidation committee had not proceeded with its activity and there still was party money in the Bank of Cairo.

At the end of the session, the chairman of the court requested the two parties to present final briefs on Tuesday 25 October, and reserved the case for a ruling on Saturday 29 October, when the ruling was made that the New Wafd Party should resume engaging in its activity and participate in the coming local elections, thus becoming the sixth party on the map of open political activity in Egypt.

As regards the ambiguities on the ruling issued by the Council of State, due to which it was likely that the government would take the initiative of suspending the execution, an official source says, "It was the custom, regarding the rulings issued by the Council of State, on grounds that that is the biggest judiciary body, that the government would commit itself to carry out its rulings. As far as the objective part bearing on the New Wafd Party went, in terms of its existence and legitimacy, the matter is contingent on the opinion of the board of delegates formed of senior counsellors which will make its final statement."

11887

CSO: 4504/99

NEED FOR FAMILY CENSUS EXPLAINED

Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA in French 31 Dec 83 p 3

[Report on interview with Minister of Interior Driss Basri, 27 December, on Moroccan television]

[Text] Rabat (MAP)--Following the speech by the king on Tuesday announcing the planning of a socioeconomic census of the population, Moroccan Radio and Television (RTM) organized an interview with Minister of Interior Driss Basri, attended by Minister of Information Abdellatif Filali.

In answer to a question concerning the purpose of the operation, Basri responded as follows:

"In accordance with the speech which His Royal Highness addressed to his loyal people on Tuesday evening and in keeping with the sovereign's high instructions, I have come on Moroccan radio and television and wish to thank Abdellatif Filali, minister of information, and Saddik Maaninou for providing me with an opportunity to explain the census operation announced by the king.

"In fact, and as His Royal Highness stated, Morocco, which is one of the developing nations, is going to organize an operation unique in nature. The purpose of the census have been clearly explained by the king. It is a question, as he said, of ensuring, if there should be any price increase on basic products, it will not affect all strata of the Moroccan people. It is in order to learn those social classes and the income of each member of Moroccan families that the king ordered a census of the income of each household, knowing that a general population census is organized every 10 years in Morocco and that in the meantime, sectorial surveys and censuses are made concerning social, economic and housing matters as well as overall income.

"However, we have never before had a survey of the income of all citizens in Morocco. This operation, as it must be called, concerns the lower- or average-income population groups because, as the king explained in his speech, he does not want all Moroccan people to have to bear the burden of the prices of basic products.

"This is the implementation of a wise price policy that will henceforth be adopted.

"Morocco must conduct this census in order to provide officials with the necessary data concerning the country's needs and the income of individuals and households. That is what His Majesty explained in emphasizing that Morocco will have the privilege of being the first country to organize such an operation, thus providing proof of its genius, maturity and exemplary civic mindedness.

"Many countries do not know their precise needs and potential. The king has provided us with an opportunity to learn precisely the income of persons and households, which will provide him, the government and officials in the sectors of the economy and consumption with all the necessary information to determine the proper way to help those with low or average incomes. This wise policy is perspicacious in its objectives and methodical in its organization."

Noble and Virtuous Operations

"Its wisdom resides in the fact that the very principle of the operation is noble and virtuous and will make it possible to determine the groups comprising Moroccan society.

"The perspicacity of its objectives resides in the fact that when the government knows the real income of each citizen, the government and competent officials in the different areas will be able to apply programs to lighten the burden that must be borne by citizens when circumstances might require an increase in the prices of certain basic commodities.

"Regarding the methods of the survey and thanks to the constant and precise instructions of the king, a census planning commission has accomplished its task in a way that television viewers will have the opportunity to observe."

In answer to the question of whether the census will cover all homes, meaning 3,437,000 families, based on the results of the last census, Basri answered:

"Actually, the last general census showed some 22 million inhabitants and 3.5 million households. In 1971 and 1972, a survey of household expenditures and university or international studies and surveys showed that basic products absorb about 34 percent of the family budget. His Majesty's remarks are clear on this subject. After the census, Morocco will be called upon to provide the aid needed by those with a low or average income and who cannot bear the burden of a steady increase in prices of basic products.

"Let there be no misunderstanding: The census only concerns persons or households with a low or average income, not the wealthier classes. His Majesty has always said that there is no question of impoverishing the rich, but of improving the standard of living of the poor. Those who, based on the criteria, might benefit from state assistance will be the only persons concerned by the census."

In answer to the question of knowing the criteria for distinguishing between the wealthier classes and low- and medium-income groups, the minister of interior answered:

"The criteria retained by the technical commission, which also completed social and political work in connection with its mission in order to determine the income of each citizen, will be explained in the appendixes. First of all, I would like to inform you that the commission began with the lowest incomes and arrived at a level which we consider minimal, based on the knowledge of the country and certain indices we have, to cover daily and monthly expenses for food, rent, clothing, education and medical care. Everything has been taken into account with the exception of what is extra, leisure, for example. The government is interested only in what is vital. After the census and when explicit information is in the hands of the king and available to his government and the experts, it will be possible to determine at what level assistance will stop."

Methods of the Census

Explaining how the census will be conducted, Basri added:

"As His Majesty explained in his speech, Morocco, governed by a constitutional monarchy, has chosen dialogue for 13 centuries -- that is, since the advent of Islam in Morocco.

"Our beloved country has also opted for public freedoms, true democracy and effective and active solidarity. This shows that all factors exist in order to ensure complete success of the decision to be made by His Majesty.

"This is not a technical census, but an operation in keeping with the objective set forth by the king in his speech, within the framework of a democratic spirit, participation and the dialogue which Morocco has at all levels. Morocco has lived in dialogue and through dialogue for centuries, principles and methods that have been strengthened by our Islamic credo and the tradition of Prophet Sidna Mohammed. That dialogue is up to date, embodied in our democratic institutions, local communities, provincial and regional assemblies and Parliament. The needs of dialogue and concerted action have all been taken into consideration and the planning commission has provided for three levels in the census.

"The first is the responsibility of the primary census and identification commission. It will be active at the district level in urban areas and the *douar* [Bedouin camps] level in rural areas. That commission will be made up of persons well known to people living in the same district or *douar* as they. They will number 10 or 15. The commission will include a member of the communal council, who will represent the people who elected him in complete freedom and democracy.

"The commission will also include the *umana* (provosts) of the professional organizations because the communal council member cannot be informed of the situation of every individual. The provost lives with the people of his trade and can even estimate their income.

"It will also include a small or medium-size farmer as well as a herdsman, if need be, a wage earner from the private sector, an artisan, the shaykh and the

moqaddam representing the local authority, an agent of authority, an intermediate-level technician, civil servants of levels 1, 2 and 3, a representative of the local agricultural credit fund who knows its customers well, a representative of official circles who knows persons of high income who will not be affected by the census, just as the representative of the agricultural credit fund should know precisely how much 100 or 200 hectares of dry or irrigated farmland bring in.

"There will also be three electors from the electoral body of commune judges. One must note with satisfaction that the king's decision to institute the system of communal judges has yielded its fruit because in all regions of the kingdom, those judges, whose posts were instituted by the law of 1977 and who were elected by wise men, will be witnesses of the virtue, sincerity of statements and honesty of the operation. These qualities are fundamental because the persons who chose those communal judges chose them from among people of a good reputation and who know how to behave with persons before the courts. There is also the representative of the auxiliary forces who lives with the Moroccan people daily and whose testimony is taken into consideration. There is also the representative of the national security in the cities and the representative of the royal gendarmerie in rural areas.

"The king's idea has been transmitted to all these persons. Concerning the question of who is going to head the commission, there have been two suggestions. The first consists in the organization of direct elections by universal voting with a relative majority within the district where the preliminary census commission will be set up. But His Majesty did not choose that proposal because the work we are going to accomplish, while being fundamental and necessary, is limited in time. That is why the king has decided that the president of the commission should be chosen from among the members of the commission or any other person. This matter will be examined by the appeal and approval commission headed by the king's governor and the names of whose members we shall learn later."

Census Sheet

"The purpose of the census sheet is to collect information on families. This information is of three kinds. The first concerns the civil status of the family -- that is, the names of the father and other members of the family. The second concerns family property: property of the father and other members of the family. As you know, the income of each family depends on the property and work of each member of the family. It is therefore natural for property to be known so that the commissions in charge of the census may evaluate family income. The third type of information has to do with family activities and resources. As I have said, resources come from the work of members of the family or property.

"The census sheet tells us about the main activity of the head of the family and other activities in which he may engage, as well as other sources of income. It also gives us an idea of the income of other members of the family if they have some job.

"The fourth type of information has to do with family expenses because every family has income and obligations. It is therefore natural for the census commission to know what the obligations of the family are. There are also some obligations that give an idea about the standard of living of the family, for example, the consumption of water, electricity, taxes, and so on. These elements will help the commission to learn the income and standard of living of families involved in the census.

"Finally, the information sheet contains the results of the operation -- that is, the evaluations of the commissions on the basis of the information that I have mentioned. The commissions can also gather testimony confirming their judgments and evaluations."

Practical Methods of the Operation

In answer to a question on the practical procedures of the census, Basri responded as follows:

"It is the duty of authorities in charge of the operation to use all possible means, even traditional (town criers), to inform the people because, as I have said, it will initially generally involve small districts, quarters, streets or douars.

"An office will be set up for the meetings of this primary census and identification commission. The members of the commission will carefully fill out the census sheet and instructions have been issued by King Hassan II to the walis and governors in all regions of the kingdom. A circular has also been sent to every member of the commission. The sovereign has issued instructions that in the case of doubt about the statements of a head of family, the commission itself will seek proof concerning the accuracy of statements made by the parties in question.

"The census is not based on considerations of a fiscal nature, but solely concerns property that is the source of income for the head of the family, to the exclusion of all other property. That is the spirit of the census."

Vast Information Campaign

"A vast information campaign will be launched to urge citizens to go to commission headquarters. The latter is to be open daily, in keeping with the high royal instructions.

"As one can observe, there are four signatures at the bottom of the page in addition to that of the chairman of the commission.

"In case of conflict, the person who made the declaration of his property may submit the question to the investigative and appeals commission, either at the level of the rural commune or cercle or at the level of an urban district under the pacha.

"This investigative and appeals commission will be responsible for investigating the daily work done by the primary census and identification commission. It

will also rule on appeals filed by citizens and authorities who deem that there has been some hitch in the proper conduct of the operation.

"His Majesty has given the commission 10 days to rule on an appeal filed by the head of the family or one of the citizens who has stated that his neighbor has been harmed or included without having the right or when he sees that the commission has attributed income to him lower than is actually the case. That person has the right to call the commission's attention to the subject. If the commission does not take clarifications made by the person into consideration, then the latter can go to the investigative and appeals commission that is closest and that is at the echelon of the rural commune or municipality, as in the case of Moulay Driss Zarhoun, for example, or of the districts in the case of large cities such as Casablanca, Rabat and Sale. The appeals and investigative commission is made up of the caïd for the rural commune, the pacha for the small municipalities such as Berrechid, Moulay Driss Zarhoun, Chemmaia, Youssoufia, or the khalif in the case of a large city.

"There is also the *mouhtassib*, who is perfectly acquainted with the daily life of the people in both the sectors of handicrafts and commerce and who is also an expert on moral questions. The presence of the *mouhtassib* is of great moral significance, given his thorough knowledge of things.

"There is also the tax collector, who also knows all inhabitants, as well as the representatives of the professional chambers: Chamber of Agriculture, Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Chamber of Handicrafts.

"In all the provinces, there are the presidents and members of these chambers, who will be able to cover all communes, districts and municipalities and who will be members of the commission. As you know, these merchants know each other very well and their presence on the commission will facilitate things.

"There is also the director of the local agricultural credit fund or his representative, an official representing the intermediate and lower-level employees and an employee of the private sector.

"The task of the latter consists of following up on the daily work of the primary census and identification commission, which will have a record in which all persons covered by the census and whose income is under what we consider high enough are registered.

"This being their primary task, the second is, as I said at the beginning of my speech, to rule on cases of conflict within a period of 10 days.

"They must then submit their work to the third commission, that of appeal and approval instituted at the level of the province and headed by the king's governor. It is made up of the presiding magistrate of the court of the first instance, the tax collector, the regional director of the national agricultural credit fund, presidents of the professional chambers (Chamber of Agriculture, Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Chamber of Handicrafts), the regional director of the National Social Security Fund, a representative of the different professional unions represented at the level of the prefectures

and provinces. One should emphasize here that His Majesty has insisted that the unions be represented because they are aware of the level of wages, the obligations and situation of the working class.

"Their presence is therefore fundamental. This commission also includes the head of provincial security, the provincial commander of the royal gendarmerie and the commanding officer of the auxiliary forces.

"The chairman of the commission may also appoint any person who might, because of his opinions and knowledge, contribute to the work of the commission. An appeals commission will be set up so that any person not content with the decision of the investigative commission might find a way to appeal to the king's governor, who, as the king's representative in the province, must accept all complaints and rule. Governors have therefore been instructed to rule on all complaints with the approval and signature of all members of the commission present."

National Solidarity Operation.

The minister of interior continued:

"The king accurately compared this census to the Green March because it is in fact a wide-ranging operation aimed at instituting impregnable national solidarity.

"The king indicated in his speech that the solutions will be adopted once the data are available, but we must realize that it is not the wealthier people who will pay new taxes to benefit the poor, as certain rumors would have it. Those rumors are false.

"His Majesty explained in his speech that if there is any increase, it cannot be blind. It will be borne by those who have the means to do so. As for the others, the government has the means to help them. It was in that sense that the king compared this operation to the Green March, which remains an epic unique in world annals. The Green March which our generation experienced and whose artisan is the king is a source of pride for any Moroccan because it is an event without equal.

"The comparison between the two operations therefore stems from their nobility because thanks to the mobilization of the citizens and their patriotic spirit, it will be possible to carry out today's operation.

"Our appeal will be made to all those who feel they need to enroll. Those whose income is known should refrain from overloading the commission because it will take a whole hour to fill out every sheet.

"That is why the primary census and identification commission will have a basic role and its action must be waged in a spirit of loyalty, patriotism and reliability.

"His Majesty has issued instructions that supervision be extremely strict. In his speech, he appealed to the Moroccan people to make this operation a model

for other countries and a subject of technical, scientific and university studies.

"As His Majesty has said, this situation is common to all countries. When the minister of finance even has talks with officials from countries that grant us loans or from international financial institutions, he realizes that Morocco is among the most respected countries. That is why the commitments asked of Morocco preserve its dignity, sovereignty and freedom of action. These officials have affirmed that Morocco's economy is in good shape, that in a year it will be able to request loans without conditions or limits. That is why the operation we are launching will ease our task at home and abroad. Therefore, the morals and virtue of this operation are fundamental and will, I am convinced, inspire the conduct of citizens whose good will and seriousness will make it possible to carry it out successfully."

Giving more details on the organization and planning of the census operation, Basri stated:

"The kingdom of Morocco is made up of 47 prefectures and provinces including 852 local communities. Each rural or urban commune or autonomous center is subdivided into districts.

"Based on the experience we have accumulated since independence, we have seen that the best territorial subdivision was the district set up for the 1960 census, that of 1971 and 1982. These subdivisions have made it possible to know the territory well and thus, the number of primary commissions will be between 16,000 and 18,000.

"In Beni Mellal province, for example, the appeals commission will sit in the city of Beni Mellal, while the primary commissions, which will number over 400, will be scattered over the different districts.

"All these commissions will work in cooperation with the king's governor and it will be the king who will judge what must be undertaken."

Basri concluded:

"His Majesty is closely following this operation, which is unique by virtue of its nature and essence, its scope and noble objectives aimed at reaffirming national solidarity. He has instructed the members of the government to tour the country explaining it in order to ensure the complete success of the operation."

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CSO: 4519/74

PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS OF MOVEMENT OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 20 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] Tunis, LE TEMPS--The first congress of the Movement of Social Democrats (MDS) ended late Sunday evening after 3 days' work. MDS Secretary General Ahmed Mestiri announced the results of the session at a press conference.

"The congress approved a series of resolutions and motions concerning the political, social and economic fields that reflect the substance of the movement's doctrine and its policy applications."

The congress elected the 81 members of the National Council by a majority of 211 to 34 and 13 abstentions. This body is composed of the members of the Political Bureau, the secretaries general of the federations, and two members elected by each federation, as well as 12 other members not belonging to the federations but holding responsibility in the special committees or in the movement's information bodies.

The 12 members are: Hachemi Ayari, Sadok Gaiji, Mme Khediya Saadallah, Tarek Ben Jaafar, Abdelaziz Mestiri, Iadh Ouerdanni, Hedi El Hbou, Mohamed Bennour, Khemais Chemmari, Taieb Boumlala, Hamadi Belarbi, and Bousairi Bou Abdallah.

The National Council also has two other members: Mohamed Ali Khalfallah of Gafsa region, and Abdelaziz Belassine of Siliana region, pending establishment of federations in these two regions. The names of the other members have not been announced.

Ahmed Mestiri also stated that the congress elected the movement's secretary general, Ahmed Mestiri himself, and the members of the Political Bureau as follows:

Secretary general Ahmed Mestiri

Members and also deputy secretaries general: Ismail Boulahya, Abdessatar El Ajmi, Mohamed Mouaada, Daly Jazi, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, Fethi Tebourbi, Said Naceur Romdhane, Omar Ben Mahmoud, and Abdellhay Chouika.

Next Congress in 1985

The participants decided to hold the next congress of the MDS in 1985, and to convene the National Council in special session to sum up the congress and to elect members of the discipline committee and two members in charge of checking finances.

Ahmed Mestiri also announced that the congress approved establishment of an enlarged Political Bureau to include, in addition to its members, the secretaries general of the federations.

Closing Speech

During the closing session that preceded the press conference, Ahmed Mestiri made a speech in which he expressed his happiness at the success of "this congress, which achieved the main objective for which it was held, that is, public and legal affirmation of the movement's existence on the political scene, thus confirming pluralism's becoming a reality."

He added: "This event is an achievement not only for our movement but also for Tunisia, its president, and its people."

"This achievement places on us a heavy responsibility that the movement, leaders, staff, and members altogether, are capable of assuming," he said, adding that "we are fully aware of the problems and obstacles in the path of achieving other objectives."

Credibility

The MDS secretary general continued: "The challenge was not so much the holding of this congress as the emergence of our movement in this decisive phase in Tunisian history, and particularly for the MSD to gain sufficient credibility to win the confidence of the public and the majority of the Tunisian people."

"We will only succeed in this challenge through our seriousness and our ability to clearly express our views and our vision of the future."

Ahmed Mestiri added that we must now define the approaches in our relationships on the political scene with those who do not share our views, whether within the government or outside, it being understood that these relationships must conform to the law. "We will concentrate on making ourselves more open to the vital and progressive elements in the society, that is, the young people, the workers, the deprived, and the civil servants, as well as all who want to work for the transformation of the society."

Ahmed Mestiri added: "Our movement does not favor one class over another, or one region over another, because our vision is directed at radical transformation of the country in the social, economic and political fields."

"Furthermore, our movement's political, economic, and social conception applies only to Tunisia, and we do not want to dictate our ideas to any other people, just as we refuse to have a foreign conception imposed on us."

Final Day's Proceedings

The congress devoted the third and last day of its work to discussion of the resolutions prepared by the committees:

--Statutes and internal regulations committee, chaired by Daly Jazi.

--Politics affairs committee, chaired by Mohamed Mouaada.

--Economic and social affairs committee, chaired by Abdelhay Chouikha.

The discussion of the report of the first committee mentioned covered various points relating to the vacancy in the Political Bureau and the formation of the committee for discipline and mass organizations. The document was approved. Three delegates abstained.

The political committee report was in four sections.

During the debate on the party ideology, which proclaims that the MSD's action should be guided by three principles--democracy, socialism, and the Arab-Muslim identity of the Tunisian people, several issues were raised, in particular the definition of the presidential mandate and ownership of the means of production.

Intervening in the discussion on the issue of the presidential mandate, Ahmed Mestiri made the following two points: "We have no intention to impugn the person of President Bourguiba, to whom the movement pledges its respect and esteem."

"The presidency of the Republic is the highest function in the state machinery, and it must have an aura of respect and esteem."

This expression received majority approval, with five negative votes and six abstentions.

The second section on Palestine was approved by the majority of Congress delegates, with one negative vote and 13 abstentions.

The third section on foreign policy received majority approval. On the fourth, concerning internal policy, one delegate voted against it and seven abstained.

In regard to the other documents voted on, the delegates discussed, then approved, the report on social affairs (five opposed, eight abstentions), and the report on education, culture and information (three opposed, three abstentions).

In respect to the economic report, the discussion dealt in particular with leasing land to foreign nationals, an issue that elicited opposition among the delegates but that had been recommended in the committee report. The paragraph was unanimously disapproved (with a flood of abstentions), but it was retained in the report.

The final vote on the report was as follows: approval by majority, with five opposed and four abstentions.

9920

CSO: 4519/81

LAW REDIVIDING COUNTRY INTO TWENTY-THREE GOVERNORATES

Tunis JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE in French No 79, 6 Dec 83
pp 3138, 3139

[Text] Law No 83-104 of 3 December 1983, amending the decree of 21 June 1956
on administrative organization of the Republic.*

In the name of the people,

We, Habib Bourguiba, president of the Tunisian Republic;

The Chamber of Deputies having approved it,

Promulgate the law providing as follows:

Only Article. The provisions of article 1 of the decree of 21 June 1956 giving
the administrative organization of the territory of the Republic, amended and
supplemented by later issuances, are repealed and replaced by the following
provisions:

Article 1 (new). The territory of the Republic is divided into 23 territorial
administrative areas called "governorates" each bearing the name of its
capital, according to the following list:

- Governorate of Tunis with capital the town of Tunis;
- Governorate of Ariana with capital the town of Ariana;
- Governorate of Bizerte with capital the town of Bizerte;
- Governorate of Beja with capital the town of Beja;
- Governorate of Jendouba with capital the town of Jendouba;
- Governorate of Kef with capital the town of Kef;
- Governorate of Siliana with capital the town of Siliana;
- Governorate of Kasserine with capital the town of Kasserine;

* Preparatory work: discussion and approval by the Chamber of Deputies at its
session of 22 November 1983.

- Governorate of Sidi Bouzid with capital the town of Sidi Bouzid;
- Governorate of Gafsa with capital the town of Gafsa;
- Governorate of Tozeur with capital the town of Tozeur;
- Governorate of Kebili with capital the town of Kebili;
- Governorate of Tataouine with capital the town of Tataouine;
- Governorate of Medenine with capital the town of Medenine;
- Governorate of Gabes with capital the town of Gabes;
- Governorate of Sfax with capital the town of Sfax;
- Governorate of Mahdia with capital the town of Mahdia;
- Governorate of Monastir with capital the town of Monastir;
- Governorate of Sousse with capital the town of Sousse;
- Governorate of Kairouan with capital the town of Kairouan;
- Governorate of Zaghouan with capital the town of Zaghouan;
- Governorate of Nabeul with capital the town of Nabeul;
- Governorate of Ben Arous with capital the town of Ben Arous.

This law will be published in the JOURNAL OFFICIELLE DE LA REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE and implemented as a state law.

Done in the Carthage Palace, 3 December 1983
President of the Tunisian Republic
Habib Bourguiba

9920

CSO: 4519/81

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

ALUMINUM EXPORTS INCREASE--Manama, 23 Jan (WAKH)--In a statement published today an official of Aluminum Bahrain (Alba) Company said that Alba's exports reached a record level in 1982. He said that 215,000 metric tons were exported while the company's storage of finished aluminum fell from 100,000 to 50,000 tons. He said that this rise in exports has taken place despite the 13 percent increase in the cost of production in the past 6 years. He said that the production of smelted aluminum exceeded the plant's mean production capacity and totaled 170,000 metric tons. [Summary] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 0743 GMT 23 Jan 84 GF]

CSO: 4400/134

SYSTEM, FINANCIAL CRISIS IN HIGHER EDUCATION VIEWED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Maurice Brull: "Crisis in Higher Education"]

[Text]

THE CLOSURE of Israel's seven universities, scheduled for this morning, because of budgetary conflict with the government, was averted at the last minute. Spared for the time being were the students, the academic and administrative staffs, industry and, above all, the country itself.

In the midst of the present tempest of threats and counter-threats, statements and misstatements, sight has been lost of the real nature of the problem and its causes. Until these are recognized, there will be little chance of a permanent resolution and the higher education system will continue to lurch from financial crisis to financial crisis, to the detriment of all.

Identifying the nature of the problem is essential, and requires an examination of the various ways of financing higher education.

There are basically two kinds of financial structures applicable to higher education: government or state universities and private universities. Government university systems exist in many countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain (for example, in West Germany, France, the Soviet Union and in most states of the U.S.).

In a state university system, most (but not all) of the budget is supplied by the government acting through an appropriate agency. The state decides on the level of budgetary support, sets goals on

enrolment, decides on the number and nature of academic staff positions and generally takes an important part in university operations. The state also sets the level of tuition, which is usually small.

In some cases, the tuition fee is dispensed with entirely, but generally it represents 10 per cent or less of the budget.

As an example, we may cite the French system, in which tuition is nominal, and the American state universities, where tuition for a state resident is at present \$3,000 to \$4,000 a year.

In a state system, 80 per cent or more of the operating budget is contributed by the government either as a direct annual allocation or through endowments (as in the case of the so-called land grant colleges in the U.S.). The other 20 per cent is contributed by tuition income, private fund-raising, and income from research contracts.

IN OPPOSITION to the state university system, there exist in many countries private institutions of higher learning. These have generally been created by philanthropic individuals or organizations, by religious organizations, or through local civic initiative.

Such institutions usually start with a basic income-producing endowment and their growth is often limited by their fund-raising ability. Some private universities remain

small liberal arts institutions, but others have grown into prestigious multi-disciplinary centres, such as Harvard, Stanford and MIT.

Almost without exception, private universities receive substantial subsidies from local or national government, but this represents between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of the operating budget and the state does not participate in operational decisions or in setting tuition.

Thus, a private university, like any other organization providing a service, is free to fix what it considers an adequate price for its service. This it does by considering its budgetary needs, the level of government subsidy, endowment income, and income from other services it offers, such as contract research.

The fact that a government supplies a subsidy to such a university does not entitle it to set the tuition. (As a parallel consider national airlines: they receive subsidies, but their fares are governed by market forces and agreements between airlines).

Income sources for a typical private university are divided as follows: endowment income, 35 per cent; government subsidy, 25 per cent; research, 20 per cent; tuition 20 per cent. The tuition in typical private universities is now about \$9,000 a year, a figure that sometimes varies with faculty (medicine, life sciences, music, or engineering cost more than history or philosophy).

IF WE EXAMINE the system of higher education in Israel in the light of these remarks and in its historical context, we are led to rather startling conclusions as to the cause of the present crisis. Two Israeli universities — the Hebrew University and the Technion — antedate the state and, therefore, were created and grew as private institutions, at least until 1948. After independence, these institutions started receiving subsidies from the government, and these contributions grew to a level amounting to between 75 per cent and 80 per cent of operating budgets. Thus, although these institutions con-

tinued to be called private, they functioned essentially as state universities.

New universities were created as a result of individual or community initiative, but the government, while giving formal or informal encouragement, was not the prime mover in the creation and development of these "new-comers." Since higher education was recognized as essential to both the defence effort and economic development, these new "private" universities were granted government financial support. They naturally struggled to get their fair share which, of course, meant that they strived to receive the same level of support as their older sister institutions.

Thus, with periodic dislocations, when new institutions appeared, the system grew willy-nilly to what was essentially a state university system although it was never given that name. In due course, the Ministry of Education created the National Council for Higher Education and established the Planning and Grants Committee, commonly known as VATAT (acronym for Va'ada LeTichnun ve Tiktzu). Even while the system was functioning essentially as a state system, most of the development funds (that is, buildings, major equipment, etc.) came from fund-raising and outside sponsored research. A few years ago, the Treasury insisted that, as long as it was footing an important part of the bill, it should be part and party to all salary discussions and should have authority to set tuition fees.

THIS SITUATION prevailed until the Rabin government, for reasons it never made clear, decided to cut university budgets in a sudden and drastic fashion. This policy, which was implemented rapidly and without much thought for its long-term implications, was continued by the Begin government. And, if the present crisis is any indication, it may be adopted as well by the Shamir government.

Within a few years, the government contribution to university budgets has been decreased from nearly 80 per cent to somewhat under 60 per cent, and the Treasury is

proposing a further cut of 8 per cent. At the same time, the government has continued to set tuition and to control salaries.

Responding to this drastic loss of support, universities have cut academic staff by 3 per cent, administrative staff by 11 per cent, and services have been so curtailed that the level of education has already suffered. Some activities have been abandoned for lack of facilities and library purchases have been suspended.

These retrenchments may not have an immediate and obvious effect, but they nevertheless affect the quality of education. In addition to the decrease of academic staff, there has been a freeze in new positions, which has resulted in many promising young Israelis deciding to emigrate in search of academic positions overseas.

Many of these are graduates of Israeli universities who have obtained doctorates from distinguished institutions overseas and cannot return home for lack of positions.

Thus, a brain-drain has been created which will be difficult to stem, and of course aliya of experienced academic personnel has all but stopped.

ONE MIGHT ASK how the universities have survived so far. It is clear that this was accomplished at the cost of severe cuts, compensated partially by strong fund-raising efforts on the part of the various university administrations. These efforts certainly deserve great praise and have probably exceeded reasonable expectations. But they cannot, in such a short time, bear enough fruit to make up for the loss of income.

In addition to retrenchments and to outside fund-raising, the university system has so far survived by keeping academic and administrative salaries low. According to studies by two government committees and by a compulsory arbitration board, there has been a substantial erosion of salaries with respect to the Israeli economy.

Although former finance minister Yoram Aridor chose not to honour a compulsory arbitration decision

— and then chose to ignore a court order to comply and pay up — this does not alter the facts.

As a result, the drop in government subsidy has been made up, in part, by a subsidy to the student on the part of the academic and administrative staffs of the universities. Sooner or later, this situation will become intolerable.

Some people chose to criticize the research activities of the universities and question whether certain fields should be pursued at all because "they do not contribute to the economy." Yet when the Technion, supported by David Ben-Gurion, created a department of aeronautical engineering, there was no thought of setting up an aircraft industry. Over the years this department has provided much of the technical personnel of the Armaments Authority (Rafael), of the Israel Aircraft Industries and of the Israel Air Force.

Thus, what might have been perceived at the time as a visionary, impractical idea became the backbone of an important national activity years later. Similar comments could be made about the Shiloah Institute at Tel Aviv University and many others.

It should be emphasized that activity in the humanities and social sciences is as important as that in the so-called hard sciences. The preservation of social and cultural values is as important to the country as the development of its industry or economy, and it can only be ensured by promoting all intellectual endeavour.

FINALLY, it should be said that besides enhancing knowledge and bringing in hard currency, university research has brought to the country a great deal of prestige through the respect and regard that Israeli researchers enjoy abroad. It is difficult and would be undesirable to measure such factors in terms of money.

If we examine the distribution of support in Israeli universities, we see that what was essentially a state university system (in fact, if not in name) has been, over the last few years, substantially shifted towards a private university system, and this

without freeing the tuition level. I believe that this change in philosophy has in fact not been recognized even by those who originated it.

It seems to me that if the government decides to move in the direction of a private system (a move which I personally favour for reasons which are outside the scope of this article), that decision should be made knowingly, and the long-term level of subsidy support should be established as a goal to be attained over a period of some years.

Thus, an orderly and planned transition could be effected so as to avoid further disruptions.

The tuition level as fixed by the government today is \$615 per year and it is claimed that the government has undertaken to maintain this level for five years. It should be noted that this university tuition is lower than nursery school fees.

This would not be surprising if we were comparing state universities with private nursery schools, but for a private university system the comparison is simply ludicrous. The present tuition income represents approximately 8 per cent of the operating budget, while for a private university system receiving a 50 per cent state subsidy, it should be closer to 15 per cent.

It is interesting to note that a tuition increment of \$600 applied today would produce an income from 60,000 students of \$36m., which is very nearly equal to the IS4 billion debt which the Treasury refuses to pay.

IN MY OPINION, most of the academic community is in agreement with the finance minister's stated objective of cutting expenses and improving the balance of payments.

It must be realized, however, that the higher education system has already paid its dues by implementing a real retrenchment over the last few years. No other sector of the economy can make this claim.

I believe the answer to the present crisis does not lie in further arbitrary budget cuts, but rather in the implementation of a number of possible measures based on the realiza-

tion that we are moving towards a truly private university system. Such measures should include:

- An immediate increase of tuition by at least \$800 and setting the tuition for next year at \$2,000. In addition, the government should, in the long term, decide on its subsidy level and thereafter cease to interfere in tuition or salary matters. The alternative is a return to a state university system as one cannot have it both ways;

- Creation of scholarship funds to provide tuition support for students of outstanding ability who lack financial means. Such funds could come in the short term from various public sources and in the long term from fund-raising efforts;

- Creation of government-supported loan funds which would allow students ineligible for scholarships to nevertheless finance a university education;

- Adoption of a programme similar to those existing in a number of countries (e.g. France) whereby a student can attend certain institutions free of tuition and even receive a salary, provided he undertakes either to work in appropriate government positions for 10 years after graduation, or to reimburse the cost of his education over a period of 10 years following graduation. Such programmes should, of course, be adapted to the conditions of the Israeli economy.

THE QUESTION arises as to whether the typical Israeli student could afford to pay the required tuition levels. One look at university parking lots will convince anyone that at least a portion of the students (or their parents) can well afford \$2,000 a year.

As to the others, they should be taken care of through the other financing schemes outlined above.

Borrowing for an education may be frowned upon in this country, but it is certainly more worth while than borrowing for a car, an appliance, or even an apartment. Finally, it seems to me that a country which has just spent \$500m. to support bank stocks could afford to create, at a small fraction of that sum, a loan fund, the interest of which could support thousands of

students.

The protagonists of the present drama are VATAT, the Ministry of Education, the Committee of University Presidents, and the Treasury.

It is to be hoped that reason will prevail and that their discussions will result in some form of long-term programme and the mechanism for an orderly transition to the new system.

Failure to reach this objective will result in a closure which would do irreversible damage to higher education in this country. Let us hope it can be avoided.

CSO: 4400/115

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFECT UNIVERSITIES

Tel Aviv NEWSVIEW in English No 49, 20 Dec 83 p 15

[Article by Roberta Elliott: "Going for Broke"]

[Text]

Israel's universities were on the brink of closure this week as debts continued to accrue and the rift between the nation's institutions of higher learning and the Finance Ministry deepened (see *Newsview*, November 8). Heads of the nation's seven universities put the government on notice: their institutions would shut down if Finance Ministry funds were not transferred by the middle of December. "We're closing because we simply don't have the money to operate," said an official of Jerusalem's Hebrew University.

Although universities have been experiencing gradual budgetary cutbacks for the better part of a decade, the pinch came last March when the Finance Ministry made approval of the 1983-84 academic allotments contingent upon a 7.5 percent across-the-board cut in university budgets. Despite the universities' compliance, to this day the Finance Ministry has withheld funds. More recently, Finance Ministry officials came back to the universities demanding they lop off an additional eight percent — 2.5 percent from salaries and 5.5 from operational expenses — before budgets can be approved and funds properly disbursed.

By exactly what authority the Finance Ministry can hold the universities hostage is unclear. There are those who believe the ministry is simply trying to get back the money promised university faculties last March, when the Association of Faculty Staff won a court battle against the ministry for higher wages. For the ministry's part, spokeswoman Ariella Ravdal insists busi-

ness is proceeding as usual, with monthly payments to the universities current. According to Dov Keren Yar, secretary-general of the Council for Higher Education, an independent body which channels money from the Finance Ministry to the universities, since the start of the 1983-84 fiscal year on April 1, the ministry has only transferred enough money each month to cover faculty and staff salaries. "The Finance Ministry's current debt to the universities is already two billion shekels," says Keren Yar.

On paper the government had allocated Haifa's Technion 700 million shekels for the first quarter of the 1983-84 academic year. But that was predicated on a 100-percent inflation rate and an exchange rate of 70 shekels per dollar. Based on today's shekel rate of 100, the Technion is due 1.1 billion shekels, or a first-quarter loss of \$250,000 in an overall annual budget of \$75.3 million-dollars.

The universities claim they are unable to reduce salaries, since they are protected by contract. As a result, explains Hebrew University spokesman Beni Mushkin, "the eight percent the Finance Ministry is asking for can only be taken from the 20 percent of our budget used for operating expenses. Therefore it is tantamount to a 40-percent cut."

If the universities are hard pressed meeting operational expenses, let alone cutting them back, they are having even greater trouble making income tax payments. As a whole the universities owe the state 1.5 billion shekels in back

taxes, with one billion due from the Hebrew University alone. Income-tax authorities have already secured an attachment order against the assets of Bar-Ilan University, one of the country's newest and least financially secure, because of unpaid taxes.

Until recently the Council for Higher Education had been permitting universities to borrow money at local and foreign banks, thereby "pawning off our futures," according to one Technion official. A month ago, the Council put a stop to all bank loans "because we are sure the universities will never be able to repay them," explains Keren Yar.

With this last resource dried up, the universities' choices are limited: resolve their differences with the government, or close. At week's end, university heads had scheduled an eleventh-hour meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. In addition, some 780 scientists and lecturers from all the country's universities and research institutes this week signed a letter to Shamir warning him that scientific research has virtually come to a standstill because of budget cuts. Meanwhile, the Tel Aviv University Student Association has come out in favor of the impending closure, provided the university administration will in turn fight a tuition increase for the current academic year.

In the event they fail to gain the prime minister's intervention, the institutions will close immediately. Tel Aviv University, the nation's largest, will run on a Saturday schedule, with laboratory animals and experiments tended, lawns watered, and research projects and programs funded by foreign sources maintained. According to Hebrew University director-general Yisrael Bargil, that institution's closure will be "as hermetic as possible."

Although in the past strikes have shut down the universities, this week's impending closure is the first ever for lack of funds. "No one really thinks this will come to pass," said a Tel Aviv University official. "But, then again, nobody ever thought the doctors would walk out either."

CONVEYOR BELT PROPOSED TO AID POTASH TRANSPORT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by Liora Moriel: "Potash Problems"]

[Text]

THE Dead Sea Works could be producing 2.1 million tons of potash per annum by the end of 1983. Although the Jordanians have aped Israeli settlements and industry along the common southern border and also have a potash project, the price of Israeli potash is still highly competitive.

The problem of how to transport the potash to the nearest port is one that the company has grappled with since it was established during the Mandate.

Originally, the potash was shipped to the northern shore of the Dead Sea, whence it was transported on trucks to Jerusalem. From there, it was sent by rail to Haifa Port and on to world markets.

After 1948, the development of the Negev region became a major goal. Roads were constructed to Sdom and ports were established at Eilat and Ashdod.

But the volume today is more than the roads can bear. The slow trucks driving up the curves hugging the hills from the Dead Sea (some 400 metres below sea level) to the Rotem plain (400 metres above sea level) choke the narrow road and hamper the traffic.

Seeking a faster and more efficient way of transporting its minerals (common salt as well as potash), the company chose the "conveyor belt" system but then ran into several problems.

The company paper recommending the system is nothing short

of rhapsodic: "It will run across the area in a nearly straight line, about 18km. long. It will more or less hug the ground... The conveyor will carry about 600 tons per hour. It will be covered from the sides, and from above, against wind and rain. It will not spill material over the sides, nor will there be any emission of dust; it creates practically no noise."

At first glance, the conveyor belt seems to be an environmentalist's dream: progress without pollution. On closer scrutiny, however the snags become evident. The company admits one of the problems is that, "as it follows the ground, some damage to the beauty of the landscape will be unavoidable in certain places, where it has to be carried across a declivity on an earth-embankment or even a bridge, or where a steep rise cannot be negotiated and a passage has to be cut into a mountain."

The ultimate destination of the conveyor belt will be the Tsefa (Oran) railway station, on the proposed rail route to Eilat. From there, railway cars will transport the potash and salt to Ashdod Port.

ZVI TSAFRIRI, general manager of Israel Railways, believes he has a better solution: not to bring the minerals up to the railway station but to extend the line down to the Dead Sea.

"There is nothing like a railway line to develop a region," Tsafiriri told *The Jerusalem Post*. "I am cer-

tain that there is no development in the Negev because there is no railway."

On October 10, *The Post* carried a story to the effect that Canadian Pacific had proposed funding just such an extension, to the tune of \$44 million. "Payment-in-kind would be accepted by Canadian Pacific in the form of phosphates, and tourism services for organized groups of Canadian tourists visiting Israel," the article explained.

Israel Railways is of course delighted ("the Canadians are willing to fund the whole project on excellent terms"), but the government has not yet made up its mind.

While the decision to build the conveyor belt was taken some time ago, and the Dead Sea Works have already submitted plans to the regional planning commission, it appears that the surprising Canadian offer is being taken seriously and may supplant the original decision. However, the company itself is not commenting officially on the matter, and spokeswoman Ella Bar-Or says only that "nothing is closed, there are no summations, everything is still under discussion at this stage."

Bar-Or claims that there are no undue problems transporting the potash today, and that at any rate the Dead Sea Works bought Israel Railways' cargo cars for its own use last year. "We want to reduce our costs, but at the moment we have no problems as far as transportation goes. We are constructing neither rail lines nor conveyor system."

The conveyor is touted as a two-way line, capable of carrying coal to the Sdom power plant once it converts to coal. Tsafiriri claims that the railway, too, can be "multi-purpose," and has the added advantage of being part of the proposed

Trans-Negev Railway Line Project, which is a national priority (at least on paper).

"The line is still alive and appears in our master plan. We want the train to Eilat. Is it feasible? No, at this stage it is not," said Tsafiriri. "There is only one track and the tracking time is very expensive."

Yitzhak Shitrit, the southern district's planning engineer, said categorically that the proposed conveyor belt will only be authorized if it does not harm the environment in any way. "They [the Dead Sea Works] say that this is possible, but we want to see the effects on the scenery. For one thing, there is a nature reserve along the way. We want to ensure that hikers will not be hampered and that wildlife will not be harmed by the conveyor belt."

Shitrit added that both plans, the conveyor belt and the rail extension, have been approved in principle, but the planning commission is not the executor of either. If state monies are involved the Treasury will make the final decision; if the Dead Sea Works has the money itself, then it will make the final decision as to how to transport its own potash. But the ecological problems have to be ironed out.

Meanwhile, the Nature Protection Society has petitioned the Dead Sea Works not to go ahead with its conveyor-belt project because it is not compatible with the projected railway line to Eilat and will cause extensive damage to the area.

But the decision, because of the current economic crisis, may well be delayed. Meanwhile, both projects will be presented for debate at the Sixth World Congress of Engineers and Architects at the Tel Aviv Hilton on December 18-23.

BRIEFS

LAND FOR ARAB EVACUEES--NAZARETH--The Lands Administration has allocated some 70 plots to be given free to evacuees from the village of Kadita, the director of the northern branch of the office of the Prime Minister's adviser on Arab affairs, said yesterday. Motti Masiah said that the government wants to compensate the evacuees for the loss of their land and for poor living conditions since 1948. The evacuees settled in Akbara after their evacuation from Kadita, during the War of Independence. Since then the evacuees have lived in huts, due to governmental refusal to allow them to construct permanent houses. Each plot will be half a dunam. The government has also reportedly budgeted money to buy a school, to pave an access road, and to link the village to the national electric grid and water supply. [Yoel Dar] Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Dec 83 p 3]

CSO: 4400/115

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

TRANSFER OF RESIDENT PERMITS--'Isa al-Yasin, undersecretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, has denied the continued suspension of the transfer and cancellation of residence permits of those working in Kuwait without exception or of any nationality, noting that these processes are only passing through more stringent measures. In an exclusive statement to AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 'Isa al-Yasin said that the files have not been suspended more than 1 week and then only for the purpose of reorganizing the office and to use very stringent measures on these files with regard to the signatures of employers and their countersignatures and required evidence. Al-Yasin said the ministry continues to issue work permits to national commercial companies which have dealings with the government provided that these companies have work and contracts which are executed by the government and that persons who are being brought into the country possess engineering and technical qualifications which are not available in the country and their works are with companies. He said this applies to the companies which are 51-percent owned by the government. He added that the ministry has suspended issuing work permits for national companies which do not have dealings with the government for an unspecified period. "I hope this will end very soon," he said. [Text]
[GF231400 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 22 Jan 84 p 1]

CSO: 4400/133

VIEWS OF LEADING FIGURES ON NEUTRALITY CONCEPT CITED

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 4 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by N. Khalifah: "Fourth Option: Lebanon Between Neutrality and Neutralization; al-Husayni, Austrian Style, Is Only Solution to Lebanon's Problem; Cheysson: Neutralizing Beirut Now in Hope of Neutralizing All of Lebanon Tomorrow; Committee of Intellectuals: Draft Plan for Complete Solution to Lebanese Issue"]

[Text] We will continue in this part to present the views of Lebanese and foreign journalists, politicians and intellectuals on the issue of Lebanon's neutrality.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI magazine gave special attention to the issue of Lebanon's neutrality. In an exclusive edition on "neutrality,"¹ the magazine polled the Lebanese leaders on the issue. Jubran Tuwayni introduced the edition with an article titled "Armed Neutrality" in which he resorted to the method of the knowledgeable man who pretends to be ignorant, thereby raising several questions:

"Can Lebanon be saved by being neutralized?

"Will neutrality be the shield protecting the country against the collapse of the people's unity and against the exposure of the land's and that identity's unity to danger whenever a storm blows through the Arab world, whenever a new leader emerges, whenever a coup occurs or whenever a religious, ideological or emotional wave arrives?"²

As to whether neutrality is "the means to salvation, the missing link, the main guarantee of Lebanon's role and the real safety valve needed," Jubran Tuwayni answered: "Neutrality, neutrality! Yes it is, in our opinion, the only means. But what neutrality? Not Swiss, nor Austrian nor any imported neutrality but a Lebanese neutrality deriving from the will of the Lebanese and reflecting their character, aspirations, history and heritage--an armed neutrality with a capable army that imposes Lebanon's neutrality and protects it with force as its backbone."³

As for the Lebanese politicians polled on the issue of "Lebanon's neutrality," their answers have been varied, and it behooves us to familiarize ourselves with the gist of their answers:

Ex-President Camille Sham'un declared his approval of Lebanon's neutrality vis-a-vis the Arab conflicts. But Lebanon cannot be neutral as long as it is a member of the Arab League and of the United Nations, and it must abide by supporting the Arab states in international conflicts.

Ex-President Charles Hilu set three conditions for this neutrality, namely:

- Its approval by the majority of the citizens.
- Its acceptance by the countries adjacent to Lebanon.
- Its acceptance and assurance by the major powers, especially the two super-powers.

Neutrality does not require Lebanon to withdraw from the Arab League or from the United Nations and it is not likely to detach Lebanon from its cultural, political and economic environment. But neutrality will relieve Lebanon of military commitments. President Hilu pointed out that he had presented this plan as a system for Lebanon a quarter century ago.

Ex-Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam considers "the idea of neutralizing Lebanon as rejected in part and parcel. If those projecting the idea examined it profoundly, they would find that it is rejected at the Lebanese, Arab and international levels because of its practical ramifications. It is a theory that does not apply to the reality, and wading into it is a waste of time."

Ex-Prime Minister Rashid Karami wondered about "what is meant by neutralizing Lebanon, how possible is this to achieve" and how capable is Lebanon of "living in political and economic isolation from its environment" when its role and message in this environment are determined by its presence in the Arab League?

Ex-Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh considered a neutral Lebanon a "land with no role, a society with no goal and a homeland with no causes." The Lebanese in a state of neutrality are very much like a "neglected quantity, as if they were a community in some other country. Neutrality in Lebanon's present situation is tantamount to completing the Lebanese-Israeli accord and to becoming a main factor in uprooting Lebanon from its Arab environment and in changing its identity."

Pierre al-Jumayyil noted that he had presented this plan to the Council of Ministers during the administration of the quadrilateral government in 1959. The plan called not only for neutralizing Lebanon but also for "making it the homeland of man and the meeting point for all civilizations." It is essential that the Lebanese agree on any projected formula, including the neutralization formula. The present goal of the Lebanese is to liberate the land before neutralization.

Munah al-Sulh called for "neutralizing Lebanon militarily and adopting peace politically" within the framework of a political principle that calls for "standing fast in the face of all and not ceding to everybody" and for

determination in keeping Lebanon an Arab country with the commitments to the single Arab affiliation and identity and in keeping it a country that plays an honorable role in the Arab renaissance.

Fadi Afram, the commander of the Lebanese Forces, believes that "neutrality may be a positive thing and a solution that guarantees Lebanon's safety, security and stability." But neutrality cannot be established without international and regional recognition. This requires Syria, for example, to take a position it has refused to take since the inception of the Republic of Lebanon. Neutrality in itself is no solution unless bolstered by a material force to protect it. Neutrality does not mean severing the link with the surrounding environment but puts Lebanon at an equal distance from all the political forces pulling it simultaneously.

Deputy Husayn al-Husayni, the former secretary general of Amal Movement, is one of the Lebanese politicians most enthusiastic about the idea of Lebanon's neutrality, Austrian style. But his concept of neutrality stems from the two facts:

"The first is geographical, namely that Lebanon is located in a strategic area subject to polarization by regional and international forces.

"The second is sociopolitical, namely that Lebanon is comprised of varied religious factions. Whenever it is forced to enter into regional or international axes, it is exposed to internal turmoil and disintegration."

Deputy al-Husayni has pointed out the distortion to which the idea of Lebanon's neutrality has been subjected by some. As a result, this idea "has come to mean in some circles Lebanon's separation from its Arab environment or its evasion of its pan-Arab commitments." However, Israel's entry into the heart of the Lebanese homeland gives the idea of neutrality its importance and credibility because this idea, to the exclusion of all others, realizes five fundamental things in Lebanon's life:

--A transformation without the conclusion of any treaty with Israel, especially in the military sphere. It guarantees Israel's northern borders by a neutral Lebanon and puts an end to the Israeli occupation.

--It permits ousting the Palestinian fighters and the Syrian forces from Lebanon, because naturally there will be no justification for this presence in a neutral country.

--It guarantees the security of Syria's borders with a neutral Lebanon.

--It preserves Lebanon's political, cultural and economic relations with its Arab environment. The ban on military relations does not apply to the other relations.

--It spares Lebanon the cost of building a big modern army whose economic burden Lebanon cannot shoulder.

In all the Arab-Israeli wars, Lebanon has been considered a supporting, not a confrontation, country. This being the case, all Lebanon has to do is to withdraw from the joint defense treaty to reach what Deputy al-Husayni calls neutrality, meaning the only "solution and escape" from its crisis.

Dr 'Abd al-Majid al-Rafi'i, the deputy representing Tripoli, supports, demands and insists on Lebanon's neutrality if it means neutrality in Lebanon's relations with the international camps. Such neutrality reaffirms independence in its national decisions and remoteness from the circles of containment and centers of international polarization. But Lebanon cannot be neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict because Lebanon's belonging to its Arab environment determines the relationship that governs its position vis-a-vis that conflict. Lebanon is an organic part of the Arab nation and, like the other organs, Lebanon performs, and must perform, its task in the course of the Pan-Arab conflict.

Lawyer Nabih Barri, the secretary general of Amal Movement, welcomes neutrality if it means "neutralizing Lebanon from the influences of foreign and international intervention in its political decisions." These influences have always been the cause of the sectarian wars. The policy of axes harms Lebanon's future and exposes Lebanon to the dangers of fragmentation. As for Lebanon's relationship with its Arab environment, this is an indisputable issue, not only from the angle of Lebanon's economic interest but also from the angle of its cultural identity and of its Arab commitments. Therefore, what is required is to "neutralize Lebanon from all the international axes and not from its Arab environment."

Raymond Iddih believes that the real meaning of Lebanon's neutrality is the "establishment of political and trade relations with Israel, and this is what we cannot approve."⁴ As for Pierre Iddih, he has stated in a lecture given in Tripoli that the idea of Lebanon's neutrality vis-a-vis the issues of the Arab countries is rejected and is something that is "unacceptable to reason and logic and to the common future of Lebanon and the Arab countries."⁵

Plan of Lebanese Intellectuals Committee in Paris

The latest plan and solution is a special and undeclared neutrality plan drafted in Paris by a group of Lebanese intellectuals, including Father Yuwakim Mubarak, Dr Basim al-Jisr, Dr George Qurum, Dr 'Isam Khalifah, Dr Ghassan Salamah, Amin al-Ma'luf and Ra'uf Abu Zaki. It was natural to familiarize some of the Lebanese politicians present in Beirut with the plan and to seek their opinions on it.

1. The solution has been phrased in the form of a draft resolution to be presented by the Lebanese government, on the recommendation of the National Reconciliation Committee, to the UN Security Council for approval. The draft resolution includes six provisions (see the text of the original draft resolution next to this article).
2. The first provision underlines Lebanon's borders as defined by the Lebanese constitution and stresses "prohibiting use of the Lebanese territories for any military act by any non-Lebanese party."

3. The second provision calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Lebanese territories and for ending the Syrian and Palestinian military presence in Lebanon.

4. The third provision includes five important points:

--Lebanon's continued adherence to the 1949 truce agreement.

--Linkage of normalization of Lebanon's relations with Israel to a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

--Lebanon's continued membership in the Arab League.

--Freeze on Lebanon's membership in the joint Arab defense treaty.

5. The fourth provision recommends the formation of an international force to safeguard peace in all of Lebanon, provided that the force come from countries not involved directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

6. The fifth provision defines the tasks of the international force as those of "supporting the legitimate Lebanese authorities to implement the following three main objectives:

--"Dissolve all the armed militias and consider the army a united national force working to fuse the society, to protect the borders and the constitutional institutions and to develop the provinces socially and economically.

--"Hold free elections, with the new parliament introducing the necessary amendments to the Lebanese laws on the basis of insuring the rights of all the factions, sects and citizens and insuring the basis of the principles of freedom, democracy and equality.

--"Return all those evicted since 1975 as a result of the acts of war to their homes and secure protection to all the civilian population."

7. The sixth and final provision of the plan calls for considering this UN Security Council resolution tantamount to a "declaration of the new legal status of the Republic of Lebanon. The permanent members of the Security Council shall guarantee this status, as they shall guarantee the immediate implementation of this resolution with all the means stipulated by the UN charter."

8. A careful examination of the plan's provisions, especially the first, third and sixth provisions, confirms that the new legal international status of the Republic of Lebanon is the status of neutrality, even though the text does not state this frankly.

9. Finally, it must be noted that this plan was presented to President Amin al-Jumayyil by Father Yuwakim Mubarak on behalf of the Lebanese Intellectuals Committee in Paris. There is more than one sign that the French government welcomes this plan and solution. The speculation goes even further to say that the mission of the French delegation which visited Moscow recently under

the chairmanship of Francis Gutmman, the director of the French foreign relations, was to persuade the Soviets to approve this plan!

Lebanese Neutrality at Arab and International Levels

Lebanon's neutrality has not been the object of attention by just the Lebanese. Rather, this plan has been projected at the Arab and international levels, and more than one party has expressed its opinion, either advocating it or warning against it.

First, at the Arab level:

Butrus Ghali, the Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, stated in an interview published by AL-AHRAM on 30 July 1982 that "turning Lebanon into a neutral country, like Switzerland, can solve the crisis there" and pointed out that "permanent neutrality will insure Lebanon's sovereignty, security and national unity." Ghali also said: "If the Lebanese people approve neutrality, then this position must be guaranteed by the superpowers and by the Arab countries in the area."⁶ Ghali's statement was made during the Israeli blockade of Beirut.

King Husayn has been reserved regarding Lebanon's neutrality. Asked what he would do if the issue of Lebanon's neutrality were raised, the king answered:

"As long as Lebanon has not presented this idea, I cannot give an answer."⁷

Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad has wondered: "What does the word 'neutralization' mean?" adding that neutralizing Lebanon is an "issue that needs lengthy discussion. In any case, Lebanon's destiny has not been isolated in the past and will not be isolated in the future from the destiny of the nation to which Lebanon belongs. Lebanon's strength is this nation's strength, its humiliation is this nation's humiliation, its gain is this nation's gain and its loss is this nation's loss."⁸

Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO chairman, believes that the "problem of some Lebanese philosophizers is that they cannot consider themselves a part of this Arab nation which is now waging a struggle for the existence or nonexistence of its civilization. This question must be answered by some people who say we are Phoenicians, our civilization is a multiple civilization and so forth."⁹ 'Arafat added: "There are Lebanese philosophers who forget that the main enemy of this nation is Israel and that we are waging a battle of civilization against it. If we take this into consideration, then whatever afflicts Lebanon or any other Arab part afflicts all Arabs."¹⁰

Second, at the international level:

Particular note is made of the position of France, which is sympathetic to the idea of Lebanon's neutrality--a position that takes into consideration the will of the Lebanese, the approval of the Arab states (or most of them, at least), Syria and Israel and a guarantee by the major powers. In the wake of the 1978 call by the Academy of Science for Overseas urging Lebanon's

neutrality, the French have implicitly and explicitly expressed their sympathy for the idea of neutrality as a solution to the Lebanese problem.

Claude Cheysson, the French minister of foreign relations, made a statement during the Israeli blockade of Beirut in which he said:

"We still believe that the city of Beirut can be neutralized by ousting all the foreign forces from it. The so-called 'Battle of Beirut' can thus be avoided. We have proposed the formation of a multinational force to be deployed in the capital of Lebanon to disengage the combatants and to insure the neutralization of the city. One day, the neutrality of all of Lebanon may be declared internationally. But the urgent current need demands declaring the neutrality of its capital first."¹¹

French author Pierre (Milleux) has often written in favor of Lebanon's neutrality.

During the Beirut blockade in the summer of 1982, he wrote: "Lebanon's problem goes far beyond the issue of the blockade of West Beirut. It deals with liberating all the territories of the homeland of the cedars from all the foreign military occupiers: Palestinian, Syrian and Israeli. But how can one respond to the call for help voiced by all the Lebanese?"¹²

Answering this question, (Milleux) said: "This appeal must be answered by giving the country of the cedars a constitution of neutrality recognized internationally, as was the case of Austria in 1955."¹³

Regarding the justifications for neutrality, (Milleux) said in his article:

"A position of neutrality in Lebanon is tied naturally to Lebanon's geographic location, to its socioreligious origins, to its traditions of tolerance and political liberalism and to its economic role of openness to the outside world, all of which makes it a link between the East and the West."¹⁴

Regarding the steps required for neutrality and regarding the consequences of this neutrality to Lebanon's position and to its Arab and international relations, (Milleux) believes that "Lebanon, with the help of its friends, led by France, can begin with internal and external steps that lead to guaranteed international neutrality. Such steps can keep Lebanon a member of the Arab League and the United Nations. Such neutrality, to which a larger and larger number of Lebanese aspire, will protect Lebanon from becoming once more an arena for the conflicts of its neighbors--conflicts from which the Palestinian cause reaps no benefits but rather, on the contrary, incurs losses."¹⁵

In another article, entitled "Lebanon's Neutrality," (Milleux) expressed the belief that "an increasing number of Muslims and Christians have come to realize that a guaranteed position of international neutrality in Lebanon is the best means to lead Lebanon away from new tragedies."¹⁶

In charting the phases through which Lebanon's neutrality may undergo, the author said:

--The Lebanese themselves take the initiative.

--The Lebanese parliament votes on a new law declaring Lebanon's neutrality, rejecting participation in any military pacts and refusing to give military bases on Lebanon's territories to any foreign force.

--This parliamentary resolution must be taken after the foreign forces depart from Lebanon's territories so that there may be no chance to cast doubt on it.

--Lebanon forms a deterrent military force to repel any foreign aggression.

--Lebanon remains a member of the United Nations and of the Arab League, except for its military commitments.

--Lebanon continues to cooperate with all the UN and Arab League economic, cultural and social organizations. Beirut can become the capital of the Near East.

--Upon promulgation of the neutrality law, the Lebanese government conveys the law to the UN secretary general to get the maximum guarantee possible from the UN member states.

--It is axiomatic to say that the Lebanese government must make sure in advance of the approval of the permanent members of the Security Council and of the largest possible number of Arab countries.

--A Lebanese neutrality guaranteed by the United Nations will make Israel abandon the idea of concluding a separate treaty with Lebanon.

Concluding this review of the opinions of Lebanese and foreign intellectuals, journalists and politicians regarding the idea of "Lebanon's neutrality," we must cite some passages from the address delivered by Pierre Aubert, the president of the Swiss Confederation, to the opening session of the National Dialogue Conference held in Geneva on 31 September 1983. He said:

"Lebanon, despite the long distance and the numerous differences, seems very close to our country by virtue of the numerous instances of similarity and especially by virtue of the existence in both our countries of great diversity in a small area of land.

"This diversity is a source of wealth for each side. It creates a multiple society where the concepts of democracy, freedom and human rights bear greater importance than in any other place. It has become customary to compare our two countries, and one of our two countries has been given the name of the other."

The president of the Swiss Confederation then addressed these expressive words to the conferees: "Many have asked me whether the selection of Geneva as the site of the dialogue is because Switzerland is similar to Lebanon. It is certain that the roots of a given people cannot be exported because they are a historical result peculiar to each people. But these roots are the result

of long development and are, consequently, the symbol of success. The success of others is not a lesson, but the difficulties preceding this success can be the subject of examination. In the case of the country hosting you, the current coexistence among extremely diverse groups was attained only after a long, turbulent and often tragic history."¹⁷

[Resolution printed in separate box]

Draft Resolution To Be Presented by Lebanese Government, on Recommendation of National Reconciliation Committee, to UN Security Council for Approval

Resolution:

The UN Security Council,

In accordance with the memorandum it has received from the Lebanese government on....,

And in accordance with the previous Council resolutions concerning Lebanon and because threats to the entity of the Republic of Lebanon and the safety of its territories pose a threat to world peace and security,

And out of its eagerness for the [non-]recurrence of such a situation that is in conflict with the letter and spirit of the UN charter,

Decides the following:

Provision One. The Council reaffirms that the borders of the Republic of Lebanon as established by the Lebanese constitution are final borders and stresses prohibiting the use of Lebanese territories for any military action by any non-Lebanese party.

Provision Two. The Council demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territories and the termination of the Syrian and Palestinian military presence in Lebanon.

Provision Three. The Council reaffirms the continued validity of the 1949 truce agreement which was formulated under the supervision of the United Nations. The Council takes note of the Lebanese government's official declaration that the 1969 Cairo agreement has been abolished. It further takes note of Lebanon's position linking any normalization of Lebanon's relations with Israel to a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Council also takes note of Lebanon's reaffirmation of its membership in the Arab League and of its suspension of its participation in the joint Arab defense treaty.

Provision Four. The Council shall form an international force to safeguard peace in which countries not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict shall participate. The Council shall also provide this force with all the resources that guarantee the implementation of its tasks.

Provision Five. The tasks of the international force include supporting the legitimate Lebanese authorities in achieving the following goals:

A. Dissolve all the militias and fuse the qualified elements of these militias in the Lebanese army, underlining the need for the Lebanese army to be a united national force working to fuse society, to protect the borders and the constitutional institutions and to develop the provinces socially and economically.

B. Hold free parliamentary elections so that a new parliament may be formed to introduce the necessary amendments into the Lebanese laws in order to guarantee the rights of all the factions, sects and citizens generally on the basis of the principles of freedom, democracy and equality.

C. Return all those evicted since 1975 because of military acts to their homes and secure protection for the entire civilian population.

Provision Six. The Council considers this resolution tantamount to a declaration of a new legal international status for the Republic of Lebanon. The Council's permanent members shall guarantee this legal status, as they shall guarantee the immediate implementation of this resolution with all the means stipulated in the UN charter.

FOOTNOTES

1. AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 318, 12 June 1983.
2. Ibid, p 35.
3. Ibid, p 35.
4. AL-NAHAR, 29 June 1968.
5. AL-NAHAR, 30 March 1971.
6. AL-NAHAR, 30 July 1982.
7. AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 30 April 1983.
8. Ibid, 7 November 1982.
9. Ibid, 26 December 1982.
10. Ibid.
11. Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL No 283, 24 July 1982
12. Paris LE AURORE 23 July 1982, published by HALIYAT No 27, p 154 (French Section).

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. (Le Reveil) 30 November 1982, published by HALIYAT No 28, p 149 (French section).
17. AL-NAHAR, 1 November 1983.

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CSO: 4404/220

GOVERNMENT SEEKS ELIMINATION OF SUBSIDIES

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 34, 3 Dec 83 p 34

/Text/ The Lebanese government has been preoccupied for a long while with a review of the issue of subsidies, subsidies which the treasury has provided and continues to provide on food and petroleum products. This has been done to support some of the industrial, manufacturing, and basic commodities sectors, the most prominent being the bread production sector, the national factories, the Lebanon Electric Company, and the National Cement Company.

Government moves to eliminate these subsidies, which are costly and burdensome to the Lebanese treasury, come at a time when the Lebanese economy and the status of the treasury do not currently encourage continuation of the burdens of subsidies that amount to about 1 billion Lebanese pounds. The state's income has retreated to about half of what it was in 1974, that is, before the Lebanese War. Also, national production facilities are today about 70 percent idle.

Add to this the fact that Arab aid to Lebanon stopped some time ago. This has led to a strain in the country's financial situation and a large percentage increase in the amount of the public debt. At the end of last September it amounted to 22 billion Lebanese pounds. This means that continuation of a subsidization policy would be tantamount to national suicide, especially since the subsidies themselves, due to the deterioration of the security situation in many regions that are not under the control of the state, have lost their true purposes and goals and are susceptible to being used illegally.

In execution of a policy of eliminating subsidies on fuels and bread, Minister of Industry and Oil George Afram prepared a report for the cabinet which included the negative aspects of continuing this /subsidization/ policy in light of the current situation. The report identified the savings that would accrue to the Lebanese treasury as a result of eliminating subsidies. This would help the treasury to eliminate a part, although a small part, of the deficit that the treasury is suffering from.

Today the government, through a number of ministers, is presenting its view to parties that may be opposed to the idea of eliminating subsidies, particularly the General Labor Federation, which insists that the state continue to subsidize bread (at 100 million pounds annually), and the Lebanese Manufacturers Society, which also insists on the necessity of continuing state subsidies on fuel oil (at 150 million pounds annually).

The state, in its actions, is focusing on a number of facts that are backed up by numbers that demonstrate the impossibility of continuing a policy of subsidization, at least in the current phase. Among the facts the government is presenting are the following:

1 - The condition of the Lebanese treasury is not currently adequate to allow continuation of the burdens of subsidies amounting to about 1 billion Lebanese pounds annually. The reasons for this are directly linked to developments in the Lebanese crisis, since the war has led to the state's loss of half of its income (revenues from customs duties, taxes, etc.).

2 - The public debt charged against the Lebanese treasury--domestic and foreign loans--amounted to 22 billion Lebanese pounds at the end of September 1983.

3 - The total value of losses to local production from 1974 to the end of 1982 is estimated at 114 billion Lebanese pounds. This figure is expected to reach 125 billion pounds by the end of 1983. These losses are basically the result of the cessation of production due to total or partial destruction affecting units of production.

4 - The value of losses to national capital from 1975 to the end of 1982 is estimated at 21 billion Lebanese pounds. It is distributed among the various sectors as follows: the housing sector--3.2 billion Lebanese pounds, the tourism sector--1.2 billion Lebanese pounds, commerce--9.3 (billion) pounds, industry--1.5 billion pounds, agriculture--1 billion pounds, public utilities--4 billion pounds, and capital activity and private ownership--2 billion pounds.

5 - In addition to all of this, there remains an important and basic issue: the absence of state authority over about three-fourths of Lebanon. This matter has led to the inability of the state to monitor the subsidized sectors. This means that the subsidies have lost their basic purposes and have become ineffective and useless, since the absence of state oversight encourages some to take advantage of the subsidies in an illegal way, that is, for purposes that are not in the public interest.

Based on what was presented above, the government hopes to succeed in convincing influential figures of its point of view concerning the subject of subsidies. What remains for us to say is that the government is insistent on eliminating subsidies and pursuing the implementation of this policy as long as the treasury is in its current condition and as long as the security situation is in its current condition.

12608

CSO: 4404/219

SAMIR JA'JA' DISCUSSES EVENTS IN AL-SHUF

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 3 Dec 83 p 3

[Interview with Samir Ja'ja', Lebanese Forces commander of the Mount Lebanon district; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] What is your evaluation of the situation as it stands in Mount Lebanon?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, we were expecting more to happen in Bhamdun than actually took place. We were all also, undoubtedly, hoping that the results of the Bhamdun battle would be different. At this time, I will not go into the details of what happened in Bhamdun and Mount Lebanon as a whole, or the background of these battles, or the factors that entered into play. We will discuss these things thoroughly in the future to clarify many aspects of the events that took place in Mount Lebanon.

The only thing that I will focus on now is that the Mount Lebanon battle was not the first and will not be the last. The Mount Lebanon battle was not the beginning of the universe and it will not be the end of the universe. In our work in the Lebanese Forces--a political and military organization--we make history. That is, we do not undertake simple operations for limited goals. When we make history, it is measured in years, even centuries. Therefore, despite the importance of what happened in Bhamdun, and Mount Lebanon in general, this year, we consider this to be a very short period in our history. Therefore, it is not inevitable that it will affect our morale and our aspirations for the future. We must point out that the events that took place this year in Mount Lebanon are not an adequate measure and, therefore, do not even represent a drop in the sea of experience that we have had. Nor does it represent a number in the equation that we are trying to achieve.

The events that took place were undoubtedly significant, dreadful, painful and, tragic. However, in relation to history, the fate of the people, the situation in the country, and the situation in the Middle East as a whole, what happened in Mount Lebanon is no more than a small drop. It is not worth pausing for, and it is too insignificant to paralyze our movement, affect our morale, and make us believe that there is no place for us in the local, regional, and international game.

It is easy and simple for me to call on all compatriots, leaders, officials, and observers to overcome the recent events in Mount Lebanon in order to complete our work in the desired direction. It has become necessary that we be, as much as possible, effective and serious in our work. I could ask that we not pause over the results of the Mount Lebanon events and that we not continue to "cry over spilt milk" as a result of the Mount Lebanon war. At the same time, I must ask that we learn the appropriate lessons from the events that took place in Mount Lebanon. We are a people that cannot lose twice, and cannot bear taking a wrong step. It cannot be assumed that we will accept the minimum measures or the minimum behavior, something that will not lead to the desired results. Therefore, I reiterate my call to all elements and officials to pause a long time and consider everything that happened in Mount Lebanon, not in order to "cry over spilt milk," but to analyze what happened, expose it appropriately, learn the necessary lessons, and look to the future with hope and optimism.

As I said in the beginning, I will try not to go into the background, the details, the dimensions, and the intricate factors of the Mount Lebanon events. This is a thorny subject. But I have no doubt, if I am to bear my complete responsibility, that there were certain shortcomings that took place concerning the Mount Lebanon situation. We must become accustomed to being brave, not only in war, but also in peace, and with each other. We must be able to control any situation based on its results and not on our hopes, feelings, or inclinations.

Great Responsibility

[Question] Isn't it true that the error, to a large extent, does not lie with the Lebanese Forces because of the many intricate factors in the Mount Lebanon situation?

[Answer] If we did not consider ourselves responsible for this people and this society, then it would not be our error. However, if we have accepted the premise from the beginning that the Lebanese Forces are the political and military organization that leads the Christian people through these events, then this means that we are responsible. If we were not responsible, it would mean that we do not bear the responsibility for this people and that we, therefore, do not lead this people. On this matter, I insist and repeat, although there are many that have a different opinion, that we are the political and military leadership of the Christian people during this crisis. When this crisis ends, then "every event has its story."

[Question] Despite our efforts to overcome what happened and to look to the future with hope, won't there be a large question mark hanging over the background of what happened?

[Answer] The day will undoubtedly come when I will explain the background and details of the Mount Lebanon event, but not at the present time.

Human Position

[Question] After the Bhamdun battle, we read in the newspapers a statement by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens talking negatively about the position of the Lebanese Forces in the battle. What is your comment on this Israeli position?

[Answer] I find Moshe Arens' position strange. I know "Mr" Arens to be an educated person and a professor who uses a scientific approach to political behavior. I therefore find it strange that statements would come from him that have no basis in reality, for which he does not have the necessary facts, and which mete out haphazard judgments from afar on the rights of organizations and individuals. I will not respond at length to Mr Arens on this subject, but I would like to ask him one question: Why did Israeli planes, just after the operation aimed at the military command headquarters in Tyre, strike Bhamdun and its environs? When he answers this question, the question he raised will be answered concerning the real position of the Lebanese Forces in the battle of Bhamdun.

12608

CSO: 4404/215

DISSOLUTION OF 'SHI'ITE ARMY' DESCRIBED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 1 Dec 83 p 5

[Article: "Abu Sati' in a press conference: 'I Will Join Amal If I Am Accepted'; Only 30 Members of the 'Shi'ite Army Remain"]

[Text] A former official of what is called the "Shi'ite Army," 'Abd-al-Amir Mansur, also known as Abu Sati', held a press conference at one of the Amal Movement centers in Burj al-Barajinah. The conference was attended by Mustafa Abu 'Ali, a member of the movement's political bureau. During the meeting Abu Sati' said that he was going to join the Amal Movement and that no more than 30 members of the "Shi'ite Army" remained, all of whom are expected to leave it within a month.

Abu Sati' began the conference by reading the following press statement: "Overwhelmed with persistent fears for the fate of our people and our south, and deceived by the Israeli enemy, we thought it proper to establish what is called the "Shi'ite Army," which would perhaps provide salvation from the factional militias. However, we quickly became certain that this artificial army would not be under our command, but under the command of the Israeli enemy. This would ensure factional fighting in the south similar to that in Mount Lebanon."

He continued: "The Amal Movement with its awakened, nationalist leadership has played the major role in the enlightenment of public opinion and the resistance of the establishment of a factional army to face another existing factional army. The south has never experienced and will never experience factional bigotry, and will never slip into a factional war that is not part of its nature."

He added: "Monitoring the positions and the struggle of the Amal Movement, we noticed that we were on the edge of the abyss, and that we were passing unawares on the road of danger that would only benefit the Israeli enemy. Therefore, I am here today addressing my brothers in the south and the Lebanese public, announcing the dissolution of the Shi'ite Army."

He announced his loyalty to the course followed by the Amal Movement and asked that everyone accept his apology.

Abu Sati', in responding to reporters' questions said, "The Shi'ite Army was supposed to include 14,000 soldiers. The Israelis claimed that it would be at the disposal of the Lebanese government in order to help it in the future. The Israelis also claimed that the soldiers' salaries would be paid by the state. However, after a time, it became clear that the salaries were not paid by the Lebanese state and that the state did not recognize this army. We saw that our people consider anyone carrying a gun in the south to be the main enemy, so they ignore him and reject him. Our people resisted this army."

He explained that the Shi'ite Army only had 120 soldiers, but that they had left and now there are only about 30 soldiers who are staying at a house on the Ansar road. He said that they are not soldiers who used to be in the Lebanese Army, but they do have previous party affiliation. He expected that they would quit within a month.

Concerning the relationship between this army and Israel, Abu Sati' said, "Our goal was to liberate our people from the domination practiced by what is called the 'National Guard,' and others, and from the humiliation that was forced on our people. We tried to help our people. Therefore, when the Shi'ite Army was established, we made it conditional upon the dissolution of these forces and the cessation of their excesses. However, they escalated their practices and the Israelis did not respond to our complaints and demands that [our people] not be subjected to these forces. We were surprised to discover that we had become an obstacle to our people and not the opposite."

He stated that the dissolution of the army took place 10 days ago, and that its members dispersed to their villages or travelled or went to Beirut. He expected that Israel would pursue those that remained in the south and detain them or try to deceive them again.

In response to a question he said, "I will join the Amal Movement because ahead of me there is a struggle, at the heart of which is a national Islamic organization that is like a loving mother who forgives us if we err. We will join this organization if it will accept us into its ranks."

He finished by saying that he no longer had ties with anyone that was with him in the Shi'ite Army, and that he knew nothing about them. He said, "I decided to leave this army now because I perceived the extent of its danger to my people. The source of this danger is Israel."

Abu 'Ali commented on Abu Sati''s statements saying, "Abu Sati' is one of those who was duped by the Israelis and who imagined that there is no way out except through Israel. However, our people have refused deception and aggression, and have called for others to refuse to deal with Israel, especially after the assassination of the agents."

He added, "Our warning extends to all who deal with the enemy."

12608

CSO: 4404/215

COURT LEGALIZES EXISTING HIGH INTEREST RATES

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 14 Dec 83 p 5

/Text/ The Lebanese courts have issued a judgment allowing commercial banks operating in Lebanon to charge interest on loans that exceed the legal rate. This is an unprecedented event concerning an issue which no judge previously has been bold enough to address.

The highest court in Beirut (the chamber of the Honorable Hasan al-Hajj and Counselors Matar and Shadyaq) issued a judgment at the end of last month allowing the Bank of Beirut and Riyadh to charge interest rates higher than 12 percent because the Bank of Lebanon (the state bank) was giving 14 percent interest on treasury bonds. The court said that talk of the illegality of current interest rates was itself a violation of the principle of balance between the requirements of the lending bank and its rights vis-a-vis the customer, and would lead to the creation of an uneasy situation, economic instability, and chaos in legal institutions.

The text of the decision, carried by the magazine AL-BAYAN, is as follows:

It is well-known that interest on various accounts, both borrowing and lending, have risen noticeably during recent years and have surpassed the legal rate. Banks have gradually given interest on cash deposits amounting at times to 15 percent. The plaintiffs have not denounced the receipt of interest exceeding the legal rate on their deposits. Even the central bank, carrying out its task of maintaining economic stability and the soundness of the banking system, has issued and continues to issue publicly available treasury bonds with interest rates that exceed the legal rate and reach as much as 14 percent.

Faced with this situation and seeking to adhere to the principle of balance and equality of treatment, a principle which must dominate the legal relations between people, organizations and society, it is impermissible that the banks be forced to collect interest from their debtors that is much less than the interest they are paying to the same people, if they happen to have a deposit account.

The counter argument of the illegality of interest rates charged by banks that exceed the legal rate is itself a violation of the principle of balance between the requirements of the lending bank and its rights vis-a-vis the customer. Such a situation would, in turn, lead to uneasiness, economic instability, and confusion among legal institutions. It is the duty of the courts to restore balance, or try to restore balance, to the uneasy legal situation by legalizing existing agreements between the parties, agreements which maintain this balance. It is necessary that the state not participate in the creation of economic confusion by giving its creditors interest that exceeds the legal rate while preventing other lenders from doing the same thing.

What strengthens this opinion and convinces the court to uphold it is the fact that the reason for making excessive interest rates illegal under normal conditions is to uphold the principle of equality between the creditor and debtor, and protect the rights of the debtor against an arbitrary lender. This principle cannot be violated in the interest of the debtor. Therefore, as the rights of the creditor are being threatened with loss and waste, intervention is necessary in order to protect these rights based on the principle of comprehensive justice.

On the strength of the argument against the plaintiffs concerning the illegality of the interest charged to their debtor account by the defendant, the court rules that the latter has the right to charge the interest rate agreed to in the loan contract.

12608

CSO: 4404/219

COUNTRY'S BORROWING POLICY EXPLAINED

Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 9 Dec 83 p 13

[Text]

MUSCAT — The core of Sultanate of Oman's government policy is to borrow according to the need, and within its means to honour all commitments involved. This is, perhaps, the reason why the response from creditors to the recent 300-million dollar Euroloan was "so favourable and forthcoming".

In an interview to the Central Bank of Oman publication 'Al Markazi', Mr Mohamed Musa, Under-secretary of the Directorate of Finance, says while Oman could have borrowed much more than that amount, "we must bear in mind that future plans should not, as far as possible, be burdened with inherited obligations. Each Plan should be self-dependent, balancing the deployment of its own resources."

Mr Musa says the first loan, sought and obtained by the Sultanate in 1980 towards the end of the First Five Year Plan, was cancelled before any drawing was made, following an increase in oil prices then. The country's financial resources were then considered adequate to meet commitments.

But, as the situation changed with a drop in oil prices and the government decided to seek a loan, a Gulf international bank was approached to arrange a Euroloan facility to augment the financing of on-going and future development plans.

"The response from international creditors was instantaneous and the high competition to share in contribution was a solid proof of the reputation our economy enjoys at international levels," Mr Musa notes.

The proceeds of the Euroloan have been allocated to partially finance the foreign currency costs of selected pro-

jects approved in the Second Plan ending 1985. They include: Phase III of the government gas network; expansion and modernisation of the telephone exchange network; agriculture and fisheries projects; power and water resources projects; and industrial ventures comprising the cement plant, the Rusayl industrial area, and loans and grants to industrial projects.

Mr Musa says other loans and credit facilities, amounting to 360 million dollars, have also been availed this year from Arab development funds, Islamic Development Bank, IBRD and from export credit institutions like the UK's Export Credit Guarantee Department and its American, French and Japanese counterparts.

Mr Musa says, full precautions have been taken and would continue to be taken, to ensure prompt settlement of the high-interest-accruing debt.

It is to avoid the ensuing pitfalls that foreign borrowing has been centralised in Oman, Mr Musa points out. "A Royal Decree and a government regulation forbid borrowing, except through the Ministry of Finance, the only government agency which has the authorisation... and the means to judge the country's overall financial capabilities."

As for the private sector, the investors' need to resort to foreign borrowing has been reduced to "little or nil". This is mainly because the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and other specialised banks and agencies are availing the bulk of industrial and farm financing in the form of easy loans and grants.

Such continuous governmental financial support (for setting up industries and farms) had left the field open

for private investors to draw on the commercial banks which have been playing an increasing role in financing trade.

Exemption from profit tax was another incentive Omani companies enjoyed.

Cent per cent Omani companies were fully exempted by a Royal Decree since 1975. Joint ventures, of more than 51 per cent Omani participation, paid 15 per cent of their profit as Business Profit Tax, the percentage rising to 20 if the (Omani) participation decreased.

The government laid no restriction on money transfers, import of raw materials, or transfer of remittance.

"The country is not in receipt of major grants, of recent," Mr Musa notes. "But, drawings from grants given by friendly countries before 1981 continue ... in connection with the execution of specified development projects."

"The trade balance peaked in 1981, realising a surplus of RO 681.6 million. A slight drop occurred in 1982 but it is anticipated that significant surpluses will continue to be realised specially in view of the fact that deficits in the general budget have been largely offset by borrowings from the Reserve Fund," Mr Musa says.

CSO: 4400/116

NEW AGRICULTURAL CENTER OPENED IN SULTANATE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 30 Oct 83 p 5

[Text]

MUSCAT — A new agriculture station has been inaugurated at Bayah, near Dibbah, in the Musandam peninsula of the Sultanate.

The station, costing RO 176,270, was supervised by Musandam Development Committee. It was built by Target LLC.

The design makes provision for separate enclosures for veterinary treatment of livestock, storing seeds, agrochemicals fertilisers and farm implements, and for maintenance and repair of tractors and farm equipment.

The centre is expected to give a further impetus to farm development and cattle breeding in the region.

A great deal of importance is being laid to hastening development of the peninsula. Since 1980, there has been intense activity on the farm front. The number of tractor hours worked has increased three-fold over the years. So also, there has been a 300 per cent spurt

in offtake of fertilisers and agrochemicals.

As for the distribution of seeds, there has been a four-fold rise, while the treatment facilities for cattle and other animals have shown a 600 per cent improvement—as against some 3000 animals in 1980, the number that underwent veterinary care last year was 18,299.

The new agriculture station is the fifth to be raised in the region. Yet another is nearing completion. Manned by trained agronomists, veterinarians and technical hands, these farm stations are playing a key role in imparting a futuristic dimension to farming and animal husbandry, with an accent on mechanisation and modern medicine.

The guests attending the inaugural ceremony included Shaikh Hamid bin Rashid Al-Yaqboobi, Deputy Governor of Musandam, officials of Musandam Development Committee, Ministry of Interior and Royal Oman Police.

CSO: 4400/116

OMANIZATION IN BANKING SECTOR DESCRIBED

Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 29 Dec 83 p 5

[Text]

The international banks operating in Oman have launched widespread campaign to meet the target of Omanisation fixed by the Central Bank of Oman.

A number of practical measures have been taken by three leading banks — the Arab Bank Ltd., Bank of Oman Bahrain and Kuwait and the Oman Housing Bank to carry out the CBO Directive of June '83 which stated that by the end of 1985, the total number of Omani employees in the banks must reach 90 per cent at least.

In the Arab Bank, the number of Omani staff members during the last six months has gone up from 21 per cent to 48 per cent. The general manager, Abdul Qadir Askalan says that the bank hopes that during 1984 it will have a total of 65 per cent Omani employees. By 1985, the percentage of Omanis is due to go up to 80 to 85 per cent.

"It is a very reasonable percentage if we are able to achieve it" he said.

Referring to the difficulties in achieving the target, he said that there was a shortage of Omani nationals available for filling vacancies in the bank.

Mr. Askalan says that the principal problem is that as soon as qualified Omanis graduate both the Ministries and private organisations rush to employ them.

He noted that it was in view of this that the CBO had opened the Banking Institute, with a three-year training course for Omani nationals.

Mr. Askalan said that the bank jobs required a certain standard, so that the employees could fulfil their duties

adequately.

If unqualified staff was taken, it would require a lot of time to give the required training.

Graduates in accountancy and commerce could be adjusted more easily and appointed to administrative positions.

The Arab Bank currently has an Omani manager who looks after the different facilities the bank offers to its clients. There are now four section chiefs, compared to one three months ago. Twice in a week, the bank organises lecture for its staff. In the bank's branch in Al-Kuwair, opened recently, four out of seven employees are Omanis.

In the Bank of Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait, the number of Omani staff members is 32 per cent. The bank's Chief Manager Abdur Ridha Fadhil hopes that the Banking Institute will produce a sufficient number of competent Omanis to enable the bank to employ them and increase the number of its Omani employees to the extent required by the Central Bank of Oman.

The Omanisation process is underway at BOBK. A stage has come when most of the branch managers are now Omanis. The bank is looking for qualified Omanis for more appointments. Omanis are being trained both locally and in Bahrain.

However, Mr Abdur Ridha said that it is extremely difficult to meet the 1985 target set by the CBO. The grace period given is extremely short and may allow for the appointment of 65 per cent Omanis only.

The number of qualified Omanis is

very small and the bank require time to find competent staff. The bank intends to appoint many Omanis in the new branches to be opened shortly in Birka and Wadi Hattat. Other branches of the bank to be opened in the future will also take in Omani nationals in large numbers.

The Oman Housing Bank has asked the Diwan for Personnel Affairs to provide it with a maximum number of Omani nationals for appointment to enable the bank to fulfil the targets of its Omanisation scheme launched in 1980.

The bank trains Omani secondary certificate holders at its own expense if they commit themselves to work with the bank.

The bank's general manager Mohamood Abu al-Tin says that his bank sent nine secondary certificate holders for a two-year course to obtain diplomas in banking and finance. Six of them have already completed the course and joined the bank, while the remaining three are due to return next year.

Six more Omanis are to be sent this year. A number of Omanis have also been appointed locally.

The General Manager says that banks can also give a lot to encourage Omanis to work in them.

However, he said that the grace period given by the Central Bank needs to be reviewed.

CSO: 4400/116

STATISTICS SHOW INCREASED EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 15 Dec 83 p 11

[Text]

The academic year 1982-83 brought about a remarkable change in Oman's academic life.

Statistical figures, just released by the Development Council, show that public interest in education greatly increased during the year, and the Government increased educational facilities correspondingly.

A total of 140,582 pupils were enrolled in 455 schools all over the country during the year, compared with 120,718 pupils in 408 schools.

Thus, the number of pupils given admission in 1982-83 was about 20,000, while 470 new schools were set up during the year. The figures are extremely impressive by international standards.

The largest number of schools were preparatory schools — 219, followed by 204 primary and 32 secondary. In the primary schools, 116,467 students were on the roll, whereas in preparatory and secondary, 19,985 and 4,130 students were on the roll during the year.

The total number of teachers in Omani schools during the academic year 1982-83

was 6,817. This means that an average number of 14 taught in every school — the pupil — teacher ratio being 21:4.

The largest number of schools during the year was in Batinah, where the figure has gone up to 83. This is followed by 74 in the Southern region, 58 in the Capital area, 55 in Rustaq, 55 in the Interior and the remaining in other provinces. The number of girl students all over Oman went up from 41,322 during the previous year to 50,831, while the number of boys went up from 79,396 to 89,751.

Of all the teachers in Omani schools, the largest number was that of Egyptians who numbered 4,250. There were 869 Jordanians, and 530 Sudanese.

The number of Omani teachers went down from 770 during the previous year to 709.

The remaining teachers were from Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Britain, Pakistan and other countries.

Of the total number of 6,817 teachers, 4,610 were male and 2,878 female.

CSO: 4400/116

OMANIZATION AFFECTS CIVIL SERVICE

Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 22 Dec 83 p 3

[Text]

The Government's programme for Omanisation has shown an increase in the number of Omani nationals in the Civil Service.

A total of 25,096 nationals were employed in the Government in 1981. Last year, 2,143 more appointments were made, bringing the number of nationals in government service to 27,249.

The total number of civil servants in Oman in 1981 was 40,098. The figure went up to 44,087 in 1982. Expatriates in 1981 numbered 16,838.

Omanis constituted 61.8 per cent of the civil servants last year.

The 1981 and 82 figures exclude employees in Defence, Police, GTO, CBO and the Diwan of Royal Court Affairs.

A total of 186,821 labour cards were issued by the Directorate General of Labour Affairs to non-Omani workers in the private sector in 1982.

The largest number of workers was in construction and trade (combined), where the figure was 66,611, followed by construction

(46279) wholesale and retail trade (31703), manufacturing (8034), community, social and personal services (8139), agriculture and fishing (6583), mining and quarrying (3426), financing, insurance, real estate and business services (3272), transport, storage and communications (2483), restaurants and hotels (2037) and electricity, gas and water (423).

The Most expatriates came from India. The Indians numbered 120,178 followed by Pakistanis (35,431), Bangladeshis (17,015), Sri Lankans (3,591), Britons (3,196), Egyptians (1,420) and Filipinos (1,160). The remaining nationalities include people from Iran, South Korea, Cyprus, Thailand, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, Tanzania, Holland, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, U.S.A. and Canada.

The Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans constituted 64.33, 18.97, 9.11 and 1.92 per cent of the total expatriate force respectively.

CSO: 4400/116

BRIEFS

INCREASED IMPORTS, DECREASED EXPORTS--Oman's imports showed an upward trend during the year 1982 while exports registered a decline, according to the Directorate-General of National Statistics. The total value of goods imported into the country was RO 926 million in 1982, against RO 790.3 million in 1981. The value of exports in 1982 was RO 1526.9 million compared to RO 1621.9 million in 1981. The 1982 figure includes RO 1409.6 million in oil exports, RO 109.6 million in re-exports and RO 7.7 million in non-oil exports. The non-oil sector includes fresh fruits and vegetables (in thousand RO)--413.1, dry lines--363.8, frozen, dry slated and wet fish--3746.5, tobacco--322.6, flour--850.0, and other products--594.4. The countries of destination for Omani exports were the UAE, India, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, South Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan. [Text] [Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 15 Dec 83 p 35]

SALALAH AIRPORT EXPANSION--The Government has launched an ambitious plan to introduce large-scale expansion at Salalah airport to cater for the ever-increasing air traffic in the Southern Region. The plan includes an airport terminal expansion and extension project which comprises departure and arrival lounges and a restaurant. It also includes the renovation of navigational aids and ATC consoles, increasing the standby power and establishing a tower for training fire station personnel. The central air conditioning system in the communications building is to be replaced, together with crash fire vehicles. During this year, the airport saw a series of developments. A 17 KV generator with automatic changer was installed to provide power during periods of main power failure. A new building for the outer markers was constructed and a water supply project for the terminal building was completed. All approach lighting cables have been replaced. The air conditioning system in the fifth and seventh storeys of the control tower building was also replaced. [Text] [Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 15 Dec 83 p 3]

CSO: 4400/116

SUCSESSES REPORTED IN AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS

Aden 14 UKTUBAR AL-USBU'I in Arabic 22 Jul 83 p 5

Article: "Higher Rate of Accomplishment Reported, During The First Part Of This Year, Regarding Projects Of The Ministry Of Agriculture; Cost Of The Project Amounted To 41,366,600 Dinars"

Text The actual rate of accomplishment of the projects of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Land Reclamation increased by 21 percent during the first part of the third year of the amended second 5-year plan. The actual total cost of these projects was 4,652,401 dinars. The cost of the projects carried out during the first part of the second year of the plan amounted to 1,111,115 dinars, with only a 12 percent increase in accomplishment.

The report of the Department of Planning and Statistics stated that these projects include 31 projects; 18 of which were for irrigation, two for veterinary and poultry, two run by the General Authority for Vegetable and Fruit Marketing, three projects administered by the Public Administration for Research and Agricultural projects.

The report indicated that the irrigation projects included the digging of main and secondary canals and the conducting of a survey for land reclamation. In this regard, 68 hectares in the province of Lahij have been surveyed, 501,000 cubic meters of earthwork have been done in the provinces of Lahij and Abyan, 4,900 cubic meters of reinforced concrete have been poured; and 6,800 of land have been prepared for irrigation projects. In addition, 1,065 kms of ditches have been dug for canals, 18 buildings have been constructed, and a number of gates and cranes have been installed in the province of Lahij. In Wadi Rabuh, in the province of Shabwah, exploratory wells have been drilled, experimental pumps have been installed, and field studies are currently being undertaken.

The report also indicated that with respect to the drilling of wells and land reclamation, 8 hectares of new land were surveyed, 98 hectares of farm land in Mashad and Ju'ayma in the Hadramawt were surveyed anew, 271,000 cubic meters of earthwork were done, 504 cubic meters of reinforced concrete were poured, 163 meters of canals had been dug, and 4 wells previously drilled, 4 pumps were installed. The report also mentioned various investments in reclaimed land: 831 feddans of various crops have been cultivated on each

farm thus attaining 132 percent of the goal in 'Alal, Ju'ayma, Bahran, Mashad in the province of Hadramawt and 'Ara'is in the province of Lahij. Irrigation installations had been repaired: 100 buildings restored and 42 hydraulic and mechanical pieces of equipment repaired, 348 cubic meters of (Gabion) in the Tibn district in the province of Lahij; 2400 agricultural feddans irrigated, 380 feddans in Tibn, 504 in Rabuh, and 1,016 feddans in the district of Ahwar of the Abyan province.

The report also indicated the geophysical surveys in the region of Nisab in the province of Shabwa and Markha have been completed. In addition, projects in the agricultural delta of Tibn, Wadi Mayfa'a, limited irrigations have been carried out. Water resource study projects for the Mayfa'a Hijr Valley and the second stage of the agricultural of Hadramawt have been completed; 4,045 kms of back roads have been paved, 40 feddans surveyed, and 750 meters of irrigation canals dug on the armed forces farm in the province of Abyan.

Preparations for the new farm have begun: 400 hectares surveyed, plans developed, and topographic maps drawn.

The report further stated that four (derricks), equipment, and spare parts have been purchased for the farm.

The total costs of the irrigation projects during the first part of this year amounted to 3,413,666 dinars. This sum represents 24 percent of the total funds, 14,498 dinars, allocated for 1983.

With respect to livestock resources, the report indicated that the following accomplishments have been achieved: 30 percent of the project of improving sheep breeding, 34 percent of construction works, 12 percent of the installations required for the poultry industry administered by the egg production cooperative in Dar Sa'd, in the province of Aden. In addition, the installation of 14 pinfolds run by the poultry production cooperative in Abyan have been completed.

In regard to the projects of the General Authority for Vegetable and Fruit Marketing, the report mentioned that real achievements have been realized. Storage capabilities have been improved, the Authority's transport and distribution system bettered, agricultural orientation projects increased by 18 percent, crops protection projects increased by 28 percent, and fruit improvement projects increased by 24 percent. Similarly, 12 percent of the national project to diversify seeds has been achieved, 14 percent of the project to support agricultural services, and 60 percent of the project of improving state farms.

It is worth mentioning that the total of funds allocated to agricultural projects during the third year of the amended second 5-year plan, administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, amounted to 21,975,100 dinars.

12188

CSO: 4404/547

ELECTRICITY PROJECTS TO PRECLUDE POWER CRISES

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 20 Jul 83 p 2

[Article: "Projects of the General Authority for Electric Power Exceed Goals by 5 Percent"]

[Text] The actual production of the projects of the General Authority for Electric Power amounted in the first part of the current year to 30 percent of the general planning, with a 5 percent increase. The above was mentioned by brother 'Azzam Mahbub, director of planning of the General Authority for Electric Power, in a talk to Aden News Agency. He also mentioned that the total investment designated by the Association for various projects of this year amounted to 22,260,000 dinars.

He indicated that the Authority has successfully overcome the power-generating problems which occurred in the past 2 years in all parts of the Republic. This was accomplished by establishing several stations in many governorates such as al-Mansurah station in Aden, 64 megawatts; a new station in Ja'ar in Abyan province, 454 megawatts; and a station in the Wadi Hadramawt with 16 megawatts. The construction of the Shabwah building in the city of Nisab has been completed to accommodate a station and generators.

The Authority is currently working within the framework of its plan for this year to complete the studies and preparation to accept bids for the project of extending electricity to five cities in the eastern part of al-Mukalla; Ghayl, Bawazir, Shahr, (Shuhayr) Dis and Hami. The cost is estimated at 21 million dinars. The Authority is also undertaking a study of two projects: The establishment of a secondary station in Hajif, and a special training institute for the technical crew of the institute.

He also pointed out that many locally supported projects in the countryside have been carried out during the first phase in an effort to achieve the goal set by the Party and the State of extending electricity to all parts of the countryside. Towards this end, the construction of the station building has been completed, equipment bought, and parts of the electric lines sent to Hudaybu-Suqutra. The project is expected to be completed this year.

The Mahra project to extend electricity to Hawf and Jadhīb is almost finished. Equipment has already been bought and most of it has been shipped. The completion of this project is anticipated to be during the next year. Also,

an additional generator was bought to strengthen the (Ghayta) station, the installation of which is expected to be this year.

Funds have been allocated to subsidize two public projects in Qishn and Mihut in al-Mahrah province. Two main projects have been completed in Hadramawt, extending electricity to Wadi Hadramawt Valley and to the coastal strip (five towns). A subsidy was also requested for the project of Ghayl bin Yumayn, in addition to finishing 90 percent of the main project of extending electricity to the city of Nisab in Shabwah, the Authority contributed to many public projects in Khawr Habban. The Authority has also allocated funds to extend electricity to the city of Rawda within the framework of the developmental plan.

The Authority is assisting the province of Abyan in its efforts to carry out a joint project which includes many villages in the area situated between Mukayras and Mudiya. The project of extending electricity to the city of Muhfid has been partially executed this year. Its completion is expected by the end of next year.

The Authority has also contributed to the preparation of a list of generators with specific qualifications to expand al-Dalic station. The Authority also provides technical consultations to the private projects at Dhi Nakhib and Habil. The Authority's planning director pointed out future projects, among which is the extension of a high voltage line, 132 megavolts, connecting the provinces of Aden and Abyan within the efforts of connecting all the provinces of the Republic by means of that network. An additional station will be built in Aden for that purpose. He indicated that in order to totally develop the sector of electricity, an agreement has been reached with the Arab Monetary Fund for Development to fund a study of the electricity sector and come up with a long-term plan till the year 2000.

12188

CSO: 4404/547

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

FISHING PORT PROJECT PROCEEDS WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 24 Jul 83 p 3

Article: "One of the Largest Projects of the Current 5-Year Plan; \$40 Million Allocated for its Construction"

Excerpts The fishing port project in Aden is considered to be among the larger projects of the second 5-year plan that is presently implemented with the assistance of the Soviet Union. The \$40 million allocated to the project will be provided by the Soviet Union as a long-term loan in accordance with the technical and economic cooperation accord between Yemen People's Democratic and the Soviet Union.

The cornerstone was laid on 31 Jan 1970, and the actual work was started in 1980. The project is expected to be completed in 1986. It is worth mentioning that this cooperative project will be in operation in stages, i.e., each department will be fully operative as soon as it is completed.

Multi-Purpose Fish Co-op

This fishing port project in Aden is regarded as a multi-purpose fishing co-op due to its various specialized components. The project consists of the following:

1. A dock. The project includes the establishment of a 422 meter dock to receive fishing boats and regulate the loading and unloading processes. This dock will be comprised of two sections. a) a 321 meter dock for loading and unloading. It can accommodate 10 medium sized fishing boats. b) A 121 meter dock for maintenance and repair purposes. It will receive fishing boats subjected to periodical inspection for maintenance and repair.
2. A floating dock. Complete maintenance will be provided for the fishing fleet at the floating dock. The capacity of the cranes on the dock amounts to 1,500 tons. The dock is equipped with the most modern workshops specialized in the maintenance of fishing boats.
3. Cold-storage room. The port has a 3,000 ton capacity cold-storage room to preserve fish. The cold-storage room contains an ice factory capable of producing 100 tons of ice daily, a storage room of 200 ton capacity to store ice, and a 25 ton capacity freezer. Upon receiving fish deliveries from

fishing boats, the storeroom's personnel undertake the preservation of the shipments. The cold-storage room also has technological units for the fish industry. These units are:

- a. A unit for the production of 5 tons daily of fish fillet.
- b. A unit for the production of 1 ton daily of smoked fish.
- c. A unit for the production of one-half ton a day of dried fish.
- d. A unit for the production of one-half ton a day of salted fish.

The construction of the cold-storage room and its pertinent installation is expected to be completed in 1984, and operation will begin that same year.

4. Central workshop. The port includes a large central workshop in addition to two small ones. These workshops, together with the floating dock, provide the maintenance processes. It is worth mentioning that these workshops will be equipped with the most advanced technical engineering methods.

5. The project includes a four-story building for the Ministry of Fish Resources, in addition to another four-story building for the administration of the port.

High Percentage of Accomplishment

Work now in progress at the fishing port of Aden has achieved a reported successive high percentage of accomplishment exceeding the goals of the plan. During the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 the rates of accomplishments were 108, 103, 105 percent, and during the first half of 1983, the rate was approximately 104 percent.

What Then?

The fishing port project is regarded in its current stage as a technical training institute with approximately 600 male and female workers. Women represent 10 percent of the workforce. Through their job performance, the Yemeni workers are attaining technical skills such as operating and maintaining machines and cranes, and are gaining experience in construction, mechanical and electrical works.

It is worth mentioning that the project provided 47 wooden houses for Soviet experts in the region of Khawr Maksar. In addition, nine houses have been built in the district of Shaykh Ishaq, five of which have been given to the employees who were living on the site needed for the project. The remaining four houses have been distributed among the Yemeni crews working for the project. The project is also undertaking the building of 32 apartments in the region of (Juhaf). The construction of these apartments is expected to be completed by the end of this year.

The project includes a clinic in which a number of medical specialists serve: an internist, a surgeon, and a dentist. All the employees of the Ministry of Fish Resources and its agencies receive treatment and medications free of charge.

Cooperation With the Soviet Union

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the developing countries, including our own, is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and of providing assistance to the developing countries without restrictions or preset conditions. In a sincere effort to contribute to the economic development of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries, the Soviet Union has abolished customs duty on goods imported from the developing countries. The Soviet Union continues to offer financial aid for establishing industrial advancement as a basis for future development. The contributions of the Soviet Union cannot be ignored by those who have eyes and an open mind. The Soviets always offer help generously to their friends.

12188

CSO: 4404/547

MINISTER OF INDUSTRY DISCUSSES ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 189, 24-30 Sep 83 pp 3-5

[Article: "On the Occasion of National Day in Saudi Arabia, Ghazi al-Qusaybi Tells AL-MAJALLAH: 'These Are the Features of the New Phase of Our Development'"]

[Text] Jiddah--On the occasion of Saudi National Day, which falls on 23 September of this year, AL-MAJALLAH is publishing a private interview which it held with Dr Ghazi al-Qusaybi, minister of industry and electricity and deputy minister of health. In this interview he deals with various aspects of business and industrial activity in Saudi Arabia. In the interview, Dr al-Qusaybi said: "Saudi Arabia today has started a phase of stable economic growth." At the beginning of the interview Dr al-Qusaybi stressed the fact that there would be no cancellation of any of the development projects which were part of the budget. He urged Saudi businessmen to go beyond the framework of government construction projects and to endeavor to seek out new opportunities in the field of agriculture and the production of consumer goods. He also expressed his confidence in the future as far as control of the private sector by Saudis was concerned, and he revealed the fact that graduates of Saudi universities would be free to accept employment in the private sector after their graduation. Concerning government support provided for newly-established industries, he said that this would not at all be affected by declining revenues--with the exception of the increase in the cost of services. Dr al-Qusaybi added that he did not believe that the increase in the cost of electricity and water which is being paid by the industrial sector would affect the capability of this sector.

Dr al-Qusaybi stated that Saudi Arabia, after having gone through a period of rapid and balanced growth in the seventies and early eighties, was now entering a new phase. He explained this as follows: "My belief is that this situation will result in a new economic climate during the next few years. It will be possible to anticipate [economic growth], there will be stability [in our economic growth], and the level of inflation will be quite tolerable." Although Dr al-Qusaybi considered it unlikely that any economic recession would occur, he indicated that "a new pattern of thinking and behavior" would be prevailing during the new phase and that the private sector would find it necessary to be satisfied with less. He said that the enormous profits which were pursued by businessmen who were satisfied with nothing less than 100

percent profit from their investments were something which it would no longer be possible to have. Dr al-Qusaybi also supported the idea of "streamlining" some of the government projects.

Electricity and Industry

Concerning the electricity sector, Dr al-Qusaybi said the following: "We had hoped to bring electricity to all areas of Saudi Arabia within the next 2 years. However, we now see that it will take 4 or 5 years to achieve this. But we have never said that we will not bring electricity to this or that area of the country."

In response to a question about whether or not the Saudi government was honoring its commitments to contracting companies with regard to what it owed them, Dr al-Qusaybi answered that he was aware of no cases where there was a delay in payments being made to those who were owed such payments. He stated that the process of tendering had already been resumed on a broad scale and that bids were now being invited for projects such as those concerning seawater desalination plants and the construction of airports and hospitals which will cost billions of riyals. In response to an objection raised by some people in the private sector to the effect that there is a shortage of liquidity, Dr al-Qusaybi said the following: "Let me emphasize to you the fact that, ever since God created the world, businessmen have been complaining that there has not been enough liquidity. All businessmen think this way. Even when the country's oil production was more than 10 million barrels per day and the government was spending huge amounts of money, there were some businessmen who were claiming that there was not enough liquidity."

Dr al-Qusaybi said that the situation of the private sector was "sound," but he added that it must carefully and accurately keep track of the changes in development priorities which were occurring: "So far, as far as I know, no commercial establishment has declared bankruptcy. We also are seeing that most plants every day are demanding that their installations and production processes be expanded. In addition to this, new businesses are cropping up every day. All one has to do is to go to the market and see the large volume of buying and selling which is going on there."

Concerning the industrial sector, Dr al-Qusaybi had the following to say: "Out of a total of 1,500 factories and plants in Saudi Arabia, only 10 have shut down. There are perhaps another 40 plants which are facing difficulties concerning repaying their debts to the Saudi Industrial Development Fund [SIDF] or some problems in the marketing sector. If we consider that 50 factories and plants out of a total of 1,500 are encountering some difficulties, then this is a clear indication of the fact that our economic situation is both healthy and sound."

Dr al-Qusaybi stressed the fact that it was necessary to eventually have industrialists diversify their activities when he said the following: "I still receive applications for the establishment of new plants in the sector which produces prefabricated homes and prefabricated concrete structures which go into the making of buildings. This is a sector which is too crowded. Although our ministry follows a policy of non-interference, right now we are seeing ourselves forced to frustrate some people's determination to continue to

construct numerous factories which would manufacture for the building and development sector." The bottled water market is another market which suffers from being overcrowded. Dr al-Qusaybi warned that "the market would be flooded with this bottled water" if the new plants which produce it did not immediately stop their operations.

Dr al-Qusaybi said that completion of the large-scale industrial projects would serve to modify the demand for industrial products, and he went on to say: "In this regard I believe that it is necessary for businessmen to possess sufficient foresight when it comes to distributing their investments, capacities, and resources. All they have to do is to find a commodity which the government wishes to purchase and then acquire a plant which undertakes to produce this commodity in order that it be marketed." But he added that whenever demand on the part of the government for some products decreased, it became necessary for the industrialists to overcome this recession in the private sector by means of orienting themselves in other directions, and he added: "We are still spending billions of dollars every year on imports." Dr al-Qusaybi said that agriculture, maintenance, and service operations were sectors which had much to offer and were promising in terms of investment during the phase which would come after the phase of constructing the infrastructure.

Private Sector and Self-Reliance

Dr al-Qusaybi urged the private sector to demonstrate more self-reliance and went on to say: "Total reliance on the government is something which should end. If it has not already ended, then it should at least be reduced and curtailed." Dr al-Qusaybi also advised this sector that it was necessary for it to orient itself toward consumer goods, determine the wishes and demands of the consumers, and also orient itself toward the growing number of Saudi young people who are entering the labor market every year.

Dr al-Qusaybi said that the recent changes which had taken place in the labor market were "radical ones." He said that hundreds of trained Saudis were graduating every year and that "we are unable to employ all of them in government offices." Dr al-Qusaybi also revealed that a decree would soon be issued which would provide for giving employment to Saudi university graduates in the sector which they preferred. He also said that, at some time in the future, the government would be selecting the employees it needs from among those whom it regards as possessing the proper degree of responsibility.

How Do We Attract Saudis?

Dr al-Qusaybi rejected the complaint heard from the private sector to the effect that there exists an insufficient number of qualified Saudis: "The problem," he said, "is that Saudi businessmen do not do enough to make employment with their firms attractive for their fellow-Saudis. In this regard, they should follow the lead of the public sector companies such as Aramco and Petromin and establish a clear and comprehensive system of incentives and benefits. It is not enough to say: 'I want you to work in my plant.' There must also be a pay scale such as, for example, the one which

Petromin or SABIC has. In addition to this, there should also be opportunities for advancement, for training abroad, and for earning advanced degrees, there should be a health insurance plan, there should be a housing allowance, there should be a housing development, and there should be retirement pensions. These are all things which give employees an incentive to work. If a young Saudi starts employment at a particular plant, what will he be doing there? Will he spend his whole life at the job level where he began employment there? Such an employee has a goal, the achievement of which represents his personal aspirations. Any plant which is able to meet these requirements will encounter no difficulty in finding Saudi employees. Whenever there are incentives, young Saudis will be available." Dr al-Qusaybi cited, as two examples of what could be done in this regard, Aramco which hires more than 2,000 Saudis every year and the power companies which hire 500 young people every year.

Dr al-Qusaybi is very optimistic concerning the matter of Saudis taking the places of non-Saudis in various fields, and he said; "In the near future Saudi Arabia's population will be nearly 10 million. For this reason, I expect most of the workers in our plants during the next 5 years to be Saudis."

Other topics which were touched upon by Dr al-Qusaybi during this interview were the following:

Government Subsidies

According to Dr al-Qusaybi, Saudi Arabia's membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] will require a decrease in government subsidies for gasoline and industrial materials. However, he said that this step would be regulated in order to reduce the effect that it would have on small consumers. He also said that the leasing of land in industrial zones at nominal rates would continue. But he added; "Things will be different in the case of electricity. As time goes by, it will be very difficult to continue with the current rates since they represent only 25 percent of actual costs. Efforts are being made by the GCC to standardize public utility and service rates in the Gulf area in order that no one nation have an advantage over the others. Electricity in Saudi Arabia costs 7 halalahs [100 halalahs = 1 riyal] per kilowatt-hour. But in Kuwait this cost is as low as 2 halalahs. In Oman and Qatar, though, the cost is 20 halalahs." Dr al-Qusaybi went on to say: "Right now we are making contacts with the ministers of industry in the GCC nations in an effort to close the gaps in these rates without necessarily standardizing them."

He said that even when the new rates are in effect, electric power would still be subsidized to a considerable extent by means of government aid: "There will be no radical change in this regard." But he said that the rates would be made higher for the large-scale consumers in an effort to eliminate waste and over-consumption of electricity: "So far I have never seen any child in Saudi Arabia turn out the light when he leaves a room, whereas this is something which is commonly seen in Europe. We must introduce new habits in the realm of our consumption of electricity and water."

Customs Duties

Dr al-Qusaybi said that there would not be any change in the policy concerning customs fees and duties in spite of the fact that some industrial establishments were asking for protection: "I believe that we will deal with the matter of customs protection as far as fees are concerned by means of utilizing the same levels and standards that we have had so far. This means that a plant must continue production for at least 1 year and its production must cover at least about 50 percent of the market requirement for the commodity which it produces. In addition to this, the plant must maintain the quality of its production and must sell it at fairly reasonable prices. Any plant which desires such protection must furnish sound and legitimate reasons for having it. We want our industry to be capable of competing and exporting its products."

Support Provided for Contractors

The latest decree issued by King Fahd stipulates that it is necessary for all foreign contracting companies to subcontract at least 30 percent of their projects to Saudi establishments, and this will serve to provide new opportunities for Saudi establishments. In this regard, Dr al-Qusaybi said: "But there will still be competition. This will challenge the companies to avail themselves of this opportunity and to offer their services at reasonable prices."

Shares Market and Stock Exchange

The Saudi government is cautiously studying the matter of establishing a shares market and stock exchange, and it is anticipated that it will be some time before the results of this work are known. In this connection, Dr al-Qusaybi said: "The experience which other nations have had tells us that it is necessary to deal with this matter with extreme caution. We are still attempting to work out the type of guarantees which would serve to put a stop to the gambling and speculation which brought on such negative results in many other countries." Dr al-Qusaybi remarked that Saudi public sector establishments have, on the whole, been successful: "The value of some of their stocks and shares have increased 8-fold, 9-fold, and even 10-fold. This is definite proof of the fact that it is a great exaggeration to say that there is a shortage of liquidity."

Plans of the Ministry of Health

The Ministry of Health is reordering its priorities--with a deemphasis on large hospitals--in an effort to establish local clinics in the various parts of the country and it is showing more concern for preventive medicine. Nevertheless, work will be continuing on the construction of the large hospitals which were provided for within the framework of the third 5-year plan. At the present time the Ministry of Health is inviting new bids for the implementation of 10 projects in connection with the royal decree which has called for the inviting of bids and awarding of contracts in connection with these projects. In addition to this, the Ministry of Health is planning to start work this year on

the construction of a medical center in Riyadh which will have 1,000 beds. This is in addition to the three other hospitals which King Fahd ordered the construction of in al-Ta'if--a mental hospital, a pulmonary diseases hospital, and a public health hospital. Concerning these matters, Dr al-Qusaybi said: "I personally am principally concerned with planning, developing human resources, building health care centers, and coordinating health services. We have also restructured the ministry and appointed a full-time deputy minister who will be responsible for planning and development. We have also approved a new pay scale which will allow us to bring in doctors from the U.S. and Europe. During the next few months more than 100 doctors will be coming to Saudi Arabia. And finally, I was the chairman of a meeting which enjoyed the participation of the other government agencies and offices which provide medical services, such as the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard--a meeting held in an effort to achieve better coordination among these bodies and to prevent the duplication of efforts."

Dr al-Qusaybi also said that, besides this, there will be an effort to increase health awareness among people: "Hospitals might be a very fine thing. But if people and individuals are to have real health, then we must go back to the basics. We must teach mothers how to take care of their children and how to sterilize milk. We must also purify the sources of drinking water in our villages and eliminate any pollution which might be found in them. I believe that building hospitals would be a waste of time if we do not undertake to do all of these things." Dr al-Qusaybi also felt that it was very necessary to distribute medical clinics throughout all areas of the country: "We must bring medical services to the people instead of bringing the people to our large hospitals. Of course, this is not easy to do and it cannot be achieved overnight. However, we are moving in the right direction."

SABIC

Dr al-Qusaybi expressed his total satisfaction concerning the achievements accomplished by the two SABIC plants in al-Jubayl in the field of marketing--plants which began production last winter. Concerning this, he said: "I anticipate that these two plants will be able to market [all of] their production by the end of this year." These two plants are shipping their goods to Europe and Japan on virtually a weekly basis in accordance with contracts which they won within the framework of an international competition. Dr al-Qusaybi also revealed the fact that two new SABIC firms would be beginning operations in Riyadh and London. He said that their task would be to expand [Saudi] expertise in marketing and services in anticipation of the establishment of new petrochemicals enterprises.

The Future

Dr al-Qusaybi asserted that the levels of oil production were beginning to stabilize and that the same was true with regard to government revenues. He went on to say: "I believe that we will be seeing stable and reasonable increases in government revenues during the next few years."

Dr al-Qusaybi added: "Right now we are encountering more competition in almost all of the sectors. This will serve to reduce prices as far as the consumers are concerned. Today we are seeing thousands of Saudis enter into industrial training. We also notice that businessmen have begun to be more and more aware of the marketing process and have begun to develop more 'aggressive' approaches, and we are also seeing them provide maintenance and services in order to attract consumers. For this reason, I do not anticipate any difficulties. I believe that, during the next few years, we will be moving firmly ahead in the implementation of our economic program which we have set for ourselves, and we will be doing so without any ups and downs occurring."

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EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL SAUDI MEDICAL CONFERENCE CONVENES

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 195, 5-11 Nov 83 p 16

[Article by Mahir 'Abbas: "King Fahd Inaugurated and Prince 'Abdallah Sponsored the Eighth Medical Conference: Concern with Human Beings Is the Foundation for Development in Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] Riyadh--Last Sunday King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz inaugurated the work of the Eighth International Saudi Medical Conference at the National Guard's King Khalid Military Academy, and on this occasion the halls of this military academy witnessed the largest scientific and medical gathering from the Arab world to date.

The Saudi monarch's involvement with, and sponsorship of, this great humanitarian undertaking earned the admiration of the various scientists from throughout the world who attended the conference. Nearly 2,500 scientists attended this conference. King Fahd's interest in the conference emphasized the fact that the conference was a scientific and cultural achievement possessing a humanitarian dimension. The king's short and expressive speech, in which he welcomed those attending the conference, and his eagerness to sponsor the sciences and scientists constitute the greatest proof of the fact that the Saudi monarch is endeavoring to have overall construction efforts go forward in a careful and scientific manner. The edification of human beings and interest in them as a basic resource to be utilized for going forward with the growth process constitute the foundation for the development which Saudi Arabia has been undergoing.

The Saudi king also expressed his gratitude to Prince 'Abdallah for his sponsorship of this important medical conference. This was still another indication of King Fahd's interest in, and encouragement of, this humanitarian effort sponsored by the Saudi National Guard. In fact, by sponsoring this medical conference, the Saudi National Guard has shown that it is a military organization based on cultural and humanitarian values.

This conference of doctors from 37 nations represented a humanitarian gathering of people who had come together in order to bring up their ideas for scientific discussion in order to serve mankind and for the sake of providing better medical services in order to enable human beings to live longer. The conference is evidence of the fact that Saudi Arabia and its monarch possess an

international and scientific dimension in addition to the fact that their political presence is felt both in the Arab world and abroad as far as various issues are concerned.

A group of Arab and foreign doctors and professors, when commenting on the idea of the conference and the fact that high officials in Saudi Arabia were sponsoring it, said that the conference was a humanitarian step and constituted an impetus for scientific research to investigate and seek out the best things that knowledge has provided for mankind. The objective of all of these things is that of serving mankind. In the opinion of the doctors, the fact that the conference was being held at a military institution such as the Saudi National Guard was also something which indicated a number of dimensions as far as this time and this location were concerned. Among other things, it indicated that this powerful and well-equipped military establishment is a symbol of humanity and civilization rather than a symbol of destruction. In fact, the doctors felt that the National Guard was a symbol of goodness and the spirit of giving rather than a symbol of war.

This was reaffirmed by what Prince 'Abdallah said in his speech which was given on his behalf by Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Tuwayjiri, the assistant head of the National Guard: "Only yesterday this location was a desert which was inhabited only by birds and beasts of prey. All of you have witnessed the great transformation which has been gradually taking place in this vast desert. Once there was abject poverty here, but now we see here an edifice of science and knowledge and we see the edification of modern man." In his speech, Prince 'Abdallah went on to say: "It is mankind's destiny in this life to struggle against pain, sickness, weakness, and old age, and this is something that no one can prevent." He then referred to the importance of knowledge and mankind's need for knowledge when he said that the efforts expended by scientists to alleviate the physical pains of mankind represented a noble and compassionate endeavor [to eliminate] mankind's pain and suffering.

In his speech, Prince 'Abdallah stressed the fact that the Arabs have been both participants and leaders in the process of creating human civilization: "Our conference is not merely a meeting which is relevant to the present day. It is a historical meeting. Our scientists have contributed a tremendous amount to modern civilization, and no fair-minded person can deny us this fact."

At this point in his speech Prince 'Abdallah desired to tell the scientists at the conference who had come from 37 nations about the authentic nature of human civilization and the leading role which Arab scientists had played in guiding this civilization--a role which no one can deny. Prince 'Abdallah described the conference of scientists who had come from all over the world as being a conference devoted solely to knowledge and the service of mankind, and Prince 'Abdallah said that this was a historical day which enabled scientists to transcend national boundaries and overcome the limits of the material world.

Prince 'Abdallah also said that science and knowledge constituted a light which had no horizon of darkness. He said that the horizons of knowledge are like the radiance of the stars, moons, and suns of the universe.

Why Was the Conference a Success?

Those who attended the sessions of the conference in its various halls praised the efforts which had been undertaken by the Saudi National Guard in order to have the conference be a success and put it on a level which was higher than many previous scientific conferences. They said that the preparation for, and organization of, the conference were an indication of the effort being made to achieve the best possible results from the discussions which were brought up at the conference via the scientific papers presented there. More than 1,800 papers were submitted, and of this total more than 500 scientific papers were selected. A total of 478 persons spoke at the conference, and they were among the most prominent people in the medical profession in Saudi Arabia and other nations of the world. Both the soundness and importance of the papers which were selected reaffirm what was stated by Dr Muhammad al-Sharidah, chairman of the conference's Research Committee, when he said: "This conference is a scientific event with a purpose. Medical knowledge is not something which can be gained only from universities. It is something which transcends this period of time. Holding conferences is a modern scientific approach. This is why it is necessary for every doctor to continue scientific research and to continue studying."

Dr al-Sharidah went on to say that the conference had received tremendous support from all of the leaders in Saudi Arabia and that the best evidence of this had been the fact that the king of Saudi Arabia was present at its inauguration. He said that further evidence of this was the fact that the conference was also sponsored by Prince 'Abdallah, the heir to the throne, as well as by Prince Badr ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, deputy commander of the National Guard. He said that this was what made the conference a success.

Dr al-Sharidah went on to say: "The conference will confer a great deal of scientific importance to the doctors as a result of the fact that the conference is hosting such a large number of prominent persons in the field of medicine and surgery. They will enrich the conference by means of their scientific contributions. The papers of the conference will, for the first time in the history of medical conferences, deal with the subject of the medical knowledge which is found in the Koran and the Sunna with the participation of religious scholars, theologians, and Islamic legal thinkers."

Dr Ghazi al-Qusaybi, the Saudi minister of health, also praised the conference as well as the objectives of the conference and the papers which were discussed during the 5 days of the conference. He also praised the efforts which had been undertaken by the National Guard in the field of medicine and health.

Those who spoke at the conference--including Dr Fahd al-'Abd al-Jabbar, dean of the Faculty of Medicine at King Sa'ud University, and Dr 'Ali 'Abdallah al-Khalifah, vice-president of the Arab Doctors' Federation and director general of medical services in Bahrain--were in unanimous agreement that the conference represented a unique scientific endeavor undertaken for the sake of promoting the happiness of mankind.

OFFICIALS REVIEW 1983 CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 24 Oct 83 p 5

[Article: "This Is How We Reduce Time for Completing Vital Projects; Mahmud al-Kurdi, General Director of Military Installations Construction Establishment: 'With Absolute Will, All Our Days Have Turned Into National Work Days'; Ibrahim Suwaydan, Chairman of Misyaf Branch: 'We Feel Need To Offer More Work'"]

[Text] In a previous interview with Engineer Brig Gen Mahmud al-Kurdi, the general director of the Military Installations Construction Establishment, the director said: "All our days in the establishment have turned into national work days." It was then a phrase at which we did not pause long by virtue of the enthusiasm we were witnessing at the site where the interview was held. But with every passing day, we have become more aware that this establishment exerts extraordinary efforts. This is confirmed by the imprint the establishment leaves on the projects implemented here and there and in every part of the country. This fact has motivated us to ask anew: How does the Military Installations Construction Establishment operate so that it can implement with such speed and precision the developmental and vital projects it contracts? Again, the answer comes: Out of its belief in the necessity of effective participation in building and developing this generous country, the establishment has undertaken a pledge to be the forerunner in implementing the projects it contracts in order that it may achieve good for the sons of this people. One of the establishment's workers has added: "Our zeal and enthusiasm for the work have created a magnificent public response, a result of which brother citizens have taken part with us in the work in some projects." I asked this worker about the site of the projects in whose construction the citizens have participated, and he said: "There have been numerous projects, the latest of which was the Salhab road, built in Misyaf. This project was completed 1 year ahead of schedule." I will not conceal the fact that I was possessed by the urge to visit the area, see this project and meet with the workers who built it. Thus, arrangements were made with Comrade 'Ali al-Sulayman, the head of the Guidance and Information Directorate.

In Misyaf, we were met by Engineer Capt Ibrahim Suwaydan, the head of the branch office of the establishment, who said: "We feel the need to offer more work, and the branch office has the capability of implementing whatever is asked of it." This was the first phrase in the interview.

Before discussing the details of the interview with Engineer Ibrahim Suwaydan, we must give a brief idea of the circumstances surrounding the establishment

of the Misyaf Branch. The branch was set up on 1 July 1981 as a result of the development of the work in the production team that was then implementing one of the major projects in the area. The value of the work contract amounted to 95 million Syrian pounds, and 850 workers and engineers were employed in the project. The earliest presence of the establishment in the area came on 24 June 1976 under the name of Seventh Work Team of the Hamah Branch. This presence was bolstered in following years by the absence of branches of work groups of the other public sector companies from the province because of the area's poverty, because of its vast geographic area which extends from the administrative borders of Hims Governorate to the administrative borders of Idlib Governorate, covering a distance of 160 km, and because of the lack of big projects in the area. This caused the branch's projects to be confined to service projects that yield no significant profits to the establishment. Engineer Ibrahim Suwaydan has said: "The number of projects we are implementing in the area amounts to 50 projects, with the largest of these projects valued at 4.5 million Syrian pounds."

These projects consist of roads and service buildings. This is what causes the branch to encounter difficulties, the most important being the rugged mountain terrain, the projects scattered over a vast geographic area and our need to divide our workers and machinery among these small projects. If we add to these difficulties the problems experienced by the branch that are summed up in intervention from outside the work management and the lack of cooperation on the part of the supervisory and technical authorities, it becomes evident how hard are the conditions under which the branch operates. Our objective is not profit, as you can see. Our objective is to develop the country, and this requires us to rise to the level of the national responsibility we shoulder. We can do more work and produce more if we overcome some fabricated difficulties placed in the face of the construction activity. On the occasion, let me raise a small but important issue. The branch's debts to the beneficiaries have amounted to 5 million pounds. This is a large figure when compared to the resources of a new branch, such as the Misyaf Branch whose investment budget amounts to nearly 57 million pounds.

As for accomplishments, they are numerous and varied and include:

The Misyaf automatic bakery, with a contractual value of nearly 5 million pounds. This project was completed 1 year ahead of schedule and delivered in June 1983, whereas the scheduled delivery date was July 1984.

The fruits and vegetables hall [market], with a contractual value of 1 million Syrian pounds. This hall was delivered on schedule.

Haylayn School, with a contractual value of 2 million pounds. This school is under construction.

The Misyaf water reservoir, with a contractual value of nearly 2.5 million pounds. It was delivered on schedule.

Al-Hal garage and market project, with the total value of the contract amounting to 11.5 million pounds. The work scheduled for the 1983 plan has been completed, with the completed work valued at nearly 3 million pounds. Moreover,

work valued at 1 million pounds has been completed in the project with no contract.

Agricultural roads in the Misyaf-'Awj-Murmin area. Three contracts valued at 4 million pounds have been concluded for these roads, which are under construction. We received the instructions to start the work a week ago.

The Ba'rayn-Nisaf crossroad, with a contractual value of 500,000 Syrian pounds. The actual costs amounted to 613,000 pounds, and the project was delivered on schedule.

The Misyaf-'Ayn Halaqim road, at a cost of nearly 2 million pounds. It is under construction.

The Jubb Ramlah-Asilah road, at a cost of nearly 4 million pounds. It is under construction.

The Ba'marah-al-Dulaybah road, at a cost of nearly 1 million pounds. It will be delivered in 10 days.

The Misyaf-Wadi al-'Uyun-al-Shaykh Badr road, at a cost of nearly 2 million pounds. This project is tantamount to three road projects.

Al-Qadmus-Baniyas road, at a cost of nearly 1 million pounds. We started work on this project before concluding the contract. The project will be delivered in 1 week.

Mahradah Area Projects

The Mahradah grain warehouse, with a contractual value of 2.5 million pounds. It is under construction and will be delivered in nearly 2 months.

The Mahradah silos, with a contractual value of 1 million pounds. These are the first metal silos built in the country.

The Mahradah Agricultural Bank [premises], with a value of nearly 3.5 million pounds. It will be delivered 6 months ahead of schedule.

The Mahradah fruits and vegetables hall, with a contractual value of 613,000 pounds. It was delivered on schedule.

Al-Ghab Area Projects

The Agricultural Bank [premises] in al-Suqaylabiyah, with a value of 4.5 million pounds. It will be inaugurated on 16 November 1983, i.e. 1 year ahead of the schedule set by the contract.

The fruits and vegetables hall, at a cost of nearly 1 million pounds. It was delivered on schedule.

The municipal roads in al-Suqaylabiyah, at a cost of nearly 9.5 million pounds. A sum of 1.5 million pounds was allocated for the project in 1983. Work, with the value of the allocated sum, has been completed.

Mirdash-al-Suqaylabiyah road, costing nearly 1 million pounds. This project is under construction.

Al-'Asharinah-Salhab road, costing nearly 1 million pounds. It is under construction.

Various roads in al-Ghab costing nearly 4 million pounds and serving 27 villages. These roads were completed and fully delivered in 3 months, whereas the period set in the contract is 12 months.

Salhab Area Projects

The Salhab municipal roads, at a cost of nearly 2.5 million pounds. The project was started on 17 April 1983 and has been fully turned over to the beneficiaries.

The wall around the municipality building in Salhab, costing [number unclear] pounds. This project has been delivered.

The Salhab Municipality sewers, costing nearly 1.5 million pounds. Construction has not been started, and the contract is still in the process of ratification.

The Hawrat 'Amrin Municipality sewers, costing nearly 1 million pounds. This project is under construction.

It is evident from reviewing these projects that most of them have been finished in half the period set for implementation in the contracts. As for the reasons for this speedy implementation, they are summed up in three important factors:

1. The ability of the branch's apparatus to work and to get things accomplished due to the availability of the technical cadres and the material resources. We underlined this point at the beginning of the article.
2. The participation of the citizens in some of the work sites.
3. The ceaseless daily patriotic effort by the workers of the Misyaf Branch and of the other branches of the establishment.

I will pause a little to discuss the third factor. Most of the workers I met at the work sites told me that they work an average of 9 hours a day on their own initiative. Some of the workers rarely take the holidays and the other occasions on which state agencies shut down. As for the material yield of this work, all the workers have asserted that it is not important. What is important is to complete the projects with which they are entrusted. Some may think that the wages paid by this establishment are high and that this is why the workers work energetically and enthusiastically. But when you ask about the salaries and wages, you are surprised by very ordinary figures. Rather, the wages these workers get are even less than what similar workers get at other work sites. By reading what you see, you reach the conclusion that when there is belief in work and production, the accomplishment is not tied to the personal material profit gained by the workers.

Comrade Wafiq al-Husayni, the head of the political guidance section of the Misyaf Branch, has said: "We solve all the problems that the work may encounter, supply the workers with the necessary services, supervise the clinic's services directly, provide first aid to the injured, [words dropped] allocated for the workers and protect the branch furniture. We are exerting efforts to issue a monthly wall bulletin in the name of the branch, to open a party and cultural library, to provide a constant guard for all the projects, to paint signs carrying the names of the projects to be installed at the work sites and on the roads and to get the daily papers and distribute them to the workers. We are working with a spirit of high responsibility to bolster the work and development procession." As for the difficulties, al-Husayni said that the work front is vast and the branch's projects are numerous and distributed over a large area. "We also experience difficulties in transportation. However, we are prepared to carry out any work we are asked to carry out in order to build the modern Syria under the leadership of Comrade Struggler Hafiz al-Asad."

Field Tour

Comrade Engineer 'Isam al-Hajj Husayn, the head of the Salhab roads project, has said that work on the project started in April 1983, with the implementation period set at 360 days and with the project's contractual value amounting to 2 million Syrian pounds. This project calls for opening and surfacing roads and for building rainwater drains.

As for the difficulties, Engineer Husayn says that the technical cadres are not available and "we find difficulties in providing these cadres. We are exerting serious efforts to overcome these difficulties." Comrade Husayn has stressed the need to issue the instructions to begin work on the projects included in the plan and to await the approval of the authorities concerned in the governorate.

Engineer Rajih Farashah, the head of the grain warehouses and silos project in Salhab, has said: "Work on the project started on 1 June 1983, and the project's contractual value amounts to nearly 6 million pounds." As for the beneficiary, it is the Public Establishment for Grain Trading and Processing. The project calls for building a two-floor 24 by 24-meter warehouse and another two-floor 24 by 26-meter warehouse. The implementation period is 385 days as of the day the instructions for initiation of the work are given. The completion rate amounted to nearly 80 percent of the project's total work. The grain silos consist of 12 cells, each with a diameter of 8 meters and a height of 8 meters. The construction period was 75 days, and the silos have been completed.

Another engineer at the project has said that the work is proceeding at a fast rate and that the daily work amounts to 60 cubic meters of concrete. As for the materials, they are available, thanks to the care of Engineer Mahmud al-Kurdi, the establishment's general director. What drew our attention was that an executive engineer was taking part in assembling and disassembling the molds and in the entire production process. He said that the project receives moral and material support from all of the establishment's departments concerned--support that calls for optimism and success.

Engineer Tawfiz 'Ushaymi, the head of the Misyaf Branch production section, said that the section's work was confined to securing (metal paneling). As for the development of the section's activities, it became necessary to develop the section's activities, and this is what has happened. Workshops have been built for the section, and a carpentry workshop and a workshop for mixing concrete and asphalt have been opened to meet the needs of the section's projects. As of the beginning of 1983, the number of section workers amounted to 55 workers, trained and with their experience developed at the center.

Moreover, a workshop for aluminum panels and a furniture workshop will be opened next month to meet the furniture needs of the section and of its offices, in addition to producing all kinds of concrete blocks. We also have a plan to build hangars to produce gravel and tile and a workshop to produce mobile trailers. As for the difficulties, we need more buildings for workshops, and we are exerting serious efforts to get them.

Engineer Ahmad 'Aqil, the head of the repair and maintenance section, said:

"We have seven workshops in which to repair the machinery. Despite the shortage of skilled cadre, we do carry out the repairs. As for the difficulties, the delay in supplying the spare parts and the difficulty of getting such spare parts from the markets are the most significant problems we encounter." Engineer 'Aqil also proposed conducting courses to train the section's technical cadre.

Dialogue on Difficulties

We went back to the dialogue with Engineer Ibrahim Suwaydan on the internal difficulties encountered by the branch. He said: "The unavailability of raw materials, such as iron and wood, is one of the difficulties we encounter. But thanks to the efforts of the general director, we have managed to surmount these difficulties by getting these materials from the central administration. As for the difficulties we cannot surmount, they include the delay in (submitting the reports) by the benefiting circles and the premeditated red tape by the supervisory and technical service authorities for reasons which, I think, are well known to everybody in the production sectors. These difficulties also include the unavailability of enough machinery to implement the projects. We try to make up for the shortage by borrowing from the establishment's other branches, with the work carried out on the basis that it is a single company seeking to achieve the same goal."

This is one aspect of the work situation in the Misyaf Branch of the Military Installations Construction Establishment. We hope that this branch will surmount its difficulties and will be able to achieve the goals for which it has been set up in this part of the country, which still lacks most of the necessary services so that the area may turn into an important production center in the country, especially since it possesses the components to become such a center.

8494

CSO: 4404/212

INCREASED CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN ALEPPO, IDLIB GOVERNORATES

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 7 Nov 83 p 5

[Article: "Aleppo and MITA, and 50 Million in Construction Projects Under Implementation; Idlib: 'We Overcome Difficulties and Obstacles With Sound Planning'; Al-Kurdi: 'We Must Also See Bright Aspects in Our Intensifying Development Progress'"]

[Text] We felt happy with the accomplishments achieved by the Misyaf Branch of the Military Installations Construction Establishment (MITA), first, because it is a newly introduced branch in a poor and vast area and, second, because of its capability of overcoming the work difficulties and the obstacles facing it. In a previous article, we noted some of these difficulties and proposed solutions for them, taking into consideration the public benefit and interest.

We had two options facing us: Return to Damascus after completing our mission or quickly continue our tour in the branches of the Military Installation Construction Establishment in the governorates of Aleppo, Idlib and Hamah, as proposed by our colleague 'Ali al-Sulayman, the establishment's director of guidance and information, to familiarize ourselves with the accomplishments of these branches, to meet with the workers there and to discuss the work and its problems and the reasons that contribute to speeding up the work tempo and raising the work to the highest production levels.

I recall that Eng Brig Gen Mahmud al-Kurdi, the general director of the Military Installations Construction Establishment, said during the course of a discussion on the missions of the press and the role of journalists in enhancing production that it is not essential that the journalist's mission be just that of looking for the problems, the difficulties and the aspects of failure and of exposing the dark points in our practical life. The journalist must also see the bright aspects of our intensifying developmental progress.

Engineer al-Kurdi added: "I am not saying that there are no negative aspects. But I am saying that these negative aspects are almost negligible in comparison to what we have accomplished, especially during the progress of the past 13 years under the party's leadership of the society and the state and under the wise auspices of President Hafiz al-Asad."

Engineer al-Kurdi stressed that what has been achieved in this span of the revolution's life is many times what had been achieved in Syria from the time of its independence until the onset of the 1970's. He added that there are figures and statistics that prove this and then wondered: "Why do we try to note the minor negative aspects and ignore the major accomplishments?"

After that interview, we published in the paper an article which contained these ideas in an endeavor to answer those who say that we have begun to operate like a sensational press.

Let me return to colleague 'Ali al-Sulayman with whom we agreed to continue the familiarization tour in the proposed governorates.

The first stop was Aleppo where the branch of the Military Installations Construction Establishment appears without any warning at the city gates. We entered the branch and asked for the branch chief but were told that he was at the projects.

How about the branch deputy chief?

He is also at the projects.

We asked for almost everybody and then decided to tour the city while waiting for their return. In the city, we saw dozens of metal signs planted next to the projects being built by the establishment.

At about 1300, we returned to the branch headquarters where we met with the deputy chief. His hair was covered with dust, and the traces of mud were still showing on his shoes. When we drew his attention to this fact, he said: "We are implementing contracts worth 350 million pounds. So how could their traces not show on us?" He added: "He who possesses money is a tired man, sir," We laughed heartily. He considers the establishment's funds and contracts as property belonging to all.

I asked him jokingly: "And how much of this money do you spend on yourself monthly, or, in other words, what is your monthly salary?"

He said: "What is important is that we are comfortable and have no financial problems. The salary and bonuses we get from the establishment are enough to meet our needs."

I said: "We have toured the city and have seen numerous projects you are implementing. However, we would like you to give us an idea of the most important of these projects."

Most Important Projects:

1. The popular housing project in al-Haydariyah and Karm al-Qasr areas:

The objective of this project is to build 1,200 housing units divided into 43 complexes [apartment buildings]. The estimated cost of this project is

85 million Syrian pounds, and its completion period is 30 months. The value of the work completed so far amounts to 75 million Syrian pounds, and the project is expected to be completed in the first quarter of 1984. A total of 270 housing units in 9 assemblies has already been turned over and utilized.

2. Workers Housing Project:

The objective of this project is to build 660 housing units in the Hananu residential town. The project's estimated cost is 45 million Syrian pounds, and its completion period is 24 months. The value of the work completed so far amounts to 34 million pounds and the project is expected to be completed by the end of the third quarter of 1984.

3. The Hananu town road and subterranean aquifers project:

The objective of the project is to build subterranean aquifers and roads in the Hananu residential town. The project's estimated cost is 52 million Syrian pounds, and its completion period is 3 years. The value of the work completed so far is 27 million pounds, and the project is expected to be completed by the end of 1984.

4. The consumer complex project in al-Talal:

The objective of the project is to build a consumer complex which includes a commercial market, a hotel and administrative buildings.

The project's estimated cost is 22 million pounds, and its completion period is 30 months. The value of the completed work is 6 million pounds, and the project is expected to be completed in the middle of 1985.

5. The warehouse projects for the Development Establishment:

The objective of this project is to build storage warehouses for the Development Establishment in the areas of al-Salamiyah, 'Ayn al-'Arab and Jarabulus.

The project's estimated cost is 25 million Syrian pounds, and the value of the work completed so far is 21 million pounds. The project is expected to be completed by the end of 1983.

6. Associations' project:

The objective is to build the skeletal structures for 16 residential assemblies, 6 of which are for the Aleppo Lawyers Association and 10 for the Workers Association of the Military Installations Construction Establishment.

The estimated costs of the project are 20 million pounds, and the value of the work completed so far is 6.5 million pounds. The project is expected to be completed by the end of 1984.

7. Warehouse projects for the Public Consumption Establishment:

The objective is to build storage warehouses for the Public Consumption Establishment in the areas of al-Ashrafiyah and al-A'zamiyah in Aleppo. The project's total cost is 16 million pounds, and the value of the work completed so far is 4 million Syrian pounds.

The work is expected to be completed in the middle of 1985.

8. Agricultural drainage warehouses:

The project's objective is to build storage warehouses for the Agricultural Drainage Directorate in the areas of I'zaz al-Safirah, Jarabulus and 'Ayn al-'Arab. The project's estimated cost is 15 million pounds, and the value of the work completed so far is 5 million Syrian pounds. The project is expected to be completed by the end of the first half of 1984.

How are the branch's needs for raw and manufactured materials secured? They are secured through a production section consisting of the following plants and workshops:

1. A smithcraft workshop with a monthly production capacity of 70 tons.
2. A carpentry workshop with a monthly production capacity of 2,000 square meters.
3. An aluminum paneling workshop with a monthly production capacity of 500 square meters.
4. The tile workshop with a monthly production capacity of 25,000 tiles.
5. The quarry with a monthly production capacity of 25,000 cubic meters of various kinds of gravel.
6. The circular saws workshop with a monthly capacity of 300 meters.
7. The [concrete] blocks production workshop with a monthly production capacity of 100,000 blocks.
8. The concrete mixers workshop with a daily production capacity of 400 cubic meters.

Repair and maintenance work for the branch's equipment and machinery is carried out by the branch's repair and maintenance section which has workshops specializing in the repair of gas and diesel engines. The section uses the latest means for the maintenance of equipment and machinery. Let me pause a little before the consumer complex in al-Talal. This is the first complex of its kind in the country built by the establishment. It consists, as I have already pointed out, of a commercial market, administrative buildings and services and will be turned over completely finished. The building will consist of eight floors. The first floor will be used for a car park and will

be equipped with a lift to carry vehicles. The second floor will be used for stores and showrooms for electrical appliances. The next three floors will be used for showrooms for various products. The sixth floor will be used for a restaurant, a kitchen, side terraces and a cafeteria overlooking Aleppo and equipped with sun umbrellas.

The last 2 floors will be used for the hotel and will contain 40 modernly furnished rooms.

Regarding other equipment, the project director says that the complex will have two lifts, one for goods and one for people, in addition to the lift for vehicles. The complex will also have two electric escalators, television observation networks, a radio station, a fire alarm and a water pump.

What is worth noting is that the complex is being built with the expertise and cadres of the Military Installations Construction Establishment without any foreign assistance.

In one of the housing projects, we met with the engineer who supervises the activities of the Military Installations Construction Establishment and who works for the circle for which the project is implemented.

He said that all activities are proceeding well, that there are no bottlenecks and that there have been no disagreements or arguments with the establishment's engineers regarding the technical specifications because the establishment abides by the specifications book carefully and even achieves higher standards at times. He said that the establishment's management must be thanked for reducing by 5 percent the value of the contract agreed upon because the project belongs to a housing association for people in the governorate with limited income. He said that this is an initiative by Engineer Mahmud al-Kurdi to be lauded because it reflects humanitarian aspects and is connected with a group of toiling people.

The time neared 1800, and we were still in the workshops whose workers had not departed in order to finish the work at hand. We wanted to stay longer but had no time to do so. We left Aleppo and were in Idlib on the following morning. The head of the Idlib branch said: "On 1 April 1979, the establishment was entrusted with completing construction of the Idlib yarn plant because the foreign firm building the project had been suspended for its delay in constructing the project and for its failure to follow up on the work.

The first appearance of the Military Installations Construction Establishment in Idlib Governorate came in the form of a work team sent to complete a certain project. Because the team's work expanded and because the team undertook the construction of other projects in Idlib Governorate, the establishment's general director issued on 1 August 1981 Organizational Decree No 3/4, transforming the Ninth Implementation Team into the Idlib Branch. Since then, the following projects have been implemented:

The Idlib yarn plant with a value of 30 million Syrian pounds.

Supplements to road and sewerage projects valued at 5 million pounds.

Enlargement of Jisr al-Shughur transformation plant at a cost of one-half million pounds.

A swimming pool, cabins and a command building at the headquarters of al-Ba'th Vanguarders for one-half million pounds.

Projects Under Construction:

The Popular housing in Idlib: Nearly 80 percent of the first contract and 50 percent of the second and third contract have been completed, keeping in mind that the total cost of these projects is nearly 18 million Syrian pounds.

The premises of the Idlib Electricity Directorate: Nearly 60 percent of the work in this project, valued at 11 million pounds, has been completed.

A reading hall and a warehouse at the Vanguarders headquarters: Nearly 70 percent of the value of the contract, amounting to 1 million Syrian pounds, has been completed.

A school and theater building: Nearly 40 percent of the project, valued at 3.5 million Syrian pounds, has been completed.

The project for grain warehouses in Khan Shakhun: Nearly 60 percent of the project, valued at 4 million Syrian pounds, has been completed.

The Idlib municipal swimming pool: Nearly 95 percent of the project, valued at 3 million Syrian pounds, has been completed.

The consumer organization project in Silqin: Nearly 10 percent of the project, valued at 7 million Syrian pounds and started recently, has been completed.

The consumer organization project in Ariha: Nearly 10 percent of the project, valued at 7 million Syrian pounds, has been completed.

The Jurr Khabbaz water project: The work site and the go-ahead order were received on 1 September 1983, and the arrangements are underway to begin building the project.

The project to build four school clinics for the Directorate of Education at a cost of 1.2 million pounds: Construction of the clinics will begin when the necessary blueprints are received.

The project for schools in Idlib and Jisr al-Shughur, valued at 42 million pounds: The contracts with the beneficiaries are in the process of approval.

Difficulties and Obstacles Encountered by Branch:

It is normal that any work you carry out encounters some difficulties and obstacles, whether shortages in manpower, materials or machinery. But through sound planning and daily followup, we bring up these obstacles and discuss them with the establishment management in order to formulate the proper solutions, to overcome the major part of these obstacles and to make maximum use of the resources available to us.

Engineer As'ad Baysh, the head of the Idlib Electricity Directorate premises project, said: "Work on the project started on 8 August 1981, and the completion period is 3 years. The contractual value of the project and its supplements is 15.5 million pounds. Nearly 56 percent of the work has been completed. The beneficiary is the Idlib Electricity Directorate. The premises is a tower consisting of six floors and words illegible, with an area of 1,000 square meters. The project's objective is to study, implement and receive the citizens' complaints regarding the Idlib Electricity Directorate. The project includes the construction of a garage for the maintenance of vehicles, a car park and services. As for work in the project, it is proceeding well. Regarding the slow completion pace, it is due to the fact that the work site was not received from the Idlib Electricity Directorate on schedule. The manpower is available, and there are no noteworthy obstacles facing the work."

The engineer in charge of the project believes that the process of synchronizing the architectural, mechanical and electrical blueprints should be done at the beginning of a project so that differences in the blueprints may be eliminated in order to facilitate implementation.

Regarding the progress of work in the Idlib grain warehouses project, Engineer Ahmad Najjar said:

"Work on the project began on 1 November 1983, and the completion period is 380 days, excluding the annexes. The value of the contract is 2.5 million pounds, and the work is 80 percent complete, assessed on the basis of financial value.

"As for the progress of work, we are suffering from a shortage of machinery generally. Despite this, the work is proceeding at a good pace. As for manpower, it is available in good quantities."

Regarding the municipal swimming pool project, Engineer Anwar Shabib said: "Work on the project began on 20 October 1982, the duration of the contract is 250 days and its value is 2.5 million pounds. The completed work amounts to 85 percent of the project. We suffer from the shortage of materials, especially of ceramic tiles and mechanical equipment. The project generally has entered its final phases, and we are waiting for the beneficiaries to supply water and electricity to the project so that we may begin experimental operation."

Regarding the popular housing project, Engineer Muhammad 'Allush has said: "Work on the project began on 14 August 1982, the completion period is 1.5 years and the project's contractual value is nearly 5 million pounds. The beneficiary is Idlib Municipality. The work completed amounts to 50 percent of the total contracted work. The project consists of 7 housing units, each containing 10 apartments. The skeletal structure of three units has been completed so far."

Work is proceeding well in the various workshops and sections. In an interview with Comrade Tahir Darwish, the head of the reinforced concrete workshop, he said: "I have been working in the establishment since 1975. I like my work and I devote all my efforts to enhance my country's construction movement."

I feel joyous when I see the results of my work turned into buildings from which my compatriots benefit. My wish is to continue to enjoy health in order to continue to give to my country." Regarding the services offered by the establishment, Darwish said that every worker receives medical care, insurance, hazardous work pay, a specialization allowance and other bonuses that reassure the worker psychologically and enhance his capacity for production.

Engineer Midhat Hajj Qaddurah, the head of the maintenance section, said that the Idlib maintenance section was set up with the help of the Ninth Implementation Team, which built the Idlib yarn plant project with a small technical cadre. At the time, maintenance work for the Idlib yarn plant machinery was carried out in Idlib.

The section began to develop with the expansion of the work of the team, which then became Idlib Branch No 14. We have tried to secure the technical cadre qualified to do the maintenance work and also to equip the workshops with the needed machinery in order to meet the section's requirements. Engineer Khalid al-Salih, the head of the production section, said: "The objective of the creation of this section is to secure the raw materials needed for the activities of the workshops in the various projects. The production section includes:

"The central mixer which has a daily capacity of 90 cubic meters daily and which meets the needs of the projects for mixed concrete.

"The carpentry workshop: This workshop was set up in June 1983, and we now supply the woodwork and the shutters needed for the branch projects.

"The metal paneling workshop which meets the needs for metal doors and windows and for wrought iron.

"The concrete block production workshop, which has an automatic press with a daily production capacity of 2,000 blocks. There are also manual presses which meet the branch's full need for this commodity. We are currently setting up stone and iron cutters and a workshop for the production of tiles of all kinds. Moreover, we are setting up a gravel cracker at the designated production site."

Comrade Muhammad Abu Salih al-Muhammad, the head of the political guidance section, said that a number of committees have been formed, including:

A propaganda committee to contact the circles with which the branch deals in order to familiarize them with the real work situation of the Idlib Branch.

A cultural committee to prepare the wall magazine and to devote attention to the brother workers' intellectual and cultural affairs.

A party committee which has been entrusted with the task of studying the conditions of the branch workers from the living and vocational aspects and to formulate solutions for the difficulties facing the work.

The guidance section supervises the investment seminar and conducts periodic medical checks on foods [as published].

The clinic where medicines are dispensed and the workers and their families are treated free of charge.

The firefighting outfits where training courses are given on the use of the equipment.

The section deals with the other sections with a spirit of comradeship that seeks to develop the work generally.

There are no difficulties, and the spirit of love and fraternity prevails among all the workers. My wish is for the work to continue to develop in this establishment in order to build the edifice of this homeland.

These are the most important accomplishments of the branches of the Military Installations Construction Establishment in Aleppo and Idlib. What remains of our mission is to trace the activities of the Hamah Branch.

Development of Work at the Aleppo Branch

<u>Year</u>	<u>Value of Work Implemented</u>
1978	34 million
1979	42 million
1980	50 million
1981	52 million
1982	111 million

8494

CSO: 4404/212

AFGHANISTAN

USSR MISSILES REPORTEDLY DEPLOYED IN AFGHANISTAN

Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 3 Jan 84 p 5

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jan--Soviet missiles have been deployed in Afghanistan, too, and the Afghan Armed Forces are being trained to handle the new equipment.

The Soviet Army paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published Sunday a short report on an Afghan Army colonel who is "among the first to master the missile military technology".

Several photographs of missiles were also published, but no technical details were specified. The missiles are part of the Kabul regime's Army first missile units. NAB/Tanjug

CSO: 4600/246

SOVIET HELICOPTERS REPORTEDLY SHOT DOWN BY MUJAHIDIN

Kuching THE BORNEO POST in English 9 Dec 83 p 4

[Text] Islamabad, Thurs:--The Afghan Mujahideen have shot down three Soviet helicopters, destroyed nearly three dozen tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCS) and captured two dozen Soviet soldiers in what was described by western diplomatic sources as one of the fiercest encounters of the year in Guldara Valley, north of Kabul.

The sources said the Soviets began withdrawing from the valley on Dec. 2, following the fighting which started on Nov. 26. The Soviet aerial bombing of villages in and around the valley was, however, still continuing, the sources added.

They praised the Mujahideen's ability to shoot down the once dreaded Russian MI-21 helicopter gunships.

Last week, two gunships flying in formation were also shot down by the Mujahideen over Kandhar in south-western Afghanistan, the sources said.

The sources also confirmed two Mujahideen attacks on Jalalabad airport in eastern Afghanistan, near Pakistan border, last month.

The first attack on the airport took place early last month and the second on Nov. 25 in which the resistance forces damaged three Soviet helicopters with rocket and mortar fire.

CSO: 4600/245

AFGHANISTAN

AFGHAN ARMY CHIEFS REPORTEDLY DIE IN FIGHTING

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 14 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Tues.--Mujahidin fighters killed two Afghan army chiefs and scattered clashes left scores of dead as the Mujahidin reportedly readied an offensive to mark the fourth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Western diplomats said today.

Meanwhile, just north of Kabul in the Guldara Valley, a massive rebel ambush of 2,500 Soviet and Afghan troops which ended on Dec 5, left 70 Soviet troops dead, 24 captured and 11 tanks and four helicopters destroyed, a diplomat said.

He said a "large number of Afghan troops" defected to the Mujahidin during the fierce eight-day battle mounted by the Mujahidin who had two heavy machine-guns in place before the Russian and Afghan troops marched into the area, part of the southern Shomali Valley.

A Surge

The top brass were killed in separate Mujahidin attacks that made up a part of a surge of Mujahidin activity in the various outlying provinces during the past few weeks, the source said.

Afghan fighters killed the Afghan Commander of the 2nd Corps, a Major General identified only as "Uloomi", when they shot down a helicopter he was flying near the southern city of Kandahar on Dec 1, a diplomat said.--
UPI

CSO: 4600/247

COMMENTS ON FIGHTING BETWEEN AFGHAN 'BANDITS,' 'RED ARMY'

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 16 Dec 83 p 14

[Article by Shyam Bhatia: "Afghan 'Bandits' the Red Army Cannot Defeat"]

[Text]

LAST April at a crossroads outside Kabul four Afghan fighters had the shock of their lives. The four young mujahidin, or soldiers of God, rounded a corner and saw ahead of them the silhouette of a Russian tank.

Too scared to run for cover, they stood paralysed until one man, Raha Gul, took up his .303 rifle and began firing at the enemy. It was a pitch black evening and only as he started run-

ning towards his target did Gul realise there was nothing to fear. The 'tank' was a large rock.

Gul's blind courage, although directed against an imaginary foe, has long since entered the annals of mujahidin folklore. The rock formation, for those who know the story, is known simply as Raha Gul's castle.

Mujahidin leaders relish telling the story

because it neatly illustrates two important points about their struggle against the Soviet occupation of their country. The first is the unequal, David and Goliath nature of the struggle. The second is their determination not to succumb — whatever the cost.

The pitiful range of weaponry available to the mujahidin was evident from the first day of the Russian invasion on Christmas Eve 1979. Western reporters who made contact with the mujahidin in those early days noted that even World War II rifles were regarded as an advanced luxury.

The Sirdar of Ghazni who, on Christmas Day 1979, swore to take on the might of the Soviet empire, was the proud owner of a hand-crafted Belgian rifle made in 1895. The mujahidin, who claim 5,000 Russian soldiers have been killed and another 10,000

wounded, are still being trained in the art of using twentieth century grenades, rocket launchers, automatic rifles, heavy machine-guns and, when available, surface-to-air missiles.

"The wonder is that they have managed to hurt the Russians at all," said Professor Sayid Majrooh, a former head of history at Kabul University who now lives in exile across the border in Pakistan.

There was never any doubt that the Russians had the military ability to walk into Afghanistan and take over the country. In 1979 the anti-Russian opposition was hopelessly divided, the ruling administration of Hafizullah Amin was unpopular and the West showed little apparent interest in what happened to this remote, landlocked republic in central Asia.

A policy review carried out by the United States Embassy in Kabul, just before the Soviet invasion, declared: "For the United States, Afghani-

stan has at the present time limited direct interest; it is not an important trading partner; it is not an access route for US trade with others; it is not a source of oil or strategic metals."

1978 coup

The Russians by contrast had demonstrated an interest in Afghanistan from the nineteenth century onwards. When King Amanullah was given full independence from Britain in 1919, he turned to Moscow for support and encouragement. The new Bolshevik regime signed a peace and friendship treaty with Afghanistan in 1920 followed by a gift of gold, roubles and rifles.

Amanullah was later replaced by a pro-British ruler, but Moscow's relations with Kabul took a great leap forward in the 1950s when the Russians offered generous dollops of military and financial aid. Politically too, Moscow made sure it re-

mained with the winning side inside Afghanistan.

The Russian ambassador was among the first foreign envoys to call on Sardar Muhammad Daoud after he overthrew his cousin, King Zahir Shah, in 1973. It was the Russians again who offered instant recognition and support when a 1978 Marxist coup got rid of Daoud. Direct intervention became a possibility only when the new Marxist rulers began to bicker among themselves. Hafizullah Amin, who murdered his predecessor Nur Muhammad Taraki, was himself dispatched at the Russians' behest soon after their troops began to land at Kabul Airport.

Afghanistan's internal political divisions, which at first worked in the Russians' favour, are now working against Moscow's interests. The Russians made the classic mistake of actively supporting one faction of the ruling Communist Party of Afghanistan, the People's Democratic

Party, while alienating the others.

The party's Parcham wing, supported by the Russians, has long been at loggerheads with the numerically larger Khalki group. After the invasion it was the embittered Khalkis who called on the Army to resist and — much later — to defect.

Army defectors, and the Russian-made equipment they brought with them, played a crucial role in sustaining the efforts of the resistance in the early aftermath of the invasion.

Although the mujahidin are present in the main cities of Afghanistan, like Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, they are inevitably more active in the border areas near Pakistan. From the relative security of their sanctuaries, sometimes in Pakistan itself, bands of mujahidin have repeatedly managed to strike Russian targets deep inside Afghanistan. Military bases, like the Bagram air base near Kabul, have been seen as primary targets.

Weaponry

The mujahidin season begins in November when winter bogs down the Soviet Army and grounds the Air Force. Between November and March, when the snows begin to melt, the mujahidin swoop down from their high mountain passes to take revenge for losses of the summer. This cycle of revenge and counter-revenge is about to start again as the Rus-

sians approach the fourth anniversary of their invasion.

The Russian response to mujahidin raids in Afghanistan has been steadily to beef up their military presence in the country. There are now more than 100,000 Russian troops serving in Afghanistan.

They have also tried to make use of their immensely superior fire power to intimidate the resistance. The latest Warsaw Pact weaponry, originally designed to match Nato capabilities in Central Europe, has appeared in Afghanistan. Sukhoi and MiG jets, laser-guided T-72 tanks, and helicopter gunships have all been deployed to assist the 'friendly' Kabul Government and resist the attacks of 'bandit' raiders.

Western intelligence agencies are seeing the appearance in Afghanistan for the first time of equipment that was only rumoured to exist in Warsaw Pact armouries.

Most Russian equipment recovered from Afghanistan has routinely found its way to the military testing laboratories of the United States, Britain or France. One of the most exciting finds has been the wreckage of an Mi-24 Hind helicopter. This helicopter gunship, the equivalent of the American Jolly Green Giant, is encased in titanium armour. It is the latest and most heavily armed helicopter gunship in the world.

Parts of a wrecked Hind helicopter were car-

ried out of Afghanistan last year by 'freelance' mercenary agents acting on behalf of the American Defence Intelligence Agency.

The Americans also believe Russian troops have been using chemical warfare in Afghanistan. They believe lethal mycotoxins, first allegedly used by the Vietnamese army in Laos and Kampuchea, have also been approved for Afghanistan. But in the absence of positive evidence, despite a reward offer of US\$100,000, the Americans have been unable to prove their suspicions.

The Russians have not used firepower alone to contain the mujahidin. A network of spies and informers, sometimes consisting only of children, is said to operate in many Afghan valleys. In the Kunar Valley, close to the Pakistan border, the reward offered for a pair of 'mujahidin ears' is \$10.

Despite their superior arms and trained manpower, the Russians are still not in total control of Afghanistan. Much of the countryside, and at night even some of the cities, are in the gift of the mujahidin. At night, when the curfew sirens begin to wail in the cities, the defiant cries of the mullahs can be heard throughout the night: 'Allahu Akbar' — God is great.

Defiance

Such acts of defiance, shouted across the rooftops, are welcomed by the mujahidin as part of

the continuing, long-term struggle against the occupation. Significant military success on the battlefield is less easy to pinpoint. Part of the problem here is the paucity of high-grade weapons. Although better quality weapons, including automatic rifles and surface-to-air missiles, are now beginning to reach the mujahidin, the best guns are confiscated on route by the Pakistan Army.

A more serious problem concerns the political divisions that continue to plague the mujahidin. Some want the return of the monarchy; others want the establishment of an Islamic State like Iran; still others seek the return of the non-communist republic that existed under Daoud. The number of mujahidin organisations has been reduced from a fractious 65 to a more manageable nine, but these are no less quarrelsome.

The only unifying factor among the mujahidin is their common resolve that the Russians must leave; Moscow, so far, shows no sign of obliging them. The Russians have a lot at stake in Afghanistan.

Their prestige is involved. They are obsessed with keeping their southern borders secure and stable. If one day, miraculously, they should decide to go, it will be a client State they will insist on leaving behind. — London Observer Service.

EFFORTS TO UNITE AFGHAN RESISTANCE REPORTED

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 8 Dec 83 p 21

[Article by Tom Heneghan]

[Text] A 30-YEAR-OLD university dropout and a 69-year-old ex-king are working on separate plans to unite Afghanistan's squabbling resistance forces as the war in the country nears the end of its fourth year.

Guerilla leader Ahmad Shah Masood and exiled Monarch Zahir Shah have a common goal — to drive out the Soviet forces occupying their country since late December 1979 — but have nothing to do with each other. Their methods are as different as their backgrounds.

And, as if to highlight the hurdles they face, both have crowds of critics loudly denouncing them as the Kremlin's puppets and swearing their plans will never work.

Masood, who left his engineering studies to command rebel forces in the strategic Panjsher Valley north of Kabul, has chosen to fight on the ground, staging attacks on Soviet convoys and military posts across northern Afghanistan.

Now in firm control of his steep valley, he is trying to unite all guerilla groups in the north to cut off the vital land links between the Soviet border and the embattled communist government in Kabul.

Zahir Shah, living in exile in Italy since his 40-year reign ended in a bloodless coup in 1973, has opted for politics and

diplomacy, seeking to forge a united front to represent the resistance in United Nations-sponsored talks on a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

What are their chances? Can either man muster enough support to turn the tide in the four-year war?

None of the many exile groups in Peshawar, a frontier city marked by all the rough passions of Afghan life, can say for sure. Each man's supporters are as loyal as his enemies are bitter.

Western diplomats following the Afghan scene from Islamabad say neither man now seems able to mount enough pressure — military or diplomatic — to drive Moscow out of Afghanistan.

But they give Masood high marks for the effectiveness of his hit-and-run guerilla attacks and getting other commanders to turn their guns away from rival groups and towards the Soviet and Afghan armies.

Truce

Although Soviet air superiority will remain Moscow's trump card in the war — the guerillas have no surface-to-air missiles to shoot down MiG jets or helicopter gunships — his tactics could turn large parts of the north into no-go areas for the government.

Masood, who made his name holding off six

massive Soviet attempts at conquering the Panjsher Valley, took a major gamble this spring by agreeing to a six-month truce with the frustrated Soviet army.

While his rivals accused him of selling out to the Kremlin, Masood sent up to 1,500 fighters and crates of weapons to like-minded commanders spread from Badakshan in the northeast to Herat near the Iranian border.

After training and coordinating the various groups, he wants to cut off the main highway from the Soviet border to Kabul — "Afghanistan's Suez Canal," as a member of his Jamiat-E-Islami Party here put it — and secure open routes for rebel supplies from Pakistan.

Jamiat-E-Islami says the truce expired in September and Masood has refused a Soviet offer to extend it. The Soviets have not responded by attacking the valley, but an offensive could come at any time.

Zahir Shah has sent a delegation to Peshawar to drum up support for a "Loya Jirgah," a traditional Afghan assembly, to gather all resistance forces under one movement against the Kabul government. The six-man group, including his brother-in-law, has been here for the past month.

The former king is not hoping to restore the

monarchy, his supporters say, but to act as a unifying figure for the quarreling groups which he feels, must now realise how much their rivalry hurts their cause.

The Loya Jirgah, an unwieldy gathering of up to 1,000 people which should have delegates from each province as well as from the exile groups, would elect leaders to represent the Afghan people in UN talks or in dealings with foreign governments.

While both camps hail the increased efforts at unity, each is quick to point out the weak points of the rival's plan. Western diplomats say their arguments cannot be overlooked.

Masood, for example, is an ethnic Tadjik, a Persian speaker like most people living in the north and mountainous Hazarajat area of central Afghanistan.

He may be able to unite the Persian speakers, but they are a minority and the Pashtun majority would never accept one as their leader, they said.

Prospects

Zahir Shah, on the other hand, is so strongly identified with policies favouring his Pashtun people, who dominate the eastern and southeastern parts of the country, that he is anything but a unifying figure for the Persian speakers.

It was also during his reign, which was supported by a network of large landowners now swept away by communist rule, that Afghanistan turned to Moscow for economic and military aid, opening a wide field for soviet infiltration.

Fundamentalist Muslim guerilla groups, who are as anti-communist as the fiercest cold warriors in the west, swear they will never forgive Zahir Shah for that and would

fight him as they do President Babrak Karmal.

Both men are keeping a close watch on the now deadlocked UN talks on Afghanistan but — again — for different reasons.

According to travellers who recently spoke with him in the Panjsher Valley, Masood believes the Soviets step up or wind down their attacks according to the progress of the 1½-year talks. They held back early this year when prospects looked

good but resumed heavy bombing when they hit an impasse in June.

For Zahir Shah, the talks are crucial since his time will come if they advance so far that they need a representative of the resistance to tie up the package.

As it now stands, all sides here agree, that day may be far off. Pakistan and Afghanistan have held three indirect meetings, communicating through UN special envoy Diego Cordovez, but

no further talks are planned despite continuing general assembly votes favouring an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the country.

Cordovez said in an interview last month he was disappointed at the slow progress in the talks, which aim at a pullout of Soviet troops, a return of the refugees and international guarantees of no further outside interference. — Reuter

CSO: 4600/249

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

AFGHAN GENERAL FLEES--Peshawar, Wed.--Gen. Mohammad Rahim, commander of the Seventh Division of the Afghan army in Kabul, has fled to Pakistan, it was learnt here said yesterday. Reliable sources said the General walked to Pakistan with his wife and children, aided by Afghan rebels from the Islamic National Front of Afghanistan, a moderate group led by Ahmad Gailani. Gen. Rahim was reported to have said the Afghan army now numbered 35,000, against 100,000 when the Soviet army entered Afghanistan four years ago. He added that during an operation he took part in last July in the Ghazni Region south of Kabul, Soviet soldiers had taken more than 20 elderly people out of their houses and shot them down, the source said. The Afghan Islamic Press, which is based here, reported yesterday that Afghan rebels had killed Afghan Gen. Abdul Qudduz Rashid on Dec. 4 in Kabul. Meanwhile, Afghan rebels ambushed 2,500 Soviet and Afghan troops in a fierce eight-day ground and air battle north of Kabul that inflicted heavy casualties, western diplomats said in New Delhi yesterday. The fighting which started on Nov. 26 inflicted heavy casualties among civilians, rebels and Soviet and Afghan troops.--AFP, UPI. [Text] [Penang THE STAR in English 8 Dec 83 p 17]

REBELS AMBUSH SOVIET, AFGHAN TROOPS--New Delhi, Tues.--Anti-communist rebels ambushed 2,500 Soviet and Afghan soldiers in a valley north of Kabul in a fierce eight-day air and ground battle that left "heavy casualties" on both sides. A western diplomat said today he saw three truckloads of Soviet wounded being taken to the Soviet military hospital in Kabul on Thursday. He said fighting broke out in the Guldara Valley or "Valley of the Flowers" on Nov. 26 and raged through till Thursday. Sources said Soviet MiGs and helicopters continued to bomb villages only 10 miles north of Kabul after the fighting ended. They said: "Three helicopters were shot down by the rebels including one carrying 20 Soviet troops." The diplomat said both sides suffered heavy casualties and that 24 Soviet soldiers were captured. There was no estimate of the number of guerillas involved. In late October and early November, the Soviets wiped out nearly half of the town of Istalef in the southern Shomali Valley.--UPI. [Text] [Penang THE STAR in English 7 Dec 83 p 16]

CSO: 4600/244

ERSHAD'S POLITICAL STRATEGY EXAMINED

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 20 Dec 83 p 11

["Dkaka Letter" by Geof Malone]

[Text] ACCORDING to the irreverent in Dhaka, Bangladesh has not only had three presidents in the past two years, but three different types of president.

There was Abdus Sattar, an 'elected' president. Then came the last coup and Abu Fazal Mohammad Ahsanuddin Chowdhury became an 'appointed' president.

Now we have Lieutenant-General Hossain Mohamed Ershad. He is a 'self-appointed' president.

It had been rumoured for some time that the general might take over the presidency to place himself in a more advantageous position to run the country before the 'return to democracy.' The rumours gained ground when it was heard that government officials were looking for a residence in Dhaka that would be suitable for a man who had previously held a rather high position in life—it seemed as though retired judge Chowdhury was about to move out of Bangabhaban, the splendid presidential palace.

Nevertheless, the timing of the announcement did take many by surprise. The Islamic foreign ministers had only ended their five-day conference after an all-night session some four hours before General Ershad amended his own martial law regulations to take over the presidency.

Indeed, one bleary-eyed Bangladesh minister went straight from the conference to the cabinet meeting which preceded the formalities,

carrying the only copy of the official communique.

It was complete with scribbled notes, deletions and additions which reflected the debate which had gone on until the last minute of the conference.

It were photocopies of this version which were finally released—some 14 hours later. They even included the much disputed and heavily watered down resolution on the Gulf war which had been deleted at the last moment because of Iran's objections.

The Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Mr A.R. Shams-ud-Doha, had earlier, in a rather pompous fashion, told the Press that this resolution would remain 'classified' until considered by next month's Islamic summit in Morocco.

General Ershad was, however, keen to meet the Press and the day after his assumption of the presidency he invited foreign correspondents for tea at Bangabhaban. Undoubtedly he will be wishing that he had not done so.

Apparently the intention was that the journalists should stand around, tea cups and dainty sandwiches in hand, while the President wandered amongst them making small talk.

The correspondents, on the other hand, were rather keen to know why the general had become president, what his plans were, both for himself and the country, when he was going to release political prisoners, and so on.

He wan't forthcoming. "I've just invited you for tea," he said, which was the signal for a few dozen tape recorders to be produced and for the questioning to furiously begin.

The President's aides made vain attempts to rescue him from the resultant melee. "Do have some tea" was the constantly repeated appeal by high-ranking military men unused to seeing their chief treated in such a cavalier fashion.

Eventually, the President drained his cup and decided it was time to depart and disappeared through a door with the questions still being fired.

Out in the rural areas, the President's progress is much more organised. Every night Bangladesh television devotes considerable time to films of the general zooming into villages by helicopter. In true campaigning style, he meets the villagers and exhorts them to greater efforts, while promising to solve their problems.

General Ershad's concentration on the rural areas is undoubtedly increasing his popularity and will pay rich dividends in the elections, whenever they are held.

The military and administrative machine which allows him to cover so much of the country in a barnstorming manner gives him a considerable advantage over the opposition politicians who cannot even get their statements published in the censored Press.

Indeed, it is extremely difficult to even get near Begum Khaleida Zia, the widow of the last assassinated president, Ziaur Rahman,

who is one of the leading figures in the seven-party alliance. She lives in the military cantonment and guards stop visitors at the gate and turn them away when they announce they want to see the lady. The cantonment is not the ideal place from which to head a political campaign against the army.

It is much easier to see Sheikh Hasina Wazed, the daughter of assassinated president Mujibur Rahman, the 'father of the nation,' who leads the 15-party alliance.

Sheikh Hasina uses her father's home as her office. It is little changed from the day in August, 1975, when Mujib was gunned down by some army men.

The bloodstains are still there on the stairs and the wall has been left pockmarked with bullets. A Bangladesh flag marks the spot where Sheikh Mujib died.

The house already attracts many visitors who come to pay homage and Sheikh Hasina is planning to convert it into a museum and memorial to the country's first leader.

She is still puzzled by many of the aspects of the November 28 demonstrations at the secretariat which led to her being put in 'protective custody.' There is much speculation in Dhaka as to how a television crew just happened to be

on the spot at the exact place where the secretariat wall was broken down. Sheikh Hasina points out that the film shows the demonstrators carrying only lathis and asks how anyone could break through a brick wall with a piece of cane.

Just about everyone in Dhaka has theories as to exactly who was behind the demonstrations. Some believe it was the government who wanted to show how irresponsible the politicians were, and certainly General Ershad has made some capital out of the situation. "I allowed political activity and look what happened," he remarked.

Others say it was just a case of the political leaders losing control of their supporters.

The most fascinating theory, however, involves the Russians. It is alleged that there was a Soviet plot to make sure that the planned peaceful demonstration turned violent. In the resultant confusion, either Sheikh Hasina or Mrs Zia would be killed. The body would then be paraded through the streets and the army accused of murder. It was believed the result would be a general uprising which would bring down the regime.

The story goes that the government was tipped off about the plot by a friendly embassy and acted quickly to foil it. True or not, the

Bangladesh Government has decided to reduce the Russian representation in Dhaka. Although the Soviet embassy has only about 35 diplomats, there are about 80 other officials with various assignments. None of the Russians has yet left and discussions are said to be continuing between the two governments, although the Soviet Cultural Centre has been closed: a notice on the door says it is because of redecoration.

What everyone agrees with is that the action of the past few weeks has left General Ershad in a strong position. The party which he has formed, the Jana Dal, is fast gaining support of a wide range of people—including, of course, many political opportunists—and may soon become a suitable vehicle for the transition to civilian rule.

General Ershad has not actually publicly associated himself with the party so far and in the meantime continues to wear his uniform on most occasions, a reminder that he still has to look after his biggest constituency, the army.

He is likely to gain some benefit from the forthcoming local body elections and it could be after these that the Jana Dal would announce that it has chosen him as their presidential candidate.

KHOMAYNI REPORTEDLY DROPS PEACE HINT

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 140, 3 Jan 84 pp 1, 2

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] Has Ayatollah Khomeyni dropped the first hint that if victory does not come soon in the war with Iraq he will be ready to accept peace?

That, at least, is how many Iranians interpreted remarks he made last week. He said that victory must be achieved soon because the Iranian people could not just continue fighting forever without some result. He implied strongly that he foresaw the need for some result within a limited period ahead, his hearers said.

Although Khomeyni did not mention peace other than through victory it was clear, sources in Tehran said, that he was responding to growing public discontent over the failure to achieve results in the war. From primarily bemoaning losses of life this discontent has recently taken the form of public criticism of the forces for their failure to achieve victories and comments that the army in the Shah's time would have polished off the Iraqi army in little time.

The fact that the public had taken Khomeyni's hint seriously seemed backed up by a renewed spate of pro-war propaganda soon afterwards, this being seen as a response by officials who were concerned with possible side-effects of such an idea among the public. Besides harming the armed forces' image it could also threaten the credibility of the regime, which has so long expressed its confidence in the outcome of the war.

The uncertainty of the government has been reflected in other comments by Khomeyni in the past week, in which he has pleaded with the Majlis and then the bazaar to unite behind the government in the face of problems facing the country. He has on one occasion showed a certain broadmindedness about what is Islamic and on the following one reverted to his old threats that even the slightest deviation cannot be tolerated. Observers in Tehran say it is clear that for the moment the regime is not sure where it is going.

The loss of enthusiasm among the public for the war is also demonstrated by reports of deaths of Afghan refugees in the fighting at the front and of efforts to enroll many more of them in the armed forces. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq, the

opposition exile group which makes the most serious attempt to arouse foreign resentment against the brutality and oppression of the Khomeyni regime, recently published documents as evidence of official efforts to recruit the Afghans.

Other pressures to end the war are coming as a result of the gradual but now perceivable revival of the influence of the bazaar in commercial and inevitably associated areas of life. In the field of the judiciary, for example, this has coincided with the preeminence of bazaar and secular connected figures over the fanatical figures like Mohammadi-Gailani and other clerical personalities. Confiscation of private property has become positively unfashionable again, with even prominent personalities like Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani having finally opted for the idea that that kind of thing does not, after all, comply with the tenets of Islam. There has been a rush over the past 6 months of clerics who have confessed they were misled into backing such un-Islamic acts earlier in the revolutionary period.

The return of properties to, in some cases, people who have been jailed for some time for their pre-revolutionary associations, has now become a regular occurrence and a number of exiles have been encouraged to return to claim their homes and land back again. In the business field the stories of big profits now being made in the domestic commercial field as the bazaar has gradually begun to resume its traditional role once again are also beginning to lure back even some young engineers and others who are not thriving in the West.

But the professional classes abroad are still firmly resisting blandishments to return in general. Khomeyni has roundly abused the doctors who were a few months ago invited to Tehran and feted in the hope that they would decide to return home and alleviate the country's drastic shortage of physicians. They resisted his officials' blandishments and decided to stay in exile.

The reason for Khomeyni's anger is easy to see. Having made a much better job of cleaning out the leftists who have over the past 30-odd years so mindlessly damaged efforts to create a modern society in Iran than the Shah's men did, he finds that those who should be grateful have their own ideas of the system they wish to live under. And that approximates much more closely with that the late Shah provided than does his. Those who were his original allies in the revolution are either now dead or against him. Those left are busy defecting. No wonder he appeals for support to the Majlis and the Bazaar, Tehran observers say. The mass of the people, traditionally going in the direction of the wind, may soon realise that it has begun to change that direction.

Following warnings from Khomeyni's former premier Mehdi Bazargan that the agents of the Shah's regime are creeping back the Mojahedin-e-Khalq has also pointed out in a recent edition of its Persian-language newspaper that U.S. President Reagan's recent policy of showing America's strength around the world could well mean that he will now back Iranian opposition forces who may be considering landing in vulnerable parts of the country.

"Although many suspect that in true Iranian fashion the Mojahedin may be more motivated by a desire to try to warn Khomeyni that their (the Mojahedin's) enemies could act before the Left now admits it could do anything itself, rather than by thoroughly objective analysis it is interesting to find confirmation from such a source of the reports of growing support for the return of the Shah's men or those who are identified with them," an Iranian observer in Paris told IPS.

"The thesis implies that forces inside the country would be ready to work with such 'invaders' and that elements of the armed forces could be goaded into joining with them, too, with the final result that support for the Khomeyni regime would erode altogether. Up until now the Mojahedin has claimed it is the only real opposition inside Iran but now we see it suggested that, in fact, it is more centrist or rightist forces which could be the big threat."

Recent reports suggest that the Mojahedin have been dropped as prospective partners by the Iraqi regime and that the organisation is discussing cooperation with certain Palestinian groups. Although the majority of Iranians support the Palestinian cause in principle, the behaviour of 'Arafat's men in Iran after the revolution has not endeared them to Iranians and it is unlikely, observers say, that any Mojahedin approach to them will be seen as anything other than a renewed sign they cannot exist on their own.

"The public still sympathises with the young people who have the guts to go on resisting the regime but they see their activities as largely futile," a Tehran informant told IPS. "And the apparent ability of the authorities to sniff out the Mojahedin activists and their hideouts without much trouble reinforces this view."

CSO: 4600/277

AYATOLLAH GOLPAYEGANI PRAISES POLICE FORCE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 140, 3 Jan 84 pp 3, 4

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] Iranian observers have been detecting other signs that feelings of resentment have become obvious to the clergy, Ayatollah Golpayegani, who has criticized previously for having failed to stand up to Khomeyni or radical elements in the regime, recently praised the newly constituted and organised police force, describing it pointedly as the only force for law and order in the country.

He did not refer to the revolutionary guards or any other arms who regard themselves as custodians of the law, leading observers to ponder on the idea that the elderly ayatollah was making his own signals. The return of the ordinary police to the streets and many responsibilities so long carried out by the guards has been seen as a reassuring sign that more security may be returning to their lives by the general public.

Although the guards are said to number several hundred thousand sources in Tehran suggest that only a hard core of about 40,000 of these are completely committed to the aims of the hardliners of the regime. The rest, they say, are there for the job and benefits that go with it and cannot be seen as fully reliable from the regime's point of view.

A recent remark by Ayatollah Montazeri, a senior figure in the regime, that "revolution always eats up its own" also caused some comment in the capital. He was implying that reliable Muslims committed to the regime were being passed over for jobs in favour of those who had fewer Islamic credentials.

"This suggests that the pressures from the public and from the need to meet the demands on the system imposed by the war with Iraq have grown to the point where the fanatics or radicals cannot grab the jobs even when they want," one observer commented.

New food shortages, once again meaning long queues for bread and often strict rationing of supplies, are not easing the pressures on the regime. While the ruling mullahs have followed a merciless policy of exterminating those whom they have felt were posing an immediate threat to them in any way they are finding it much more difficult to deal with criticisms from the ordinary public about jobs, food shortages and other everyday hassles.

In addition, Tehran sources say, there is growing apathy towards the government's propaganda campaigns. Attempts to whip up anti-American feeling continue but the great mass of the public now ignores them. Similarly, the public quickly loses interest in what is known as the "Kia-nouri Show"--the continuing trials of the Tudeh party members which are regularly shown on television. As in previous trials the defendants and witnesses recite confessions of guilt and misguidedness which a gullible public accepts in the same way it has accepted the disgrace of the party--but without pondering on the logic of the situation or the implications of what it is hearing.

The constant criticisms of the Khomeyni regime from Moscow are also accepted as inevitable and unremarkable. Observers in Tehran say the Soviets are obviously inhibited in their abuse of the Tehran regime by a reluctance to show that the mullahs can do exactly what they like without taking Moscow's feelings into account. This, observers say, could help spread in Iran and outside the idea that, in fact, the Soviets are powerless to affect events in Iran and that the threat from them that is widely used by many exile Iranians and foreigners alike to counsel against any political or other activity inside the country holds little water.

"After what they face in Afghanistan the Soviets are most unlikely to get involved in Iran," one Paris observer told IPS. "Of course, many people point out that it would be easier to conquer Iran with its vast area and vast expanses of land where tanks and other military equipment can move freely. But Moscow knows it would be better to wait for an Iranian Khaddafi to set himself up in Tehran than to try to find a conventional leftist to promote or to take any physical action themselves.

"Unless the West finds ways to subtly encourage or promote the cause of those clergy who are against Khomeyni fundamentally and to encourage liberal and nationalistic modern minded Iranians to work together even in exile in influence their compatriots back home it looks as if a Khaddafi or some kind of a Teymour Bakhtiar may be the only alternatives left to a future Iran. If its a Khaddafi the Soviets will be able to exercise all the influence they need."

CSO: 4600/277

MONARCHY ONCE AGAIN BECOMING SYMBOL OF OPPOSITION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 140, 3 Jan 84 p 3

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] There have been growing signs inside Iran in recent weeks that the public is, after four years of the mullahs' rule, finally looking back towards the monarchy and familiar forces as the most likely alternative to the present regime.

Speeches by Ayatollah Khomeyni himself as well as other officials have revealed the growing resentment on the part of regime officials against what they see as propaganda for forces opposed to them. Khomeyni, in a strong speech last week, accused even members of the clergy of disseminating propaganda for the past regime and threatened they would be exposed.

Khomeyni said they had fallen for the propaganda being spread by those who wanted a return to the past or who were against the Islamic regime. But they should know they could not be clerics and criticise the government. The reason the regime's enemies had chosen to mount a campaign against the government itself was that it was not made up entirely of clerical figures, but the only thing that mattered in Iran was Islam and these officials were good Muslims.

Khomeyni's remarks followed a stern warning to the mullahs by Mehdi Bazargan's Freedom Party they were failing to realise the threat posed by agents and supporters of the former Shah. What was at first widely construed as an attack on the ruling clique in Iran by the embattled Freedom Party can now be seen as an attempt to arouse feeling against the former regime once again. It confirms, Iranian observers say, the reports of Iranians from all classes now saying in private or when sure of the company that no alternative to the return of forces representing the former monarchy seems on the horizon if change is to come within the foreseeable future.

The group's statement accused the mullahs of being blind to the threat that was being posed by former corrupt elements to the revolution as a result of the government's failure to take heed of public feeling.

Bazargan and his associates, recently under severe pressures from the regime to mute their criticisms and to keep in line, are said to be fuming with exasperation as the public shows more and more that its faith in so-called "liberal" alternatives to the Khomeyni regime has been dissipated. Nostalgia for the old days of plenty is constantly being expressed by people in food queues and in busses and taxis in the cities.

This has brought renewed attacks, too, on "agents" who are said to be inciting dissatisfaction and comparisons with indulgent anti-Islamic times. Several prominent officials have warned the public against such talk and have warned of the Islamic justice that will befall the perpetrators of such crimes against the republic.

"It is growing clearer and clearer to Bazargan that his hopes that he would be seen as the proper alternative to the radical mullahs because of his reputation as a God-fearing liberal have been dashed and ordinary Muslims now see a more drastic change as the way out of the impasse they nearly all feel the country is in," one newly-arrived traveler from Tehran told IPS. "There seems no ray of hope to anyone wanting to see better days except for a turning back of the clock to forces they knew before.

"The days of people like Bazargan as potential rulers of Iran are over, people say. Whatever regrets there may be about the outcome of the revolution there is no longer any feeling that what is done can be undone other than by radical change once more. Though the cowardice and corruption of some many of those who led the country before is not obvious there is no doubt that a growing number of Iranians look to others who can replace them under the banner of the monarchy as the most likely force to bring about a drastic change."

CSO: 4600/277

EXILES' ROLE BECOMES CLEARER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 140, 3 Jan 84 pp 4-6

[Article by Teezbin; London IRAN PRESS SERVICE; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] It becomes ever more clearer that criticism and pressures against the Khomeyni regime are slowly but surely building up. Not only Khomeyni's own attack on mullahs whom he contended were innocently or deliberately spreading propaganda in favour of the former regime but the bitter attack on the spreading campaign against the revolution by Mehdi Bazargan's party underline the changing mood of the Iranian public. Iranians coming to the West also stress the widespread criticisms of life in the country from even the poorer sections of the populace.

One way they can help their compatriots at home is to try to explain more forcibly to their foreign friends something of Iranian feelings towards the monarchy. While to the majority of sympathetic, intelligent foreigners who worked or lived in touch with ordinary people in Iran it was quite clear that the late Shah was, in fact, not merely achieving a lot in physical terms for his people but also bringing with it new self respect and pride in their country, his enemies at home and abroad contrived to build up a picture of him based on a few less impressive aspects of his administration. The result has been that the world has an entirely erroneous view of this man.

That his son and some others of his relatives have done nothing to try to disabuse the world of this mistaken view is harmful enough but the behaviour of the scores of thousands of well off Iranians who benefitted much more than their talents justified from the late Shah's regime is just as unforgivable. What's more, it has been downright foolish, for in trying to make him the scapegoat for their own mistakes they have merely tarred themselves with the same brush of opprobrium. They are linked firmly in the foreign publics' minds with the so-called oppression and corruption which have been made the only known aspects of the former regime which brought them and so many other Iranians untold benefits.

But the monarchy in Iranian minds is not solely linked with the late Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his family. In times like the bitter ones of today it represents a symbol of continuity and of national pride and it is only natural that even those

who, in many cases, didn't like the late Shah or many of those in responsible positions around him, are today turning back to the monarchy as the rallying point around which to gather. Although there is a ready-made incumbent in Reza Pahlavi available and he has the virtue of being a sensitive, intelligent young man who, in spite of poor advice from the compatriots around him, has managed to provide some appealing image to his people, Iranians would probably support today a monarchy which could only claim some Qajar pretender at its head. Although the feeling would probably not last long there is a widespread one among Iranians at the moment that even the late Shah's system of monarchy is preferable to most of the other alternatives that are on offer. Few people doubt that if a free and fair referendum were held in Iran today the monarchy would come out the decisive winner.

Of course, it will take a lot to get this across to the foreign press and intelligentsia, particularly that of the socialist-minded western world. And the continuing campaign of many of the former proteges of the Shah and his brilliant prime minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda to try to convince their western friends that they were aware of their former bosses' foolishness and corruption but were powerless pawns like those who served Khomeyni for so long before they were driven out does not help. Poor Hoveyda! The majority of Iranians were still living in the 19th century conditions--or even 18th--before he utilised so much of his abilities and diplomacy to turn the Shah's ideas into fruition in a meaningful way for that society. But those who benefited most from his patronage dream not of his battered body and the brutal fate he met but of prostitutes, we are led to believe! How misguided poor Amir Abbas Hoveyda was about many of his Western educated countrymen.

Perhaps the behaviour of the United States and French governments over the recent killings of their soldiers by Khomeyni-backed terrorists provides a salutary lesson for the Iranians in exile. They have sacrificed any chance of retaliatory action to the benefit of merely resisting pacifist calls to allow the thugs in Lebanon to kill off the remaining innocent and non-involved communities there without the West intervening. If human life is so cheap to Western liberals--as long, of course, as theirs are not threatened--then what hope do Iranians have of gaining sympathy for their plight if they don't work hard to evoke it. It's time to get down to the job of both rehabilitating Iranians in the eyes of the world as well as to the main one of getting back home again.

Even without any military or outside interference in affairs things are going the right way inside Iran. Not for those who want to see an Iran full of Islamic martyr perhaps or run on a socialist model, but for those who wish to see a country running like any other with opportunity for the greatest number and on a modern free economy base. The Iranian people have already rejected the first two alternatives and a lot of people must go home to see the other realised. That is why Iranians in exile should take heart and think that they can do to help in a more significant way.

It is quite clear now that the mullahs have acted very effectively against the Left. This has helped to encourage people to see the forces of the past as the most likely rivals to the mullahs. Contrary to the impression given by gullible

Western journalists, unable to speak Persian and utterly ignorant of any of the cultural or social attitudes of people in the country, there is plenty of evidence now that a majority of the ordinary people are bored and angry over the constant propaganda and interruptions to normal life to which they are still being subjected.

Indeed, while the majority of the middle and upper class are still buying their rice and meat on the black market and avoid participating in any public activities different sections of the less well off have begun protesting vociferously on occasions. Many of them now see no difference between the thuggery and psychological pressures imposed by their present rulers and that purveyed by Savak and those officials who blithely used the Shah's security apparatus to achieve their own ends under the former regime. That is why the mullahs are becoming so nervous about the growing campaign to revive memories of the more plentiful days of the Shah's government and the attempts by pro-Shah elements to whip up feeling about the failure of the Iranian forces to defeat the Iraqis. One morning they could wake up and find there had been a widespread public revulsion towards them and their inability to restore a normal economic and social life.

It is true that the middle and upper classes in Iran have shown themselves lacking in true patriotism and courage. While some of their children have given their lives in a bid to fight tyranny under the present regime they have mainly either fled or been forced to accept the oppression imposed on them in the hope that someone, somewhere will one day decide to come and save them from it.

While there is some excuse for them there is none for those outside, as we have said so often, who have made very little effort to arouse the world's conscience over the primitive slaughter that has gone on in Iran or to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of those who help make opinions around the world. They have tried to blame the late Shah for their own sins, have given in to jealousies and malice that have precluded them from cooperating with one another and have snivelled widely that it was the foreigners who got them into the predicament that they all did nothing to save. And when the younger generation, disillusioned with them, joined up with the leftist forces because nobody was interested in them they began to abuse them, too.

But it is not too late for them to expiate their sins if they really face up to reality. There have been signs from all around the world where exile communities exist that the last few months have seen some recovery of balance. Communities are beginning to draw closer again, cultural and social life is beginning to grow once more. The few who have made great efforts to start community associations are being rewarded by seeing Iranians recovering their self respect and identity once more. Anyone who attended the recent second anniversary party of the Rostam West School in London would have been deeply impressed by not only the achievements of the school itself but by the new force of the patriotism and nationalism that was evinced by the crowd there. It did one good to hear the power with which the fervent crowd sang the old national anthem. Red blood had begun coursing through their veins once more.

Once the communities outside Iran show their true nationalist spirit those back at home will no longer feel so abandoned. While the Smart Alis are still telling their foreign friends how important Shi'ite influence is in Iranian life and explaining why they think the revolution is durable the people of Iran can demonstrate by their example just what rubbish all this is and can give the final push to the slide that is already in motion under the feet of the crazy fanatics and thugs who have terrorized the country for four years in the name of an Islam which once did revive true Iranian culture but which has had no more than atrophying influence on Iranian society for several centuries.

It is obvious that Khomeyni's regime is in deep trouble. Most of the more prominent clerics would dearly love to see him out of the way, along with many of those who have been more actively supporting him. The bazaar, traditionally the force which has backed political change, is finding its feet again. The fanatical killers are no longer controlling the judiciary, even though many individuals are still authorising and carrying out executions of mainly leftists or suspected sympathisers up and down the country. Both clerics and majlismen are studiously going back on some of their freely expressed theories about confiscation of wealth and other matters from the earlier days of the revolution.

CSO: 4600/277

AMERICAN INACTION ASTONISHES IRANIANS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 140, 3 Jan 84 p 2

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] The failure of the United States to follow up Reagan's threats to avenge the Iran-backed attack on the U.S. marine base in Lebanon and other places has caused wonderment among middle and upper class Iranians and more derisory reaction among the general mass of the people. The security precautions at the White House have been the subject of widespread jokes among the public, who are amazed that their bearded zealots can frighten the greatest power on earth to such an extent. Their own fear of the thugs who oppress them in their daily lives has only been reinforced by the apparent tolerance of Western countries of threats from Iran.

CSO: 4600/277

ZIA'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH MASSES REPORTED

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 29 Dec 83 p 5

["Islamabad Letter" by Afzal Khan]

[Text] WITH a public meeting in Multan on December 21 and more planned for the coming weeks, President Zia-ul-Haq has apparently embarked upon a new and more interesting phase of the mass-contact campaign that he had launched last May.

The intervening period has been dominated by the civil disobedience campaign launched by the opposition Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

The renewal of President Zia's mass-contact programme comes at a time when the MRD campaign seems to have petered out, though not without effecting a discernible transformation in the political scene.

Speculation is rife that the regime may be contemplating some fresh initiative at this juncture when its detractors look pretty well mauled and unable to muster credible resistance in the immediate future.

The President appears to feel

elated by the success of his Multan meeting, which he termed as the biggest he had ever seen in his life. In his speech at the meeting and on some subsequent occasions, the President has been uncharacteristically aggressive in tone.

He reiterated his firm belief in an Islamic polity, but harshly criticised western-style democracy. Still more surprisingly, for the first time, he bracketed the two brief periods of the nation's experience of democracy (1948-58 and 1971-77) together and decried both of them. "It gave nothing to the nation but instability, chaos, unscrupulous pursuit of power and, in later period, the worst kind of dictatorship," he observed.

General Zia lashed out at his opponents, in particular the People's Party, and said that they would never be allowed to come to power.

("The ruffians, the rascals will never rule again.")

He was equally forceful in defending his regime. "May be, martial law has lasted too long. But one thing is clear, nobody can raise a finger at me and my colleagues

that we have amassed wealth or played with the honour and prestige of the nation."

Some of the President's other remarks could only have added to the existing confusion and uncertainty. For instance, his reference to a single-candidate constituency as one possibility and his observation that transfer of power would come "in an Islamic way" have left many people guessing.

The MRD has lost little time in reacting to General Zia's new offensive. Acting secretary-general Malik Qasim claimed equal rights for the opposition to hold public meetings and take out processions. The MRD central committee, in an apparent bid to save face, decided to call off the campaign of courting arrest and instead declared that it would hold meetings and take out processions in defiance of restrictions as a new form of its struggle.

Early this week when journalists in Lahore asked President Zia if he would allow politicians to hold meetings, his answer was a firm 'no'. "This is solely my prerogative as head of state."

CSO: 4600/255

PLANNING MINISTER OUTLINES NWFP DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Jan 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text] Islamabad, Jan. 1: A massive effort for the rapid industrial development of NWFP, costing Rs. 6 billion, largely through public sector will be made in the Sixth Five Year Plan in order to increase the income and employment levels in this relatively backward province of the country. This was stated here by the Federal Minister for Planning and Development, Dr. Mahbubul Haq.

Addressing a Press conference, the Minister said, that five major industrial projects, mostly in public sector, were already being processed for the province and these included, phosphatic fertilizer at a cost of Rs. 2,460 million, a truck manufacturing plant with an investment of Rs. 400 million, a locomotive manufacturing plant at a cost of Rs. 700 million, a cement plant at a cost of Rs. 635 million and a small tractor plant with an investment of Rs. 300 million.

He said possibilities of locating a heavy electrical complex costing Rs. 320 million in the province were also being considered while in addition to it Rs. 275 million have been provided in the Sixth Five Year Plan as a block allocation to develop projects for the industrialisation of the backward regions in the province.

Dr. Haq said the main reason that the developmental efforts in the province had remained restricted to the public sector was low performance of the private sector which, due to the inadequate infrastructure facilities, was reluctant to come forward. These projects in the public sector, he said, will accelerate the pace of the industrialisation in NWFP which will further be supplemented through the efforts of the provincial government and through the provision of more incentives for the private sector.

The Sarhad Development Authority, he added, will undertake Rs. 860 million of investment in various industrial ventures including paper, bagasse board, soda ash, sugar, dairy and meat projects, fruits and vegetables processing plants, sheet glass and many other projects.

A high level committee, the Minister said, under the Secretary Defence Production is reviewing the concrete areas for industrialisation and steps required to locate more federal projects in NWFP. The committee, he said, will submit its recommendations by the end of March next for inclusion in 1984-85 programmes.

The Minister said a total allocation of Rs. 10.45 billion has been provided in the Sixth Plan for NWFP as against Rs. 4.29 billion actually implemented in the Fifth Plan. About one-third of this allocation, he added, was earmarked for education and health, one-fourth for agriculture, irrigation and rural development and the balance for roads, water supply, housing, industry and other sectors.

An ambitious programme for extending the coverage of social services and transforming the living conditions of the vast majority of people in the province has been finalised. The targets fixed under the programme in the social sector he said, included, opening of 4,000 primary schools, 92 rural health centres and 271 basic health units, immunisation of three million children, training of 2,400 dais, electrification of 2,700 villages and provision of clean drinking water to 80 per cent of urban population and 56 per cent of rural population.

A number of major projects, he said, were also being undertaken in the energy and transport fields to improve the basic infrastructure in the region and to create better conditions for accelerating the pace of economic development. "These projects included a 220 kv transmission line from Mardan to Peshawar at a cost of Rs. 311 million; construction of Pehur High Level Link Canal at a cost of Rs. 625 million to irrigate 81,000 acres of new barani area and to supplement irrigation of an area of 87,000 acres, construction of a key irrigation-cum-power project at a cost of Rs. 800 million to irrigate 100,000 acres of land by harnessing the Gomai river at Khajuri Kach and generate 115 mw of hydel energy, start of Swabi SCARP, which may ultimate-cost Rs. 4 to 5 billion to provide adequate means of drainage to control waterlogging in a vast area of the province construction of Peshawar D. I Khan road at a cost of Rs. 714 million to provide an alternative and shorter link between Karachi and Peshawar on the right bank of the river Indus, construction of dual carriage-way between Peshawar and Nowshera (Rs. 132 million) D. I. Kahn Darya Khan bridge (Rs. 386 million), Khushal Garh bridge (Rs. 250 million) and Kohat Tunnel (Rs. 300 Million). [as published]

CSO: 4600/254

MRD ACTION BODY ASKED TO CONCENTRATE ON PUNJAB NOW

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] KARACHI, Dec. 29--Abid Zubairi, a detained leader of MRD and the Information Secretary of the National Democratic Party has asked the Central Action Committee of the MRD, to concentrate on Punjab for the second round of the movement.

In a letter to Malik Qasim, the Acting Secretary General of MRD, from Hyderabad Central Jail, he has observed that the people of Sind have done their duty so far as the restoration of democracy was concerned. Now it should be Punjab, followed by NWFP and Baluchistan.

The letter released here today by his party contains a tale of woes and sufferings of the inmates of jails and the alleged aoppressive treatment they were receiving at the hands of the authorities.

Giving a break-up of the political inmates indifferent jails of the province, he said that there wre 830 prisoners in Hyderabad, 480 in Karachi, 290 in Khairpur, and 450 in Sukkur. The total for the whole province was around 3000.

In Hyderabad out of 830, thirty have been segregated and were not allowed to meet the others.

The food provided and the sanitary, conditions were subnormal. Most of the prisoners were suffering from dysentery on stomach trouble, Mr. Zubairi requested the leadership fo MRD to provide food and medicine for the ailing inmates as the medical treatment provided in the jail was most in satisfactory.

CSO: 4600/240

NWFP GOVERNOR SPEAKS ON RELATIONS WITH INDIA

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 8

[Excerpt] PESHAWAR, Dec. 29--Governor Fazle Haq has said that Pakistan has been trying its best to have an improved relationship with India but unfortunately the response was not very encouraging due to the traditional negative attitude of the Indian leadership.

Speaking at a largely attended reception at Shahbaz Garhi and Topi in Mardan district this morning he said that Mrs. Indira Gandhi had proved to be the true daughter of the late Jawaharlal Nehru in her hatred towards Pakistan and she too had not been able to reconcile with the existence of this Muslim country. He estimated that she would not mind jumping on an opportunity to grab this remaining part of Pakistan as she did in East Pakistan. But that dream would never be accomplished as with the help of the people, Pakistan's armed forces were fully capable of defending the borders. Without the people's backing, he added, even the best equipped army could not fight the enemy.

The NWFP Governor recalled that the Bengali youth had perhaps forgotten what the Hindu capitalists had done to suck the blood of the Bengali Muslims and how the Hindu teachers had done brain-washing to create hatred against Pakistan among the student community in the eastern wing. He stressed that there was need to acquaint the younger generation here with the factors that led to the demand and creation for a separate Muslim homeland in the subcontinent.

He said that on the western borders also a critical situation had developed due to the presence of the large number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan for the last four years as a result of which almost one-third of the Afghan population had migrated to Pakistan, Iran and other countries. He regretted that certain elements some of whom were sitting outside the country were talking of "Surkh Inqilab".

CSO: 4600/240

MRD LEADER CLARIFIES STAND ON AUTONOMY ISSUE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 8

[Text] LAHORE, Dec. 28--Malik Mohammad Qasim, the acting Secretary General of MRD, in an interview today said that Hanif Ramay's suggestion that the issue of provincial autonomy should be settled before the general election, 'is a dangerous suggestion and it will open up a Pandora's box.'

In other words this suggestion he said would pave the way for the martial law government to make amendments in the constitution according to their designs and wishes. He however agreed with Mr. Ramay, in principle, that the autonomy issue should be resolved but said only elected representatives of the people were entitled to make amendments in the constitution to settle it in accordance with the wishes of the people.

Malik Qasim told The Muslim the MRD leadership was already seized of provincial autonomy problem. He said that leaders of the MRD, representatives coming from all provinces, and people belonging to various walks of life, had many meetings on this issue, and have reached an understanding.

The acting Secretary General said that after the general elections the National Assembly and Senate will take some decision after taking into consideration all the aspects of the issue. He said that decision in this respect had already been taken, and the leadership of the PNP, NDP and JUI were part of this understanding.

Malik Qasim said that Mr. Ramay had been away from the country for more than four years, and he was not well versed with the political developments which had taken place in his absence from the country. He added, that had Mr. Ramay been fully aware of the political developments he would have not put forward the suggestion. Malik Qasim declared that the MRD stand was for the restoration of democracy and for holding of general elections under 1973 Constitution and that all the agreed amendments should be passed by the National Assembly. He said, that no individual or martial law regime could be given the authority to amend the constitution.

CSO: 4600/239

MRD OFFICIAL SAYS NO WORKER TENDERED APOLOGY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] KARACHI, Dec. 28--Iqbal Haider, Assistant Secretary General of MRD, has condemned what he called the propaganda launched by the Government that the detained and convicted MRD workers and leaders were tendering apologies for their release, and termed it as baseless and fabricated.

Addressing a news conference here today he said that the statement of government functionaries and spokesman in this regard itself say that the "apologies were not being submitted in writing by the workers and leaders but verbally and through their relations."

Mr. Haider was of the opinion that now the number of political prisoners has gone so high that it was becoming difficult for the government to accommodate or feed them, and therefore, they were compelled to release them gradually.

"I can say without fear of contradiction that not a single worker or leader has tendered an apology or has regretted in any manner, his role in the movement. In fact they are very rightly proud of their role and their invaluable sacrifices are a source of pride for the nation."

He said that he had extensively toured all the four provinces and met the workers. He was of the considered opinion that the people have already given their verdict against martial law and in favour of restoration of democracy under the 1973 Constitution. "They are determined to continue the struggle till final victory," he said.

He observed that it was imperative for every civilised ruler to bow before the verdict of the people, "unfortunately our rulers are adamant in perpetuation of their unconstitutional and un-Islamic rule and are continuing to follow their oppressive policy to crush the will of the people which has resulted in a serious threat to the integrity of the country."

He was of the view that the regime had proved beyond doubt as "incapable of governing the country."

He observed that the ill-conceived pro-American policy of the regime had deprived the country of its cordial and friendly relations with its neighbours. "The regime has itself admitted time and again that the borders are under serious threat," he added.

CSO: 4600/239

PIA TO SPEND LARGE SUMS ON MODERNIZATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 6

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec. 28: The Pakistan International Airlines will construct a central building near WAPDA House here within the next couple of years. This building will house all offices of the PIA, now scattered in different places in the city, to enable the passengers avail of the facilities provided by their national carrier.

This was stated by Air Vice Marshal Viqar Azim, Managing Director, PIA, while addressing the Executive Committee meeting of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry here this morning.

Viqar Azim said the PIA would incur an expenditure of rupees 10000 million for modernisation of its equipment, providing better facilities to the public, construction of new terminals at airports and for monitoring the entire information system through computers. He said on computerisation alone an amount of Rs. 16 to 17 lakh would be spent. He said the PIA had already started monitoring the information system but since these facilities were not available at certain points they were finding it difficult at present to receive up-to-date data about the flow of traffic. In certain cases, he added, it took months to get the relevant information but with the introduction of computers, the PIA M.D. claimed, the situation had eased to a great extent.

Replying to a question regarding the operation of Haj flights from Lahore and Islamabad from this year, he said they had received instructions from the authorities concerned that PIA should carry 49,000 Haj pilgrims but

details about their places of origin would be worked out subsequently in consultation with the Haj Ministry.

About cargo handling, Viqar Azim said that PIA was facing some difficulties, like other organisations, in this respect. With the inauguration of a terminal at the Islamabad airport yesterday the situation would improve considerably.

The airlines had earned a record profit of Rs. 411 million during the last fiscal year which was the result of planned and co-ordinated efforts of the PIA personnel. This profit was double the amount of profit earned during the preceding year, he added.

The PIA, he reiterated, would introduce more flights both on domestic and international routes. He estimated that the PIA would earn a profit of rupees 600 to 650 million during the current financial year.

About the increase in PIA fares, Viqar Azim said there had been an increase in the fares during the last 18 months although there were many justifications for this purpose. Another increase was not in the offing, he clarified.

To a query, he said, the PIA would set up an ultramodern hospital at a cost of Rs. 150 million to provide better health facilities to its employees. He, however, said this hospital would also be open for treatment to outsiders.

He assured the business community that they would be given preference like the VIPS in the matter of reservation of seats.

Earlier, the LCCI President, Syed Mohsin Reza Bukhari in his address of welcome appreciated the PIA's performance during the past few years.

WORLD BANK URGES RAISING GAS PRICES AGAIN

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Jan 84 p 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 31: The World Bank has reportedly urged Pakistan government once again to raise gas prices drastically as part of its energy conservation programme.

After three price increases over the past two years, the government has already raised the average gas price from 25 per cent to about 50 per cent of fuel oil equivalent. By 1988, it proposes to raise it by another 25 per cent. It may, however, find it difficult to accept the acceleration recommended by the Bank.

But the Bank, in a recent review of the Sixth Plan strategy, has suggested that further steps should be taken to introduce full parity between the prices of gas and fuel oil. It is also of the view that charges of both power and gas for residential consumers should

be made more progressive by lowering the usage level at which higher rates apply.

Among some other recommendations made by the Bank for the energy sector is the proposal for the possible splitting of WAPDA's power and water wings and evolving an institutional structure of autonomous, commercially-oriented public utilities. Such a structure, the Bank feels, would have the benefit of creating smaller and more manageable units, facilitating greater co-ordination of the power development programme.

While recognising the need for a major expansion of oil and gas exploration and development, the World Bank has also suggested the conversion of Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) from a government department to a public company operating under commercial articles of association. The government, it has been further recommended, should pay the

OGDC more realistic prices for its output.

Expressing scepticism about attracting the projected expansion in private sector exploration activities, the Bank has suggested "a more activist approach to marketing its oil and gas prospects than in the past." This will, according to the Bank, involve, certain changes in the two-year old gas pricing formula, and more attractive terms to attract private companies to explore in gas prone areas.

The Bank is of the view the expansion in private sector involvement in exploration activities (as envisaged in the sixth plan) is unlikely because of "the worldwide downturn in exploration activity, the recent failure of several companies to discover oil in Pakistan and the fact that many remaining areas are judged to be gas prone and hence less attractive for private exploration."

CSO: 4600/254

STATE BANK REPORT FIGURES ON INFLATION DISPUTED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Where Has Inflation Gone?"]

[Text]

WAS the increase in consumer prices in the financial year ending June 30 as low as 4.5 per cent compared to ten per cent in the previous year? And was the wholesale price rise as nominal as 3.5 per cent, and the rise in even the sensitive price index, which takes into account prices of 38 essential items, as marginal as 3.7 per cent compared with 13.2 per cent in the previous year, as the Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan exuberantly contends? On the basis of such fanciful figures the Bank argues that inflationary expectations in Pakistan have been reversed? Is all this true, and is Pakistan approaching the kind of ideal state in which inflation has almost vanished, and it is doing far better than even industrial states like the U.S. where rigorous steps have been taken to hold down inflation and save the economy?

The facts and figures in other areas as presented by the State Bank tell a vastly different story. Money supply in 1982-83 increased by a whopping 26.3 per cent compared to only 11.4 per cent in the previous year. That happened as the home remittances at Rs. 31 billion jumped by 29.4 per cent compared to only six per cent in the preceding year.

While the money supply soared so dramatically in a period in which the developed states are keeping it rigidly down so as to push down prices, the gap between demand and supply widened. In Pakistan imports fell by 4.1 per cent compared to the rise of 3.7 per cent in the previous year, the value added in the manufacturing sector increased by only 8.3 per cent compared to 11.9 per cent in the preceding year, and the increase in output in the large scale manufacturing sector dropped from 13.7 per cent last year to 8.7 per cent — a large gap of five per cent. And that happened because of the fall in

production of vegetable ghee, cotton cloth, refined sugar, chemicals etc. Simultaneously the salaries of the Federal Government employees alone rose by 2.46 billion, and inclusive of the pay rise of the Provincial employees and workers in the organised industrial sector the wage rise would be close to Rs. 8 billion. In addition, the administered prices of many essential commodities were raised. And the price of petrol and other oils and lubricants and of other forms of energy too were increased. Even the budget deficit of the Federal Government jumped from the estimated Rs. 5.6 billion to Rs. 6.2 billion, as part of the overall deficit of the Federal and Provincial Governments of Rs. 23.6 billion, as stated by the State Bank report. To the extent of the federal budget deficit, currency notes had to be printed and put out in what Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan had described as the most horrible form of taxation.

After all these happenings, how could consumer prices rise by only 4.5 per cent in a whole year compared to 10 per cent in the previous year, or the sensitive price index rise by only 3.7 per cent compared to 13.2 per cent in the previous year? The right method of estimating the inflation is to deduct the 6.5 per cent increase in gross national product from the increase in money supply of 26.3 which gives the country an inflation rate of 20 per cent. But the GNP deflator used by the State Bank is only eight per cent. The Government should explain how it arrived at such fantasy figures of low prices without violating all rules of economics and the elementary laws of supply and demand.

CSO: 4600/239

KOREA OPENS CONSULATE GENERAL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Jan 84 p 6

[Text] Karachi, Dec. 31: The Consulate General of the Republic of Korea was opened here this morning in a simple but impressive ceremony.

The flag of the Republic of Korea was hoisted by the Ambassador Jay Hee Ho while the plaque on the gate of the premises was unveiled by the Mayor of Karachi Abdus Sattar Afghani.

In his brief remarks on the occasion Mr. Ho expressed his happiness and conveyed his greetings to the people of Pakistan for this important turn in the relations between the two countries.

He also expressed his pleasure on the recent visit of Dr. Mahbubul Haq, the Planning Minister of Pakistan to Korea. "The first official visit by the Minister to my country was a great success, laying a firm foundation for friendly and co-operative relations between our two countries," he added.

The Mayor, Mr. Afghani, congratulated the Ambassador and the Consul-General on the occasion.

Later talking to THE MUSLIM Ambassador Jay Hee Ho said that a new interest has been evoked among the Korean entrepreneurs for establishing industries in the onyx and leather sectors in Pakistan. "Pakistan has enough raw materials in both the sectors while our country has the technical know-how and the finished goods can be exported both to Korea and other countries," he added.

He said Korea was also interested in establishing industries for using molasses as raw material. He disclosed that during the last few years trade between the two countries has increased by about 20 per cent.

In reply to a question he said, that there was substantial demand of Pakistani cotton in Korea but this year Pakistan was not in a position to export cotton due to bad crops.

He said that after the visit of Dr. Mahbubul Haq many areas of co-operation between the two countries had been identified and "we hope that the relationship between the two countries will grow and be strengthened further."

CSO: 4600/254

OFFICIAL TALKS ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS AT AIRPORT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] KARACHI Dec 29--Major improvements in the air traffic control system have been implemented at all the country's 24 airports since the Civil Aviation Authority was founded 7 years ago the organisation's Director General Air Vice Marshal Khurshid Anwar Mirza said here today.

In an informal meeting with journalists at his office this afternoon he said the CAA had installed a number of air navigation and landing devices at all the Pakistani airports which were above and beyond the requirements specified by the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO)

Since the conversion of the old civil aviation department into a full-fledged and autonomous Civil Aviation Authority in December 1982, air traffic safety devices which had not existed at all previously had now been installed at each and every airport in the country, he added.

Similarly, main airports lacked any fire-fighting facilities before the creation of the CAA, but within the past year all of them had been provided with the necessary fire-fighting equipment.

Air Navigation aids installed included radar (two at Karachi and one at Islamabad airport), VCR DME distance-cum-directional indicators for aircraft (at Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Nawabshah, Quetta, Peshawar and Jiwani), non-directional beacons at eight different places, night-landing systems at previously-un-equipped airports (Faisalabad Moenjodaro and Peshwar), variable-slope indicators, approach lights and floodlit parking bays at all airports and new advanced category instrument landing systems at Islamabad and Lahore.

Referring to a new item appearing in a local evening newspaper, about a so-called "obsolete civil aviation barometer, which was allegedly causing some problems for the PIA, he said this was "a total fabrication" and "misleading"

CSO: 4600/240

QADIANIS' REMOVAL FROM BUREAUCRACY DEMANDED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec. 28: Addressing the Khatm-e-Nabuwat conference in Chiniot last night, Maulana Taj Mahmood said that about three lakh Qadianis had gathered in Rabwah and were trying to take advantage of the fact that different sects of Muslims were not united and added that the conference should provide a forum to all religious groups and political leaders in the name of unity of Ummah.

Maulana Taj Mahmood said that Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and Al-e-Rasool were valuable assets of all Muslims, irrespective of sectarian differences.

The Maulana recalled that President Ziaul Haq had openly condemned the Qadianis but important posts in the Government were still being held by them. He said that Zionists had allowed only Qadianis to retain their mission in Israel. Maulana Zafar Ahmed Ansari, who was holding an important assignment under the present regime, had witnessed that young Qadianis were members of the Israeli army and were fighting against the PLO.

Maulana Taj Mahmood said that Qadianis had not submitted declarations as required under the Constitution. He demanded that they must be termed as 'Murtads' and punished according to the Islamic law.

Agha Murtaza Pooya, member Majlis-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat Pakistan, speaking on the occasion said that Islamisation cannot be achieved in Pakistan without effectively weeding out Qadianis from our civil and military bureaucracy which, regretfully, now and then assumes full political charge of the country.

He said that we should revive the spirit of the 1977 movement for accelerating Islamisation and warned against a conspiracy being hatched by Qadianis, and Bahá'ees in Baluchistan.

Agha Pooya said it was a historical fact that in the disintegration of Pakistan, the Qadianis played a major role. He said the time had come to chalkout an action programme to save Islam and embark on Jihad.

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman expressed great concern over the alleged murder of Aslam Qureshi and apprehended that the Qadianis were responsible for his murder. He demanded that the government should take necessary steps to eliminate the Qadianis.

Maulana Ali Ghazanfar Kararvi said that only with the introduction of Nizam-e-Mustafa in Pakistan will the evil of Qadianiat be uprooted. He charged that Aslam Qureshi had been murdered by the non-Muslims, but no action had been taken against them so far.

Maulana Abdul Hakeem, a former member of national assembly, said that Qadianis had not accepted the creation of Pakistan and while burying their dead they pronounce that the burial is only temporary.

Khan Mohammad Ashraf Khan of the Khaksar Tehrik said that the people of Chiniot were facing a lot of problems. As there was no hospital and girls degree college, they were forced to go to Rabwah. He said that in the anti-Qadiani movement of 1953 thousands of Muslims were martyred and lakhs jailed for upholding the banner of 'Risalat' and demanding that Qadianis be declared non-Muslims.

KARACHI SHIPYARD TO BUILD SHIP FOR NAVY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] KARACHI, Dec. 29--The keel-laying ceremony of a Rs. 25 million 900-ton coastal oil tanker-cum-cargo vessel being built for the Pakistan Navy by the Karachi Ship yards and Engineering Works, was today performed by Federal Communications Minister Mohyuddin Baluch.

The vessel, which will be capable of a speed of 10.5 knots per hour, is scheduled for completion in nine months' time.

The keel-laying ceremony took place at the KSEW slipway at West Wharf.

Speaking on the occasion, Mohyuddin Baloch said the worldwide recession in maritime shipping had repercussions on the KSEW, which was facing difficult situation.

This recession was likely to persist for another two years, then a reverse cycle would set in, with the demand for new vessels rising, but until then the KSEW would have to weather the lean period.

He said the KSEW management and workers were co-operating in ensuring that the shipyard managed to ride out the present difficulties without too adverse an affect, or resorting to retrenchments.

In this connection, he said the KSEW was diversifying into the general engineering field and had secured a number of orders so that it remained financially viable.

He said the Ministry of Communications was studying the position of the KSEW, and planned to take up the matter at the Federal Cabinet level to try and ensure that the shipyard received the maximum number of orders from governmental agencies for engineering jobs.

He briefly mentioned some of the goals achieved under the aegis of the Communication Ministry's Port and Shipping Wing during the just-concluded 5th Five Year plan period (1978-83).

The ceremony was attended by officials of the Pakistan Navy, KPT and a 20-member delegation of Pakistani students studying at British educational institutions.

REMITTANCES CONTINUE TO BE STEADY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Dec. 29--Remittances from overseas Pakistanis continue to maintain their steady flow, according to official figures for the first four months of the current fiscal year available here today.

From July through October--the first four months of the fiscal 1984--these totalled over \$937, million nearly ten per cent higher than the corresponding period of fiscal 1983.

The flow of remittances is being closely monitored in view of their crucial role in alleviating pressures on Pakistan's balance of payments position in recent years.

The recent drop in oil revenues of the Middle East region (where the bulk of overseas Pakistanis are concentrated) has created a certain amount of uncertainty about the future flow of remittances. While the upward trend so far has been maintained, the situation over the next few months will need to be kept under constant review.

The weight of the overseas remittances in the overall external account is now more than the yield from merchandise exports. The value of exports during July-Oct. in the current fiscal year, for example, is about \$782 million. For the last fiscal year, remittances were close to \$3 billion compared to \$2.6 billion worth of merchandise exports. In fiscal 1974 when their weight was first felt distinctly, these were only 14 per cent of exports earnings.

Their significance is more dramatically emphasized by the fact that compared to 40 per cent of net aid flows in 1973-74, these rose to 370 per cent of such flows in 1982-83.

In net aid slumped from \$659 million in 1976-77 to \$317 million in 1981-82, workers remittances soared from \$577 million in 1976-77 to \$2224 in 1981-82.

How long Pakistan can continue to rely on this kind of flow of remittances is now a matter of serious attention in official quarters here. Planners, however, anticipate a considerable slow-down in the net emigration in the coming few years and emphasizing the need for a new strategy for the future management of balance of payments situation currently leaning heavily on overseas remittances.

POWER SHORTAGE: PLANNING IN ENERGY SECTOR CRITICIZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 31 Dec 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Load-shedding Again!"]

[Text] Soon after the announcement made by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) on Thursday that its load-shedding programme was to come into effect on January 13, 1984, the Federal Minister for Water and Power, Raja Sikandar Zaman tried to sugarcoat the bitter pill which the consumers were being asked to swallow. He told a Press conference that load-shedding would be limited to 600 megawatt against the 1000 mw last year, and the period of shedding would be restricted to 12 to 18 days while it had lasted for five weeks last year. Public memory is not such as to be able to recollect events of the previous year and draw comfort from the Minister's projected comparisons.

What baffles consumers, both domestic and industrial, is the need for such periodical disruptions in the supply of electrical energy when they are being inundated with publicity about projects undertaken to augment generation of power. Apart from the chagrin of domestic consumers when their lights suddenly go off or fans and airconditioners stop functioning, it brings the wheels of industry to a halt and adversely affects production. Farms irrigated by water from tubewells begin to wither, leading to a shortage of foodgrains vital for the survival of the owners of such farmlands. We have constantly heard edifying reports of thousands of villages electrified at hearteningly rapid intervals, while realities on the ground persuade the people not to set much store by official pronouncements.

Apart from the load-shedding undertaken every now and again and appeals made by the state media for the people to bear with it, power supply also has an almost perpetual tendency to vary the intensity of its flow, resulting in fluctuations in its voltage. Apart from the dimming and brightening of lights as if by some freak of nature, it damages, and even destroys, several electrical appliances in homes leaving their owners helpless as they can turn to no authority for compensation of the losses sustained by them. But the crunch comes when expensive items like air-conditioners or other costly equipment go irretrievably out of commission.

The fault lies with the disparity between planning and performance. And this is evidenced almost in every official undertaking. Why is it that when pompous plans are formulated and proudly announced, all necessary steps are not taken to ensure their proper and timely implementation? This complaint holds true not only in relation to WAPDA but also in respect of other government ventures. While the working of the private sector is invariably more satisfactory than that of the public sector, officialdom has often been prone to take over projects from private into official hands. In Rawalpindi, for instance, WAPDA took over the generation and supply of electricity from REPCO with high-sounding promises of promptness and assurances of uninterrupted supply to consumers. Big names and large establishments alone do not, and cannot, ensure efficiency. This is a fact that public sector organisations and agencies need to have seen and absorbed a long time ago.

CSO: 4600/242

COMMITTEES TO ANALYZE COTTON SITUATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 31 Dec 83 p 7

[Text] Lahore, Dec. 30: The government was minutely looking into the causes of cotton crop failure and two committees have been set up to analyse the whole situation and recommend measures to avoid such occurrences.

This was stated here today by the Federal Agriculture Minister Vice Admiral Fazail Janjua while talking to newsmen in the offices of PASSCO which he visited this morning.

He said the committees, one each for Punjab and Sind and composed of experts and farmers, will go into detail failure of crops in these two provinces and their recommendations will be discussed at a seminar to be held shortly in which the future line of action would be taken to prevent re-occurrence of such a situation.

The Minister said according to initial reports the damage to the crop has been caused by unfavourable weather conditions and excessive moisture and increased humidity had led to pest infection.

While the progressive and well-to-do farmers have been able to take preventive measures, small farmers were at discount, he said.

Government was aware of this situation, he said and had adopted suitable measures such as lending taccavi loans to the affected farmers to offset their losses.

The Agriculture Minister said according to the latest estimates based on statistical data the national production of cotton was 3.4 million bales out of which 1.25 million bales were produced in Sind and 2.1 million in Punjab.

Last year 4.8 million bales were produced while the target this year was 5.2 million against the national consumption of 3.1 million bales, he said.

Vice Admiral Janjua said Government departments could not be held responsible for the failure of the crop which he attributed to the vagaries of weather.

"It rained three times more during the 1983 crop season as compared to previous season", he remarked.

But he expressed the hope that with the beneficial climate, use of fertilisers, high quality seed and rain at the right time will help to ensure maximum production of cotton for the next season.

Replying to a question he said aerial spray was still available and not discontinued. But he was of the opinion that ground spraying was more effective than through the planes.

The Minister said the weather was also responsible for damaging the onion crop and the problem was further compounded by 'arhtis'. Last year, he said the crop yielded 4,77,000 tonnes out of which 75,000 tonnes were exported which earned the country ten million dollars.

The Minister said the country exported 75,000 tonnes of onion and earned a foreign exchange of 10 million dollars over a couple of years.

He said the policy of free export of onion and potatoes would continue uninterrupted as it was the best to fetch better return to the farmers to avert any possible crisis in the future, he said the Agricultural Marketing and Storage Limited (AMSL) had been asked to procure 10,000 tonnes of onion and in sufficient quantity potatoes and then release these commodities in the market according to requirements. [as published]

As far the export of vegetable, the Minister said the Ministry of Commerce had been directed to curtail the export of vegetables in case there was any shortage in the country.--PPI [as published]

CSO: 4600/242

1981 CENSUS DATA RELEASED; LITERACY, OTHER STATISTICS ISSUED

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 83 pp 1, 6

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec 29: Pakistan's literacy percentage is 26.2 (35.05 for males and 15.99 for females); 38 per cent of the Muslim population (10 years and more) can read the Holy Quran; and Urdu is the fifth most spoken household language of the country.

These are some of the conclusions of the 1981 Census, according to a latest publication of the Census Commissioner's Secretariat.

Literacy ratio, according to 1971 Census, was 21.7 per cent. During the decade it showed an annual growth of about half per cent.

Out of 13 million people who had some level of education, 46 per cent had passed primary education, 23 per cent middle, and 20 per cent matric. The percentage falls to 5.9 in case of intermediate, 3.8 for graduates, and only one for master degree holders.

The percentage for professional graduates is still low — 0.28 for engineering and 0.25 for medical, and 0.28 for law.

And out of the total population having passed the primary, middle, and matric, the share of women was 30.7, 24.6 per cent, and 23.5, respectively.

On the other hand, it stood at 22.3 per cent for medical education but 3.1 per cent for law, statistics show.

There is similar disparity on urban-rural basis — 47.12 per cent for urban areas to 17.33 per cent for the rural sector. It becomes even more conspicuous when judged sex-wise separately for the urban and the rural areas.

Province-wise, the highest literacy percentage is in Sind (31.45),

followed by the Punjab (27.42), NWFP (16.70), Baluchistan (10.32), and FATA (6.38). Federal capital Islamabad recorded a literacy percentage of 51.75.

In the 1972 Census, it was inquired whether a person can 'read and write with understanding'. But in 1981 the question was 'whether a person can read a newspaper and write a letter' to determine the literacy level. But in both cases, primary education was taken to denote literacy. Primary-passed population was 23.1 per cent and informal literates represented another 3.1 per cent.

There was no column in the 1981 Census on individual's spoken language, but a family question on 'language usually spoken in household'. This showed Punjabi on the top (48.7 per cent), followed by Pushto (13.14 per cent), Sindhi (11.77 pc), Siraiki (9.83 pc), Urdu (7.60 per cent), Baluchi (3.01 per cent), Hindko (2.43 per cent), and Brohi (1.20 per cent), and other languages 2.81 per cent.

The ability to read the Holy Quran (10 years and above) was highest in Islamabad (56 per cent), followed by NWFP (41.02), Punjab (40.61), Sind (34.78), FATA (33.15), and Baluchistan (22.29) for the all-Pakistan average of 38.37 per cent.

The interesting revelation, however, was that women came much better than men in this particular respect, 41.39 per cent of their total population being able to read the Holy Quran as against men whose ratio was 35.75 per cent only.

Province-wise, the ratio for male and female was in line with the national average.

The Census inquiry covered in-province migration, migration from one province to another, and migration abroad.

The number of migrants in the NWFP was five per cent of total migrant population out of which 36.5 per cent moved within the province and the rest coming to live in the NWFP from the other provinces, viz Punjab 20.2 per cent, FATA 3.8 per cent.

In the Punjab, 6,315,700 or 63.4 per cent were found migrants (42.2 per cent within the province and 43.6 per cent from India, Bangladesh and other countries).

In Sind, the figure stood at well over 2.77 million or 27.9 per cent of the total migrant population of the country and of it 42.3 per cent was found to have come from India, Bangladesh and other countries, 22.8 per cent from the Punjab, and 13.3 per cent from the NWFP. Only 14.5 per cent had moved within the province.

In Baluchistan 2.7 per cent of the total migrant population of the country had come to live (44.3 per cent from within province, and 21.3 per cent from Punjab, and 11.2 per cent from NWFP).

According to the Census, a total of 1.7 million Pakistani nationals were found to have proceeded abroad during 1971-81, most of them (82.8 per cent) from the rural areas.

Province-wise, Punjab accounted for 43 per cent of emigrants, NWFP 34.6 per cent, and Sind 17.6 per cent.

Percentage of emigrants to the population of their respective provinces was: NWFP 5.3, Baluchistan 1.8, Punjab 1.6, and Sind 1.6.

Thus, proportionately, three times as many migrants went from the NWFP as compared to the other provinces. Taken together with FATA (whose figures are not available), the share of NWFP could be higher still.

The country's labour force in 1981 was 27.6 per cent of the total population and 40.2 per cent of population of 10 years and above—male 50.6 per cent and female 2.1 per cent.

It showed that Pakistan's labour force participation rate is lower than that of Malaysia (36.6), Indonesia (37.7) and Thailand (48.8), and 50 per cent for most developed countries of the world.

This primarily stems from the low female participation rate in Pakistan although the male participation compares well with the other countries.

The unemployment rate in the country was, however, stated to be 3.1 per cent (2.3 per cent in rural

and 5.2 per cent in urban areas)—2.9 per cent for males and 7.5 per cent for females.

Occupation-wise, nearly half of the country's labour force is engaged in agriculture (including animal husbandry, fisheries, forestry, hunting); another 25 per cent in production and related works, 8.3 per cent in sales, etc., and 3 to 4 per cent in professional, technical and related trades and professions including clerical jobs, services, etc.

CSO: 4600/241

DISMISSAL OF UNIVERSITY TEACHER SAID 'UNWARRANTED'

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 83 p 15

[Editorial: "An Unwarranted Action"]

[Text]

THE Punjab Teachers Union and restricts their academic freedom. It is surprising that the latest voice to join the protest against the dismissal of the University's adoption of these rules aroused no comment at the time. Perhaps the Punjab University lecturer, Mr Omar Asghar Khan, whose dismissal under a Martial Law regulation raises crucial issues of academic freedom and university autonomy. Mr Omar Asghar Khan was served with the first of three show-cause notices in August 1983 asking him to showcause why action should not be taken against him by the University authorities for permitting his wife to take part in an "illegal procession". The notice was served under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1966, which were adopted by the Punjab University in June, 1983, four months after the incident had occurred. Under these rules, neither a government servant nor his/her spouse is permitted to indulge in any kind of political activity. The supersession of the University statutes by the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules is a serious breach of the principle of university autonomy. It turns teachers and scholars into bureaucrats and restricts their academic freedom. It is surprising that the University's adoption of these rules aroused no comment at the time. Perhaps the University authorities were not as troubled as they should have been by the move, and that in itself is not a healthy trend.

The second and third show-cause notices served on Mr Omar Asghar Khan, first by the University and subsequently by the Martial Law Administrator (Zone A), resulted in his dismissal in November under MLR 51 "in connection with an agitation organised by industrial labour" at Lahore railway station on October 26. It is perhaps the first time in the history of the country that a teacher has been dismissed under MLR and that, too, without being given a chance to be heard in person. Once again, university autonomy is seriously eroded by this precedent. In the interests of the university autonomy and academic freedom, the dismissal of Mr Omar Asghar Khan should be reviewed by the Government and the University authorities.

CSO: 4600/241

ZAKAT: JUSTIFICATION, IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 83 p 15

[Article by Mushtaq Ahmad: "Zakat as Instrument of Social Justice"]

[Text]

ALL MEN are born equal. So did the Scriptures say. And the faithful among them were bound together into a common fraternity by their adherence to a common faith. Whether an equal sharing of the fruits of the Earth was also divinely ordained, was open to interpretation. But if the consequence of unequal sharing was destructive of his equality it was a violation of the law of God.

While no limit was set on the wealth a man could legitimately own, its amassment was frowned upon. Avarice was a sinful indulgence certain to invoke the Divine wrath and condemn the sinner to eternal damnation. In the philosophies that seek to interpret the world, we find a modern version of this ancient wisdom. Injustice of any form against which protests are continually raised were revolting to the pristine spirit of religion. The might of the Roman Empire built on the inhuman institution of slavery was destroyed by upholding the rights of man. To Christianity and Islam alike not only human bondage but also human exploitation was abhorrent.

Poverty

Existence of poverty, the Holy Prophet had said, was an invitation to disbelief. A system of distributive justice was consequently an integral part of Islam. The general principles of the system and some of the specific directives were revealed in the Holy Quran and spelt out in the traditions. Dispersal rather than the concentration of wealth, prompt payment of the just

reward for labour, denunciation of hoarding and speculation, prohibition of *riba*, were a few of the measures aimed at the establishment of a social order based on equity and justice. An economic system that helped to perpetuate poverty and stray men away from the path of rectitude was by its very definition un-Islamic.

Poverty and plenty in those days differed from our own times in magnitude and scale. Life was then simple and auster. The Prophet and his disciples lived on a sparse diet of barley and dates. The sermons on simplicity and austerity we now hear from the pulpit and the platform do not have the remotest resemblance to the life style of the elite. In an age of lavishness and luxury, men climb on each other's shoulders to reach their ultimate fruition. The maldistribution of worldly goods vehemently denounced by religion, is shockingly defended with the same vehemence by its protagonists.

The progress of poverty has accompanied the advancement of science and technology, particularly in societies like our own where the rights of the many are smothered by the privileges of the few, and where moral principles are publicly paraded to justify private material gains. The problems we face are unlimited for their solution not even the limited means at our disposal are available.

We have not made a serious attempt to reform the social order inherited from our colonial past. Instead, we have been running after the seeming and the superficial,

and indulging in controversies for the glorification of the self and the sects to which we belong, at the expense of society.

Our fundamental problem is the problem of poverty on which the President laid his finger in his address to the Punjab Zakat Convention held recently in Lahore. The main concern of his administration, he told his audience, was to bridge the gap between the haves and the have-nots. With this end in view the State has assumed responsibility for the collection of Zakat and its disbursement among the rightful claimants. One of the five pillars of Islam, its payment is a religious duty of the well-to-do towards the ill-to-do members of the society, such as the widows, the handicapped and the invalid.

The Prophet who was the founder and the first Head of the Islamic State at Madina both in the temporal and spiritual sense, had levied it as a tax whose revenues were to be used for the relief of the poor, the indigent, the new converts and also for the furtherance of the proselytising mission of Islam. The institution was, however, not developed and perfected as an instrument of the financial and fiscal policies of the State. Its sanctity nevertheless continued to be respected in the personal life of the Muslims, more in the nature of a self gratifying religious duty than as a matter of social obligation for the welfare of the society.

What was once a collective State exaction, in course of time, acquired the character of a voluntary individual donation on a basis of

self-assessment, with no provision for scrutiny and no control over its utilisation except the donor's own discretion. The practice remained unchanged through centuries. However meticulously observed, the fact that its observance has not solved the problem of poverty is writ large on the face of Muslim society all over the world. Poverty existing in the midst of plenty is a universal phenomenon. A source of income to the State has been converted into a means of charity. To the affluent sinners it is an act of benevolence for the atonement of their sins, not excluding the sin of avarice; to the God-fearing an act of piety for heavenly bliss in the life hereafter.

Radical departure

The policy of compulsory deductions adopted by the present government is a radical departure from the laissez faire approach of the previous administrations. The handsome dividend it has paid is glaringly reflected in the realisation of over a billion rupees from this source at zero cost. Since the enforcement of the law, the yield has recorded a progressive increase from Rs.815 million in June 1981 to Rs.904 million in 1982 and Rs.1,027 million in 1983. The President has reasons to congratulate himself on an achievement that is truly impressive, but a dispassionate examination of the contribution of each of the eleven officially listed Zakatable assets is also a cause for concern. A single asset, namely, saving bank accounts, accounts for nearly three-fourths of the total income. In three years of the operation of the scheme, it has contributed 75 per cent, 72 per cent and 70 per cent of the Zakat revenues.

The maximum limit of the interest bearing saving account deposit being Rs. two lakhs for one account holder, it is significant that persons in this category make a ma-

nor contribution, while the contributions of those with assets above this limit and running to millions and tens of millions is insignificant. At the present rate of deduction, disparities of wealth and incomes even in the long run would be impossible to eliminate. Even a narrowing of the gap is difficult to imagine given a return of 7½ per cent to 14 per cent on savings maintained in the commercial banks or investments in shares and certificates. All it amounts to is a deduction of 2½ per cent from his income, leaving the capital intact. Still more disturbing is the almost inconsequential impact of the levy on the wealthier classes whose assets are locked up in movable and immovable assets, including real estate, trade and industry, liquid cash and jewellery which are beyond the reach of the law. Moreover, the mercantile community operates on borrowed capital from the banks. Debtors rather than creditors, the traders and industrialists are still the most opulent segment of the population. If the yield from fixed deposits is any indicator of their contribution, it is barely one-fifth on the entire collections.

Statistics published in the Economic Surveys of the Government and the Annual Reports of the State Bank, do not bear out the contention of the Director-General of the Administration of Zakat and the Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, that 90 per cent of it is collected from one street in Karachi. If Mr Imtiaz had the Head Offices of the commercial banks located on Chundrigar Road in mind, no one will quarrel with the statement, but if what was meant by it was, that it represented the share of the upper strata of the society, nothing could be farther from truth.

Secular taxes

Looking to the newness of the levy, the response has been en-

couraging. Nevertheless, its recoveries constitute only one-and-a-half per cent of the receipts from the secular taxes which are the backbone of the country's financial system. The gross revenues of the government are nearly Rs.60 billion compared to one billion of the Zakat revenues. There can, therefore, be no question in the immediate or foreseeable future of replacement of one by the other, much as the business men would prefer it as an alternative, despite its meagre contribution to the Exchequer even in the traditional field of taxation. Their persistent plea has been persistently rejected by the spokesmen of the government on the ground of its limited potentialities to meet the enormous expenditure on defence and development. The potentialities of Zakat for meeting the demands of welfare in the specific area of activity for which the fund is earmarked, have yet to be realised by either enlarging the list of the present Zakatable heads so as to bring within its purview the assets of the propertied class or by compelling them to make their contribution by devising some other means to honour their religious obligation.

Appeals for voluntary contributions having failed, resort to compulsion has become inevitable. A voluntary contribution of Rs.2 million against a compulsory collection of Rs.1000 million, shows how large is the extent of avoidance, and how great is the need for the extension of the compulsive element to assets that now conveniently escape the net. If there are a million persons requiring financial support and permanent rehabilitation, an expenditure of rupees one billion cannot go very far. All that can be said for the existing system of collection and method of distribution is, that the relief though not substantial, is better than no relief at all.

STEPS DISCUSSED TO PREVENT ENCROACHMENTS ALONG KARAKORAM HIGHWAY

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 83 p 7

[Text]

GILGIT, Dec 29: A high-level meeting held in Gilgit on Tuesday discussed the ways and means to stop encroachments on the Karakoram Highway and reserve the scenic beauty and natural environment of the Northern Areas.

Mr Ayaz Ali Shah, Joint Secretary, Urban Affairs Division, presided.

The meeting was attended by the Commissioner for Northern Areas, Mr Zahoor Anwar Malik; Chairman District Council Mr Mir Baz Khan; Chairman Municipal Committee Mr Salim Raza and elected members of Gilgit district.

The Joint Secretary Urban Affairs Division said that the Government intends to keep the Karakoram Highway free from all kinds of encroachments for smooth flow of traffic right from Hasanabad to Khunjarab. He said that

proposals had been sent to the Government with land use plans and zones earmarked for afforestation, natural habitation and other purposes.

He said that Northern Areas have now been opened for the rest of the world and more tourists and population growth is expected to arrive in these areas. He stressed the need of keeping the ecological balance and the natural environment of the Karakoram range and asked the elected members to cooperate in the implementation of the Government plans for the collective welfare of the people.

The Joint Secretary Urban Affairs Division said that, in order to protect the Karakoram Highway from all kinds of encroachments, the National Highway Ordinance will be strictly followed.—APP.

CSO: 4600/241

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, CONCERNS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 Magazine pp 3, 6

[Article by Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri]

[Text] When we speak of human rights today, we really mean those rights drawing their formulation from the last decades of the 18th century and the American and French revolutions. But the idea of the inalienable rights of the human being is much older and, in fact, was known to poets, philosophers and politicians in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. Throughout the centuries there has been a close connection and interdependence between the idea of "natural law" and the idea of the natural rights of man.

As civilization advanced it was found necessary to enshrine, protect and defend some of the human rights or 'natural rights' referred to above on an international level. It began to be felt that if mother earth was going to become a better and a safer and more civilised place to live in, then violation of some of these basic rights should draw international censure and that they be given international protection by means of various multilateral treaties. An important landmark in this direction was the Covenant of the peace treaties between Germany and its allies and the victorious powers. Although the Covenant of the League of Nations did not deal with or formally recognise the fundamental rights of man, the Covenant, nevertheless, did contain certain elements suggesting a recognition of the rights and welfare of man on the international level.

The Charter of the United Nations (1945) contains the reaffirmation of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small". "Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights" and "assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms" are words that appear, with some variations in different contexts, at several places in the Charter.

The catalogue of rights set out by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be regarded more or less as the sum of all the important traditional political and civil rights of national constitutions and legal systems. Among these are equality before the law; protection against

arbitrary arrest; the right to a fair trial and freedom from ex-post facto criminal laws; the right to own property. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; and the freedom of peaceful assembly and association. To these lists of civil and political rights the Declaration has added economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to work and to choose one's work freely, the right to earn equal pay for equal work, and the right to education.

The declaration is not an international treaty and was meant to proclaim a common standard of achievement rather than enforceable legal obligations. But to the degree that it has filled a gap caused by the delay in the completion and entry of the covenants into force, the Universal Declaration has acquired a different and more important status than was originally intended. It has been widely used by international organisations, conferences, and governments as a means of judging how well governments have carried out their obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to questions of human rights.

Pakistani Scene

With this background in mind we are now better placed to look at the state of human rights in Pakistan. Unfortunately even a very casual observer of the Pakistani scene cannot but be shocked at the gross violation of human rights that prevails in Pakistan today. The critics of the present state of affairs are some times reminded by the advocates of the present regime that human rights have been persistently violated in Pakistan in the past during both civil and military rule and that their violation, unfortunately, seems to have become the pattern of Pakistani politics. [as published]

The defenders of the present regime point to the gross violation of human rights perpetrated during the civilian regime immediately preceding the present martial law government. Repeated references are made to untraced murder of political opponents, humiliation of women folk and other family members of those meant to be persecuted, indiscriminate arrests and resort to detention as well as the removal of some people opposed to the then regime to the infamous Dulai Camp. Unfortunately there is a great degree of truth in these charges. This however, is no justification for gross violation of human rights during the tenure of the present regime. In fact in some ways the situation is far worse than it ever was, either during the tenure of the civilian regime immediately preceding the present Martial Law administration, or for that matter at any time since 1947.

Role of Judiciary

There is absolutely no doubt about the fact that the judiciary has never been so totally crippled as it has been during the tenure of the present government. Until the present Martial Law, the country's higher judiciary had remained relatively independent despite periodic waves of political pressure. The interposition of an independent judiciary between citizens and the government served to protect individual rights from governmental excesses during two previous martial law regimes. In those periods the

judiciary emerged as a vital force in checking abuses of power and in promoting and protecting fundamental and constitutional rights of citizens of Pakistan. People still remember the valiant role played by eminent judges like Mr. Justice M. R. Kiani, Mr. Justice Cornelius and Mr. Justice Shabbir Ahmad in protecting the fundamental rights of citizens against the ravages and encroachments made by martial law and other dictatorial governments. This restraining force has unfortunately disappeared under the present government.

Martial Law orders have extinguished the civilian courts' power to review acts of military authorities, including decisions of military courts. Presidential Order No. 1 of 1980 restricted the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and barred them from making any order concerning the validity of any martial law order or action taken thereunder. The order further prohibited the High Courts from reviewing sentences and verdicts of military tribunals, or from taking any action against persons acting under martial law authority. The order removed the courts' jurisdiction retroactively.

The 1980 presidential order prohibited High Courts from granting any form of relief, such as setting bail, ordering the release of persons unjustly detained or staying executions and floggings. Nevertheless, some courts continued to grant such relief until enactment of the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981 ("PCO"). The PCO suspended all orders made by the Superior Courts pertaining to decisions of military courts and declared null and void all other decisions addressing the legality of the military government. The PCO proscribes any challenge in a court of law to any act of the military government, including decisions of military tribunals. Judicial compliance with the restrictions imposed by the PCO has been ensured by severe incursions on judicial independence effected by the order.

Resignations

Article 17 of the PCO provides that judges of the Supreme and High Courts of Pakistan may not continue to hold their offices unless they swear an oath to abide by the PCO. A person who makes that oath is forbidden to call into question any provision of the PCO. This provision ended the traditional of judicial independence that previously shielded individual rights from governmental excesses. As indicated above, even after the President's Order No. 1 of 1980 was issued, some judges of the High Courts of Punjab and Baluchistan defied the military regime by overturning military court decisions. The PCO forced those judges, who were committed to upholding the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, to resign. Nineteen Supreme Court and Provincial High Court judges lost their seats on the bench for refusing to take the oath required by the PCO.

The disastrous effect on human rights of President's Order No. 1 1980 and the judicial "oath of allegiance" required by the PCO cannot be overstated. In the past no matter how erratic or arbitrary government action might be, one always had the opportunity to appeal one's case or seek a writ of

mandamus or habeas corpus when a lower court or a governmental official acted improperly. The writ jurisdiction traditionally served as an effective shield against excessive abuse of power by successive dictatorial regimes. Such writ actions are no longer possible.

A major protection which citizens of most civilized countries possess as a shield against violation of their fundamental and basic human rights is the presence of a free and independent press. Press in Pakistan has never had an easy ride. Press and Publications Ordinance, various Martial Law Regulations, censorship, precensorship, self-censorship and denial of official and public sector advertisements are just a few of the devices that have been used to keep the press well under control.

Dismissal of Journalists

Those who fight injustice by words and ideas are always the victims of injustice, for even the oppressors know the power of words and ideas to harness and unleash the instinct for freedom that all people have. The most recent and glaring example of harsh treatment of the press is the summary dismissal from service of ten eminent journalists of Lahore for merely signing a petition expressing concern over the situation in Sind and demanding restoration of constitutional government. Treatment meted out to Irshad Rao, the publisher of the Urdu weekly AL FATAHA and formerly editor of MASAWAAT, is too well known to need any narration. Even those writing for foreign journals enjoy no immunity from the actions of the present government. Mr. Salamat Ali was arrested for writing an article in the Hong Kong based FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, called: "Baluchistan: an upheaval is forecast". The prosecution chief witness, Colonel Abdur Rauf Khan, described Salamat Ali's article as "a reasonable interpretation" of the situation in the province, but despite that Salamat Ali was found guilty and sentenced to one year imprisonment with hard labour. After international protest against his trial and conviction he was released four months later.

Universities

Universities which act as the breeding ground for the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity have naturally attracted the attention of the present regime. In most civilized societies universities, being places of scholarship and learning, provide an atmosphere in which healthy difference of opinion is not only entertained but is actually encouraged. In Pakistan today the concept of academic freedom on university campuses is non-existent.

Three highly respected professors of Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University, after undergoing mental and physical torture while in police lock-up have been given severe sentences. They were convicted for being in possession of what has been termed objectionable literature. These teachers are Jamil Omar, lecturer Computer Sciences, Dr. Muhammad Salim, Assistant Professor Department of Chemistry and Tariq Ehsan, lecturer Pakistan Studies. Jamil Omar has described in detail the beatings, tortures,

burnings and repeated violations of his person in such painful and hair raising detail that it is impossible to describe and repeat all his sufferings in the presence of ladies. More recently, three professors of the Punjab University were served with show cause notices. One of them Professor Umar Asghar Khan, an eminent Cambridge economist and son of Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, has already been dismissed. The charge against Omar Asghar relates to his presence at the site of a procession of trade unionists. The fact that the subject of trade union movement in Pakistan is of special interest to Omar Asghar Khan and that he has made valuable contributions to reputed Pakistani and international publications on this subject was totally ignored as an explanation for his presence on the occasion.

Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan who has been in prison and under house arrest for the last four years for advocating restoration of the 1973 constitution and the transfer of power to the elected representative of the people says in his recent book "Generals in Politics"... "never before in the history of the country have so many people including women been lodged in the dungeon--like cells of the Moghul Fort at Lahroe which has been known since British days as one of the worst torture centres. To hide such unpleasant facts, the press is kept in bondage and peaceful agitation against the Martial Law regime is punished by whipping, rigorous imprisonment up to fourteen years and confiscation of property".

Miss Benazir Bhutto, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Rasul Bakhsh Paleejo and thousands of other political leaders and workers rot in Pakistani prisons today for no fault of theirs; their only crime seems to be their desire to restore the 1973 constitution which protects the fundamental rights of Pakistanis and which also guarantees the territorial integrity of our country by allowing citizens of Pakistan a right to take part in their own governance.

It would be in place here to refer to some of the human rights violations which have been listed by the Amnesty International in its report on Pakistan. The report is very exhaustive and only a very brief reference is made here to highlight some violations which the present government has committed and which infringe basic human rights contravening 'international human rights law'. A reference may be made to the following violations:

i) "Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that even in times of "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed" States have an absolute obligation to uphold the right to life, the freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right not to be tried under retrospective law, and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Most of these human rights are not upheld in Pakistan today. 'Amnesty 1981 Report on Pakistan, p. 3). [as published]

ii) "The powers of Pakistan's judiciary to protect fundamental human rights had been eroded by previous administrations. However, a series of

constitutional amendments and martial law provisions passed since 1977 and culminating in the March 1981 PCO has virtually ended the long established independence of the judiciary. The jurisdiction of the civilian courts has been restricted to an unprecedented extent by the loss of all powers to review military court proceedings and executive action. Political prisoners in Pakistan are no longer protected by the right to habeas corpus, in contravention of the guarantee in Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The right to habeas corpus protected by an independent judiciary is a basic legal safeguard. Its suspension has in, Amnesty International's experience, often facilitated grave human rights violations (Amnesty 1981 Report on Pakistan p. 3-4)".

iii) Amnesty International has received reports of torture citing both the police and, with increasing frequency, the army. Such complaints have come from all over Pakistan. They include allegations that prisoners have been beaten on the sole of the feet and other parts burned with cigarettes, given electric shocks, suffered serious sensory deprivation and been threatened with execution (Amnesty Report 1981 p. 5).

iv) "In recent years, the torture of women political prisoners, has been reported for the first time. At least 10 prisoners died in custody between January 1980 and August 1981, allegedly as a result of tortures; three were political prisoners. Torture is prohibited in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Right. Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment contains an absolute prohibition of torture" (Amnesty 1981 Report on Pakistan p. 5).

v) Death Due to Torture (Political Prisoners)

(a) "Nazir Abbasi student leader (SNSF) died on 9th August 1980 in military custody in Karachi. Reports from several sources have confirmed that Nazir Abbasi died in military custody as a result of torture (p. 35-36) (Amnesty 1981 Report on Pakistan p. 35)".

(b) Kalu Brahmani a college student and member of the Sind Student Federation, died in Khairpur Nathanshah police station allegedly as a result of torture. He was detained by order of the sub-martial law administrator. Relatives have identified the two police officers they believe are responsible for his death" (Amnesty 1981 Report on Pakistan, p. 36).

(c) Inayat Masih trade union leader and Secretary of the Rawalpindi Municipal Labour Union, is reported to have died in custody in Rawalpindi Hospital on 6th September 1980. Amnesty International cabled President Zia-ul-Haq on 10th October 1980 expressing its deep concern about the allegations that Inayat Masih had died in custody after torture". (Amnesty 1981 Report on Pakistan p. 36).

Sedition?

While we are on the subject of human rights violations in Pakistan it is appropriate to make a brief reference to the concept of sedition which has been resorted to in Pakistan by those in power to suppress their political opponents. Any piece of literature, even barely critical of the regime in power, has been dubbed sedition. The concept of sedition is a left over from the days of medieval despotism. Although its fellow crime 'heresy' met its demise when the church lost secular power, sedition has been retained by the modern state as one of its black laws of repression and right of criticism has all but ousted sedition from the statute books. While democratic states are increasingly reluctant, if not outrightly embarrassed, to invoke sedition against their citizens, repressive regimes have, out of internal weaknesses, always equated criticism with sedition. In 1870 when Syed Ahmad Shaheed's movement was challenging British authority in the North-West of the Indian subcontinent, the British added section 124-A to Indian Penal Code to curb the movement. Later, in 1893 the section was revised and made more stringent and then increasingly invoked to take the lives of our Nationalist heroes or to transport them across the black-waters to Andaman and Nicobar islands. Sedition in a legal sense means creating or attempting to create hatred against a government established by law but it has been held by courts that to be punishable it should be such as to induce violence and that the words of section 124-A were not designed to pander to the wounded ego of a touchy government.

The important question in this connection arises as to when criticism of government ceases to be criticism and becomes seditious. For all criticism of authority is a condemnation and liable to create some negative feelings towards authority. If all speech and writing is to be declared seditious on the basis of attempting to create hatred etc it must be clearly differentiated from criticism in general; moreover the feelings a piece of literature or speech create or excite are not so much a product of its contents as of its times. In fact all literature derives force from its time.

There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come. In this subcontinent, conduct which in 1857 was considered highly seditious and for which suspects were tied to guns and blown to pieces, became proclaimed objective of political parties and a basis of direct action by these parties in the 20th century. The line dividing sedition from criticism has always been an arbitrary decision of authority but during various martial law regimes this line has been totally blurred and any criticism of the government is now likely to attract the wrath of various Martial Law Regulations. This approach towards the concept of sedition is symptomatic of a general spirit of intolerance which characterises our society.

It must be said at this juncture that even civilian politicians have not been very tolerant of their opponents. Frequent resort to Declarations of Emergency and suspension of Fundamental Rights in the newly independent Third World countries with written constitutions has been basically

directed at strengthening the power of the ruling coterie or junta at the expense of its moral and political opposition. We experienced its consequences in Pakistan during rule by civilian politicians. It is high time that all political parties in Pakistan reached a gentleman's agreement regarding an amendment to the constitution with respect to Declaration of Emergency after an elected government assumes power. Soon or later an elected civil government has to take office if this country is to survive and it is, therefore, vital for politicians of different shades of opinion to realise that some amendment which reduces the arbitrary resort to Declaration of Emergency is vital, if citizens of Pakistan are to enjoy Fundamental human rights. In this respect it may be noted that there is such a feeling among the component parties of the MRD and while in prison our fellow prisoners belonging to the former ruling party freely admitted the many political mistakes which they made when they were in office and it was generally resolved that such mistakes should not be committed in future by politicians of any political party. If a larger consensus involving of no parties outside the MRD were to emerge on such issues, it would definitely go a long way in the enforcement of basic human rights in Pakistan.

CSO: 4600/241

SOCIETY'S CULTURAL DEGRADATION ANALYZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 Magazine p 8

[Article by Dr Imdad Hussain: "The Theme of Rottenness"]

[Text] In surveying the contemporary field of manners, morals and integrity in Pakistan the mind of a septuagenarian like the present writer goes back wistfully to the colonial rule under which he grew up and was forty at Partition. The imperial power held on to authority against the wishes of the local population of India, clamouring for self-government and the struggle went on. But to be honest about it, despite clashes, and political discontent day to day life in those days was contented, and orderly. There was still discipline, honesty and fair-play in evidence, what is more, there was almost no bribery and corruption, no profiteering.

This was not because the rulers were angelic but because many of the top men were university men, imbued with knowledge and ideals of fair-play, dedicated to their profession and their country. Besides as in the West honesty was believed to be the best policy. No wonder the British had acquired the reputation of being the best colonists in a bad lot. In saying this one is not justifying colonialism but one should be honest enough to give credit where due, even to one's enemies, and put blame, even on one's friends, where it is deserved.

Quite legitimately, the struggle for self-rule had grown among the politicians and the people and the country was partitioned, with murder arson and loot and mass-migrations, rarely matched in history. Bharat and Pakistan found dearly-bought independence and freedom, and, therefore, must guard it jealously.

But the question is, even 36 years after independence how independent and how free can a penury-stricken, strife-stricken, country like Pakistan be in the global jungle where power-politics is practised on the point of a nuclear war-head? Any of our mighty neighbours can swallow us in a gulp, without a belch.

However, let us not talk of strife, inner and outer and gloomy forebodings. Let us, instead, ponder on consequent human freedom, human independence, for which political changes are only the outer frame-work.

How free and how independent have we been during the last 36 years, on the individual level? That is the question. Real freedom is freedom of the mind and the spirit, the ability to preserve their integrity. A free individual can think his own thoughts and be free, from coercion and bullying of any kind, governmental, social and religious. He acquires the prerogative of God-given freedom of the spirit to make his own choices. He is utterly free to choose for himself, existentially.

But historically speaking, Adam was the first existentialist, who choose wrongly and was banished out of paradise, bequeathing to the human race the awesome responsibility of a life-time of choices, right and wrong, good and evil. And to make matters worse, God also let loose Satan to insidiously tempt man to choose comfort, convenience, compromise, the immediately satisfying, over the ultimate good, which humans, anyhow, find difficult to distinguish in the bewildering mirror-house that life is. So it is the fate of man to roam in the darkness of ignorance, with only the tiny torch of his conscience and the grace of God, to stumble on the right road, the Siratul Mustaqeem. In the process he may have to explore truth in the relevant fields of art, science, philosophy and religion, as well as in the vast and mysterious territory of bitter-sweet human experiences that constitute life. The search is lonely and endless. But let us leave philosophising and come down to what in the English idiom is called brass tacks. What about us in Pakistan? The present government came into power as a result of a coup d'etat but has been able to prolong its stipulated rule of 90 days to six years, ostensibly to set up an Islamic order. And for the attainment of that objective it has been ant-busy in constructing the required infrastructure of Islamic law, Islamic banking, Islamic Scholarship, Islamic education as well as Islamic punishments, like, for example, stoning the woman to death for adultery. These measures are intended to make Pakistan correspond to the pattern of Islam practised during the life of the Holy Prophet and the Khulafah-Rashideen. In the meantime the world has moved on relentlessly. Whether a golden age can be deliverately re-constructed exactly on the pattern valid 1400 years ago, is a debatable point, even among the various schools of Muslim theology, not to speak of the dreamer of Pakistan, Allama Iqbal, with his categorical emphasis on "reconstruction" in terms of modern knowledge the adoption of Ijtehad.

Ironically, this very difficulty and uncertainty about the achievement of their brand of fundamentalist Islam in the modern context, has become a strong point in perpetuation of the present military regime. It came accidentally to power but with shrewd and brilliant after-thought, has now piously dedicated itself to the completion of the holy task it has set itself, no matter how long it takes. If one may be forgiven the profanity of quoting the translation of a Hindi saying "Radha will not dance unless 9 maunds of oil has been collected". Looking from the government angle one can quite understand that it would be cowardly and defeatist on its part to leave such a noble and historic task incomplete. Therefore cannot but admire the tenacity of all those Mujahideen engaged, against historical odds, in a holy, but somewhat protracted, and possibly endless task.

However irreverent towards these lofty aims, it may be one question irrevocably torments certain perceptive minds afflicted by the modern disease of objective assessment. And that is about the net results actually achieved in 6 years on the moral plane. How much piety and holiness have we achieved, qualitatively and quantitatively during the last six years of the regime? Propaganda, subtle and crude, of the apologists and the propaganda-machine of Government media apart, what percentage of Pakistanis are, in fact, more pious, more God-fearing, more compassionate and helpful towards the down-trodden poor sections of their society? Real progress is progress in charity. Do the 'have-not's have even a tithe of what they hoped for after the dawn of freedom 36 years ago? [as published] Who has more and in what proportion to the honest labour put in: Who has, under Govt. patronage and graft, made millions? Are our youth, on whom the future rests, less ignorant, less indolent and dishonest, less given over to malpractices and rat-race ideals then before? Are our business deals, private and governmental clean? In short, is our land a land of the pure or a land of the corrupt?

The crux of the argument is do we not lead, or almost lead, the world in corruption? Yes, corruption, rottenness of the state of Pakistan, that is our theme today, to which I seem to have come, perhaps, in a somewhat round about way.

Much has already been written on this theme and its antecedents. I read the other day that an "Abdur Rab Nishtar Bridge", worth about 70 million rupees in today's money terms was "built" and charged for, but which only existed in the books of the P.W.D.! The Sardar Sahib, along with his family, tried to look for it but, to his surprise, it was just not there! But he was a good man and made no fuss about it. This was nearly 30 years ago when there was still a back-wash of decency left and corruption was the exception rather than the rule. Since then we have made tremendous headway.

We who talk incessantly of "Rizqe Halal" are world's number one practitioners and exporters of the techniques of acquiring ill-gotten money. Many of our best minds are conducting serious research on these 'labour-saving' devices, get-rich-quick practices. Our real gains are made through smuggling and black-marketing. It has been claimed that nearly seventy percent of the heroin sold in the streets of the West goes through Pakistan with the advertisement "Pure heroin from the Land of the Pure"!

Through long practice unbridled corruption has almost become an art and a way of life in Pakistan. You are considered queer and abnormal if you are honest. In fact some types of corruption are no longer even thought of as being reprehensible in any way and are accepted as being part of the natural order of things. We all have to bribe to get a telephone connection, clear a car, or other imported items through customs, settle a tax claim for a lesser amount than that due under law, have a traffic challan squashed, or influence a hundred other categories of bureaucratic decisions. Then there is theft of electricity, evasion of excise duty, sales tax; over-invoicing of imports and under invoicing of exports. As

writers on this subject have pointed out there are large scale embezzlements in National Saving Centres, Khas Deposit Certificates and Price Bond Schemes and other Govt. and Semi-Government Organizations. Our Ministeries and departments, headed by paragons of piety are involved knee-deep in corruption but feign complete innocence. The Majlise-Shoora continues to discourse on the glorious Islamic era they are ushering in with their unctuous rhetoric. It is some such perversion of the human mind, where black becomes white and right becomes wrong, that George Orwell in his fantasy Nineteen Eighty Four had described as "double-think", which, in essence, is accepting two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously. This is what in other words is called having the cake and eating it too. But of George Orwell and the future of mankind, next week, the first Friday of the fateful 1984.

CSO: 4600/241

BRIEFS

BALUCHISTAN GOVERNOR MEETS BUGTI, BIZENJO--Karachi, Dec. 30: Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, Governor of Baluchistan, today visited Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, President of the defunct Pakistan National Party (PNP), and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti at the JPMC and the Mid-East Centre respectively. According to hospital sources, the Governor stayed with Mr. Bizenjo and Mr. Bugti separately for about one hour and inquired about their health and facilities available to them. Mr. Bizenjo is under detention and being treated for some spinal ailment in the Jinnah Hospital for the last fortnight. Mr. Bugti is undergoing treatment for blood clots in the leg at the Mid-East Centre. During Mr. Rahimuddin's separate meetings with Mr. Bizenjo and Mr. Bugti no one was stated to have been present. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 31 Dec 83 p 1]

POLITICAL PRISONERS MOVED--Hyderabad, Dec. 30: About 50 political prisoners have been transferred from district jail Larkana to Central Jail Sukkur and Central Jail Mash (Baluchistan). The political prisoners who have been shifted include 24 of those who were involved in Mirpur Bhutto (Larkana) incident, some leaders of PSF, students of SST and one journalist. They have been shifted as the District jail Larkana had no place to accommodate them. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 31 Dec 83 p 6]

RECLAMATION STUDY TO BE COMPLETED--Islamabad, Dec. 30: Drainage and Reclamation Institute of Pakistan (DRIP) is currently conducting research on tile drainage to explore the possibility of reclaiming the water logged and salt affected areas of the country, which is expected to be completed in January 1984. To achieve the purpose, a pilot project of the tile drainage is being executed in Khairpur East area (Sind). The phase one of the said project will cover an area of 486 hectares. In this regard, the institute has recommended several locally available materials thus saving a handsome amount of foreign exchange.--PPI [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 31 Dec 83 p 7]

SUMMARY MILITARY COURT CONVICTIONS--Hyderabad, Dec 29: The Summary Military Court No. 16 Sanghar, tried three persons in absentia and awarded them one-year rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 50,000 fine each on charges of taking out procession, raising anti-Government slogans and absconding. Summary Military Court No. 19 Hyderabad, awarded one-year R.I. to two

persons under MLR-33 and 44 on charges of gathering at (Suroonagar Chowk, Phulleli) Hyderabad, and raising objectionable slogans against the Government. Further various terms of punishment was pronounced to 23 persons of Hala, on charges of gathering at Market Chowk, Hala. New, on different dates. [as published] Nineteen convicts, according to Divisional Martial Law authorities, Hyderabad, were awarded three months R.I. each, while four convicts would undergo one year R.I. each.--APP. [Text]
[Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 83 p 9]

NEW AIRPORT AT ISLAMABAD--Islamabad, Dec 29: The ground-breaking ceremony of the new international airport, to be built at an estimated cost of Rs 1250 million just five miles away from Ternal in Rawalpindi, facing towards the main Peshawar Road, will begin some time in April, 1984. Disclosing this to newsmen, the Civil Aviation chief, Air Vice-Marshal Khurshid Anwar Mirze, said the new Islamabad airport will have the capacity to handle 2.5 million passengers annually. He said that a French-firm is currently busy surveying and designing the new Rawalpindi-Islamabad airport's design etc. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 30 Dec 83 p 14]

NEW POLITICAL PARTY FORMED--Jhang, Dec. 31: A new political party, the Pakistan Islami Jamhoori Party, has been established. According to a party Press release, a Ghurba convention was held in Chiniot in which the decision to set up a new party was taken. Manzoor Ahmed Bhatti was named convenor of the party. The Press release states that the charter of the party will be announced in Rawalpindi on March 31. It says the party will participate in both provincial and national elections. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Jan 84 p 6]

WORLD BANK LOAN--Lahore, Dec. 31: The World Bank will provide a loan of 100 million dollars to Pakistan for heavy industries which will be available to the industrialists at a debt-equity ratio of 30:70. The minimum loan which an industrialist will be able to draw is one million dollars and the maximum 10 million dollars. These loans will be disbursed through the Pakistan Industrial Credits and Investment Corporation (PICIC), NDFC and Habib Bank. Other nationalised banks are also likely to be inducted in the disbursement process at a later stage. This was disclosed here today by the Chairman, Pakistan Banking Council, M. R. Khan, while exchanging views with the office-bearers of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He said an American expert has been appointed to recommend the projects seeking loans but added that the Pakistan Banking Council would be the final authority to grant loans. The loans will bear an interest rate of 13 per cent, including three per cent risk fee of the foreign exchange. The World Bank will provide another loan of 100 to 200 million dollars exclusively for agricultural purposes. Four projects related with agricultural machinery, energy, minerals and engineering will be examined by the bank in February, he added.--PPI [Text]
[Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Jan 84 p 8]

GHAFFAR KHAN ON AFGHANISTAN--PESHAWAR, Dec. 28--Veteran Khudai Khidmatgar Abdul Ghaffar Khan has reiterated that Pakistan should strictly keep out of what he described as the Super-Powers' conflict in Afghanistan. In a statement issued from the Lady Reading Hospital here this afternoon he recalled that on his return from Afghanistan he had stated that the present situation in that country was in no way a Jihad as was being claimed by the defunct Jamaat-e-Islami and her supporters. But unfortunately his assertion was not accepted and Pakistan continued to involve itself unnecessarily therein although this policy was not in the interests of the country. He therefore stressed that Pakistan must not become a party in this conflict. Meanwhile, official sources in Peshawar have clarified that Badshah Khan who had been under detention since August this year had been freed more than a week back but he had opted to stay on in the hospital for further medical check up and treatment. So far as the government was concerned, these sources said, there were also no restrictions on his visitors. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 6]

LEADER VOWS TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE--PESHAWAR, Dec 28--Provincial Chairman of the Defunct Tehrik-e-Istiqlal Syed Munir Shah has said that the struggle for the restoration of the democratic rights of the people will continue till the achievement of the final goal. In a statement issued in Peshawar today he said that democracy was the birth right of the people of Pakistan and it could not be denied for an indefinite period. No amount of force he added could suppress the will of the masses. Syed Munir Shah paid rich tributes to the people of Sind for their heroic contributions and sacrifices to the cause of democracy and fundamental rights of the people and expressed the hope that these sacrifices would not go waste. He deplored that the people of Sind who had played a major role in the Pakistan Movement had to undergo all kinds of hardships during the struggle for the peoples rights. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 83 p 6]

AFFIDAVITS ON FINALITY OF PROPHETHOOD--ISLAMABAD, Dec. 29--The Federal Government is understood to have decided to keep a complete record of all Qadianis currently employed in Grade 18 and above in the Central Superior Service. A circular letter, along with an affidavit form, has been sent to all the superior officers directing them to declare on oath that they believe in the finality of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and not to subscribe to any idea, philosophy or thinking contrary to this basic concept of Islam.

These officers have been specifically directed to state in unambiguous terms that their faith in the Holy Prophet as the last prophet is complete and they do not in any way believe that there could ever be another prophet or his successor or any messenger of God until Doomsday. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 1]

LOCOMOTIVES FACTORY BY 1987--PESHAWAR, Dec. 29--The Federal Minister for Railways, Abdul Ghafoor Khan of Hoti, has said that the Rs. 1500 million factory for manufacturing locomotives is expected to go into production by the end of 1987. Talking to 'The Muslim' in Mardan this morning, he added that the single shift production capacity of the factory will be 25 locomotives per annum which will be sufficient to meet the domestic requirements. Any additional production, he said, could be for export purposes. The Minister said that the work at the site located between Risalpur and Mardan has begun and Japanese experts were likely to arrive some time next year. In order to thrash out the details, a Pakistani delegation headed by the Minister himself and including two senior Railway officials will be visiting Japan soon. The extent and shape of technical assistance would be determined after this visit. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 6]

MRD OFFICIAL ON PROTEST--PESHAWAR, Dec. 29--The provincial Acting President of the defunct PPP Khan Bahadur Khan has described as totally incorrect the propaganda by the controlled media that the recent movement for the restoration of democracy had failed and said that it will continue till the achievement of its objectives. In a statement issued here today he said that the movement had yielded positive results as people from Karachi to Peshawar had courted arrests in large numbers to protest against the government. Many of the political leaders and workers were still in jails where they had also been maltreated. The movement, he added, had unnerved the authorities to such an extent that they started using abusive language against the MRD and the people. He suggested that the MRD should also be allowed to hold public meetings as was being done by the President and that will prove the popularity of the two sides. He said that instead of making the national, political and constitutional issues a matter of prestige the government would do well to restore 1973 Constitution, hold the elections thereunder and transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. That, he observed, was the only way to pull the country out of the present crisis. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Dec 83 p 6]

CSO: 4600/240

INTERVIEW WITH INDIAN OFFICIAL ON INDO-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS

BK080319 Colombo WEEKEND in English 18 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] India's External Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao, in an exclusive interview with WEEKEND called for increased economic cooperation between Sri Lanka and India.

Some of the important areas, he said, were the textile and hotel sectors, telecommunications, inland fisheries and livestock development.

Shri Rao said that during his recent visit to Sri Lanka, he had told Foreign Minister Shahul Hameed, that the Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission for Economic Trade and Technical Cooperation should be reactivated. He also said he had asked the Sri Lanka government to nominate a minister who would head the commission from the Sri Lankan side.

Here are Shri Rao's answers to questions posed by WEEKEND.

Question: Sri Lanka and India have had very close ties for centuries. But in the field of closer economic cooperation, trade, etc., there appears to be a wider gulf. How does India view this and what are India's views on means to narrow [word indistinct] and redress the imbalance in trade.

Answer: You have rightly stressed the unique nature of the relationship between our two countries; one which has endured for thousands of years. These traditional ties have been reinforced by our common experience of colonial rule and our position today as nonaligned, developing countries.

I do not, however, share your assessment that these close ties are not adequately reflected in the economic sphere. India is Sri Lanka's eighth largest trading partner. The balance of trade which has traditionally been in favour of India has come down over the years as a result of the steps taken by us to increase imports from Sri Lanka.

We are, for instance, giving preferential treatment for imports of cloves from Sri Lanka and have also offered on several occasions to purchase rubber. To give you some idea in 1979-80 India had a trade surplus of about 900,000 Indian rupees in its trade with Sri Lanka. By 1981-82 this was virtually halved and came down to about 500,000 Indian rupees.

India has extended several rupee credits to Sri Lanka since 1966 even though we are not really an aid-giving country. So far 13 credits have been extended totalling 756 million Indian rupees. The latest credit, signed in January 1981 was for 100 million rupees. We have also extended export credits under various finance schemes as well as technical and economic assistance under the ITEC [International Technical and Economic Cooperation] programme.

The main areas in which assistance has been provided are in the supply of mechanical equipment, training facilities in fields such as engineering, agriculture and banking and the provision of Indian experts.

There is considerable scope for economic cooperation between India and Sri Lanka. Some of the important areas of cooperation are the textile and hotel sectors, telecommunications, inland fisheries and livestock development. I hope these ties will expand further in the years to come.

Question: Do you feel that Joint Committees at the highest government level to review and keep check on cooperation in various fields will help? In the past (during Premier Dudley Senanayake's time) such a committee did exist and made substantial progress.

Answer: An Indo-Sri Lankan Committee on Economic Cooperation was set up on June 19, 1968. The name of the committee was later changed to the Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation.

This commission has, unfortunately, not met as frequently as it should have. During my recent visit to Sri Lanka I emphasised that the commission should be reactivated and also requested the Sri Lankan Government to nominate a minister who would hear the commission from the Sri Lankan side. On our side the commission is headed by the foreign minister.

Question: After the recent ethnic disturbances, there have been apprehensions in some quarters in Sri Lanka of a possible invasion by Indian forces. In the absence of any positive assertion by Indian leaders these fears appear to be gaining. Would you comment?

Answer: I do not know what you mean by "the absence of any positive assertion" by Indian leaders. My prime minister has categorically stated that India stands for the unity of Sri Lanka and does not condone terrorism or resort to violence of any kind.

Question: We understand that the government of Sri Lanka has made available to your government details of terrorist training in Indian territory. Since Sri Lanka has accepted Indian good offices to resolve Tamil problems as a constructive effort, how do you view this. Should not India dissuade them from using her territory?

Answer: We have apprised the Government of Sri Lanka that there is no question of any training being imparted in Indian territory. As I mentioned earlier, however, about 24,000 Tamils have come to India in the last few months. Many more are reported to have come clandestinely.

Priority must, therefore, be given to the creation of conditions which would restore a sense of security among the Tamil minority so that they do not come to India. I can do no better than to quote your president who expressed the hope that if an acceptable political solution is found "violent activity or support for it would wither away."

Question: In a statement to the Lok Sabha soon after the Sri Lankan riots, you mentioned that there was reason to believe that Sri Lanka had requested foreign military assistance. Was India requested for any such assistance? What would be India's reaction if others had been asked for assistance?

Answer: There were reports that Sri Lanka had requested assistance from foreign governments and I informed Parliament that according to our information there was substance in these reports. I also stated that we were opposed to any outside interference.

Question: There are fears in some political quarters in Sri Lanka that India is portraying itself. If as a supporter of one community (Tamil). [as published] Would you comment?

Answer: India considers itself a friend of Sri Lanka and not a proponent of any particular community in that country. Since what is being sought, however, is a solution to the problem of the Sri Lankan Tamils, India has tried to convey their feelings and aspirations to the Sri Lankan Government just as we have sought to convey to the Tamil leadership the concerns expressed by Sri Lankan Government leaders.

A lasting solution is possible only if it is willingly accepted by all communities in Sri Lanka.

Question: Does India consider the problem of 'stateless persons of Indian origin' in Sri Lanka as over. Is it India's position that Sri Lanka should confer citizenship on those whose status is not yet determined. Have you discussed this matter during your talks with Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Shahul Hameed, recently?

Answer: The Indo-Sri Lankan agreement of 1964 and 1974 on stateless persons of Indian origin came to an end on October 30, 1981 when the 17-year period specified for their implementation expired. President Jayewardene has assured us that he will take steps to grant Sri Lankan citizenship to all those who remain stateless.

Question: Has India's offer of good offices to resolve Tamil problems affected New Delhi's bilateral relations with Colombo?

Answer: I do not think that this has affected our bilateral relations.

Question: Is there a likelihood of Special Envoy G. Parthasarathy, visiting Colombo in the coming week to continue his dialogue to help bring about a settlement?

Answer: Our good offices continue to be available to the Sri Lankan Government, including the visit of the special Envoy.

TWO NEW PORTS PLANNED

Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 20 Dec 83 p 19

[Text]

COLOMBO—Sri Lanka fears getting choked by its own success at the Colombo water front.

Having established Colombo as a major transshipment centre and the first in the region to handle a large volume of containerised cargo ahead of expert's schedules, the Government has begun to plan a massive development project for its two other major ports Trincomalee in the north east and Galle in the south to ease Colombo of its increasing burden of cargo.

Colombo baffled experts who had predicted 100,000 containers as transshipment cargo for the port by the year 1988-89 by handling that amount in 1982. The Sri Lanka Port Authority is confident of hitting a target of 300,000 containers by the year 1988-89.

Motivated by an open economy and a generous offer of financial assistance from the government of Japan, the Colombo port has already acquired a reputation for being a highly efficient and organised port in South Asia.

But if more world shipping lines want its use Colombo might be in trouble because of its physical inadequacies such as the dearth of back-up area and the highly congested town just outside it. The port of Colombo virtually grew with a town on its back and comparatively with harbours in the region is narrow in land extent.

The port's earlier 600 acres of water area is now 590 after a portion was reclaimed for the construction of its second container terminal. Its land area is only 175 acres as against Trincomalee's 2,500 acres and is smaller than the Singapore port.

The stage one of the Colombo port development programme with Japanese assistance is scheduled to be completed by September 1985 but the experts might be proved wrong. The Japanese government has now committed to commence stage two immediately after the completion of stage one without any interruption. Stage one will cost Rs. 1,000 million (40 million dollars) the foreign exchange component met by the Japanese government and local expenses from the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).

The Government has estimated that stage two will cost around Rs. 1200 million (48 million dollars). Alongside the Japanese-aided programme is another massive undertaking—the construction of a drydocks costing 55 million dollars.

Equipment brought by the SLPA for its development programmes exceeds Rs. 1,000 million (40 million dollars). The Authority hopes to spend Rs. 4,000 million (160 million dollars) in the next three to four years on the Colombo Port programme. This equals the cost of building one dam for Sri Lanka's gigantic development project—the Mahaweli diversion scheme.

Sri Lanka's Shipping Minister Lalith Athulathmudali says: "Our objective is not only to service Sri Lanka but to make Colombo port to serve the entire South Asia, from the western part of the Arabian Sea to the east of Bengal and from the African part of Asia to South East and West Asia. We seek to serve better and more efficiently than the customers seek to have."